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Update VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md
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@@ -97,21 +97,43 @@ Should the Gigacage be bypassed or its base address leaked, this vulnerability e
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## 6. Remediation Recommendations
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We recommend the immediate implementation of **Checked Arithmetic** in the following components:
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### 6.1 Implementation of Checked Arithmetic
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The root cause—an integer overflow during memory offset calculation—must be addressed by implementing checked arithmetic within the JavaScriptCore runtime. We recommend replacing standard multiplication with compiler-intrinsic overflow checks to ensure that any `byteOffset` exceeding the 32-bit boundary is caught before memory access is attempted.
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**Target Components:**
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- `Source/JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSArrayBufferView.cpp`
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- `Source/JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSDataView.cpp`
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**Proposed Fix:**
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Utilize compiler intrinsics to detect overflows during offset calculation:
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**Proposed Fix (C++):**
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```cpp
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// Utilize compiler intrinsics to detect 32-bit overflows
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size_t byteOffset;
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if (__builtin_mul_overflow(static_cast<size_t>(index), m_elementSize, &byteOffset)) {
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return throwOverflowError(); // Prevent execution from reaching the Gigacage
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}
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// Ensure the end-of-range does not wrap
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size_t endOffset;
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if (__builtin_add_overflow(byteOffset, m_elementSize, &endOffset)) {
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return throwOverflowError();
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}
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```
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### 6.2 Technical Justification from Crash Telemetry
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The necessity of this fix is confirmed by the provided crash logs (Incidents 50371BD6 and F8D6F487). The telemetry data reveals:
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- **Hardware-Level Enforcement:** The current reliance on the Gigacage (Namespace 31) results in an `EXC_GUARD` violation. While effective at preventing RCE, this is a "fail-safe" rather than a primary validation, leading to a persistent Denial of Service.
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- **Consistent Failure Point:** The identical crash frame at `0x22DB0E96C` across both MobileSafari and SafariViewService indicates the flaw is centrally located within the shared WebKit binary (`uuid: af25fa78...`).
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- **Systemic Vulnerability:** The presence of the same exception in SafariViewService confirms that the vulnerability affects all third-party applications utilizing `WKWebView` on iOS 26.2.
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### 6.3 JIT Compiler Hardening
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In addition to runtime checks, the WebAssembly JIT compiler must be updated to ensure that 32-bit integer arithmetic (`i32`) does not elide bounds checks when calculating effective addresses. The compiler should emit explicit check-and-branch instructions where an `i32.add` could result in a wrapped offset that bypasses standard bounds-checking logic.
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---
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## 7. Supporting Evidence
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@@ -124,10 +146,9 @@ if (__builtin_mul_overflow(static_cast<size_t>(index), m_elementSize, &byteOffse
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All logs demonstrate an identical crash offset (`0xADD7476C`) and namespace 31 violation, confirming 100% reproducibility across various process roles.
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---
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# End of Report
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---
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- **Primary Contact:** Joseph Goydish II
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