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公明
131 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
131 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Hardening
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[中文](../zh-CN/security-hardening.md)
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This checklist covers pre-production and continuous hardening for CyberStrikeAI.
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## Before Going Live
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- Change `auth.password` to a long random secret.
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- Use HTTPS or a trusted reverse proxy.
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- Restrict access by IP, VPN, or bastion.
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- Enable `audit.enabled`.
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- Set `c2.enabled: false` when C2 is not required.
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- Do not expose standalone HTTP MCP without strong auth and network isolation.
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- Connect only trusted external MCP services.
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- Back up `config.yaml`, `data/`, and custom resource directories.
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## Reverse Proxy Baseline
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```nginx
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client_max_body_size 200m;
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proxy_buffering off;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
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proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
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proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
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```
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Recommended security headers:
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```nginx
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
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add_header Referrer-Policy no-referrer;
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add_header X-Frame-Options DENY;
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```
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## HITL Allowlist Baseline
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Minimal allowlist:
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```yaml
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hitl:
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tool_whitelist:
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- read_file
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- glob
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- grep
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- tool_search
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```
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Do not globally allowlist:
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- `execute`;
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- WebShell write/execute tools;
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- C2 task/payload tools;
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- high-risk external MCP tools;
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- delete, write, upload, persistence tools.
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## File Permissions
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```bash
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chmod 600 config.yaml
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chmod 700 data
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```
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Run under a dedicated OS user. Avoid root unless explicitly required.
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## External MCP Review
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Before connecting:
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- Can it execute commands?
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- Can it read/write local files?
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- Does it send data to third parties?
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- Does it authenticate?
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- Can output contain untrusted model/web content?
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- Should it run in a container or separate user?
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After connecting:
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- keep high-risk tools out of allowlist;
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- review tool list changes;
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- audit config changes.
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## C2 and WebShell
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C2:
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- disabled by default;
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- enabled only during authorized window;
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- listener ports separated from admin UI;
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- cleanup payloads, sessions, tasks, and events.
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WebShell:
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- authorized targets only;
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- clear naming;
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- write/delete/execute requires approval;
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- delete connections after project end.
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## Retention
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Suggested:
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- audit: 30-90 days;
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- monitor: 90-180 days;
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- uploads: clean after project;
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- C2/WebShell outputs: keep only report evidence;
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- knowledge base: no real credentials or customer secrets.
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## Periodic Review
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Weekly:
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- failed logins and unusual IPs;
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- config changes;
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- external MCP changes;
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- long-running tools;
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- unexpected C2 enablement;
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- stale WebShell connections;
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- disk and DB size.
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Project closeout:
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- clean temp workspaces;
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- delete unnecessary uploads;
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- archive evidence;
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- delete stale WebShell/C2 resources;
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- export audit records.
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