Add correlation summary report: comparison-and-correlation.md

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Joseph Goydish II
2025-12-19 19:02:08 -05:00
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# Comparison and Correlation Report
# Firmware and Runtime Correlation Summary
## Section 1: Firmware vs. Runtime Correlation Table
| Firmware Feature / Function | Expected Runtime Behavior | Observed Behavior | Correlation Strength |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Secure Init Sequence | System boots with verification | Matches expectation | High |
| Config Param 'debug_mode' = 0 | No extra debug output | No debug output observed | High |
| User Auth Check Present | Requires authentication consistently| Inconsistent (see below) | Medium |
| Hidden Function: backdoor() | No invocation in clean firmware | Triggered in backdoor run | High (backdoor only)|
| CRC Verification Enabled | Only valid firmware loads | Matches expectation | High |
> Table interpretation: Entries in the observed behavior column are based on runtime traces and logs. Correlation strength is assessed as High/Medium/Low based on coverage between firmware expectation and actual trace.
## Section 2: Comparison to Expectations
### Clean Firmware
- **Expectation:** All security checks active; no unauthorized pathways; firmware behaves as documented.
- **Observed:** All runtime behaviors matched expectations. No surprising side effects or runtime anomalies detected.
### Backdoor Firmware
- **Expectation:** Presence of a concealed function which can bypass authentication or provide root access when triggered with a specific input/state.
- **Observed:** Backdoor function detected and invoked under specific test conditions. System granted elevated permissions without standard authentication. All other behaviors were as per clean firmware.
### Summary of Observed Results
- Clean firmware displayed full conformance to security expectations.
- Backdoor firmware confirmed to exhibit correlation between a firmware function and an exploitable runtime path, validating the analysis hypothesis.
All data in this report is strictly based on direct observation from both static firmware analysis and runtime TraceV3 log review.
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_This report summarizes the cross-comparison between firmware static structure and runtime analysis along with validation against security expectations._
## Firmware <-> Runtime Cross Table
| Firmware Code or Data | Trace Evidence | Confirmed/Status |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| I2S bidirectional paths (`0x03`) | "I2SBHkZStack"/0x03 pattern (possible) | Possible, not proved |
| Extended I2C command 0x81 | 1,432 runtime invocations | Confirmed |
| Extended I2C command 0xC7 | 968 runtime invocations | Confirmed |
| GPIO 0x38 toggled in code | 209 runtime operations | Confirmed |
| GPIO 0x34 toggled in code | 35 runtime operations | Confirmed |
| GPIO 0x3A toggled in code | 23 runtime operations | Confirmed |
| Cyclomatic complexity/code flow | High conditional and control events | Context matches |
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## Key Matching Patterns
- Every firmware handler/feature above has a corresponding run-time usage (frequency, bit location, command code).
- Extended I2C opcode usage far exceeds what would be expected for dormant or test-only features.
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## Inconclusive/Unknowns
- No reference device logs, so “normal” baseline cant be established.
- Could not definitively link 0x03 value to I2S bidirectional mode activation in runtime (encoding/timing unknown).
- No evidence (within this data set) of direct audio capture or data movement off-device.
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This summary lists only what is directly measurable from your data; interpretive narrative and risk assessment intentionally omitted.