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v3.4.1: harness intelligence — router, ReAct, dedup, token-trim, configurable MCP, +54 code agents, credits
- Task-based model ROUTER (recon/select prefer a fast model; exploit prefers primary; validate uses a different model than the finder) - ReAct doctrine injected into exploit prompts (Thought→Action→Observation, token-efficient) - Dedup: unique agents per run + findings deduped by CWE/endpoint/title (highest confidence kept) - Token economy: recon blob capped for selector + per-agent context - Configurable MCP: merge user mcp.servers.json into the pipeline's .mcp.json - +54 white-box/code-analysis agents (NoSQLi, LDAP/XPath, JWT-none, Java/.NET/PHP/Go/Node/Python specifics, SSTI, ReDoS, deserialization, etc.) → 303 agents total (78 code) - Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders (CLI banner, interactive header, HTML+Typst report) - README: GitHub stars/forks badges, 60-second quick start, full API config steps, intuitive layout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
CyberSecurityUP
@@ -1,10 +1,27 @@
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# NeuroSploit v3.4.1 🦀
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<h1 align="center">NeuroSploit v3.4.1 🦀</h1>
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<p align="center">
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<a href="https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&color=8b5cf6" alt="Stars"></a>
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<a href="https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/network/members"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/forks/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&color=a855f7" alt="Forks"></a>
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<a href="https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/issues"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit?style=for-the-badge&color=22d3ee" alt="Issues"></a>
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit?style=for-the-badge&color=34d399" alt="Last commit">
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</p>
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<p align="center">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Version-3.4.1-blue?style=flat-square">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Harness-Rust%20%7C%20tokio-e6b673?style=flat-square">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-green?style=flat-square">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/MD%20Agents-303-red?style=flat-square">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Models-12%20providers-success?style=flat-square">
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<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Auth-API%20key%20%7C%20Subscription-orange?style=flat-square">
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</p>
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<p align="center"><b>Autonomous, multi-model penetration-testing harness — Rust, CLI-only.</b><br>
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<i>by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders</i></p>
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> ⭐ If this is useful, **star the repo** — it helps a lot.
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---
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**Autonomous, multi-model penetration-testing harness — Rust, CLI-only.**
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@@ -20,6 +37,23 @@ discovered surface**, runs them in parallel, then validates every finding by
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---
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## ⚡ Quick start (60 seconds)
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```bash
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# 1. build
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cd neurosploit-rs && cargo build --release
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# 2. easiest path — just run it, the wizard asks everything:
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./target/release/neurosploit
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# 3. or one-liner (subscription login, no API key needed):
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./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
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```
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No login? Use an **API key** instead — see [Authentication](#authentication--run-via-api-key-or-subscription).
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---
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## Build
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```bash
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@@ -181,13 +215,13 @@ Every run writes a self-contained folder `runs/ns-<ts>-<target>/`:
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A reinforcement-learning reward store (`data/rl_state_rs.json`) biases agent
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selection on future runs.
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## Agent library — `agents_md/` (249)
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## Agent library — `agents_md/` (303)
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| Category | Count | Purpose |
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|----------|-------|---------|
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| `vulns/` | 196 | Exploit a specific vulnerability class |
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| `recon/` | 12 | Information gathering / attack surface |
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| `code/` | 24 | White-box source-code (SAST) review |
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| `code/` | 78 | White-box source-code (SAST) review |
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| `meta/` | 17 | Orchestrator, validator, scorers, reporter, RL |
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Each agent is a self-contained markdown playbook (`## User Prompt` methodology +
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@@ -202,6 +236,10 @@ For **authorized** testing only. Agents are instructed to stay in scope, never r
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destructive/DoS actions, and require proof-of-exploitation. You are responsible for
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having permission for any target.
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## Credits
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**Joas A Santos** & **Red Team Leaders**.
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## License
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MIT.
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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# Source Committed-Secret Reviewer Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for secrets committed to the repository in the source code.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
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- Keys/tokens/passwords in source, configs, .env, history
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- High-entropy literals on credential-named vars
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### 2. Trace dataflow
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
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- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
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### 3. Confirm exploitability
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- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
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- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Source Committed-Secret Reviewer at [file:line]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-540
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- Endpoint: [file:line]
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- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
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- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
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- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
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- Impact: Credential compromise
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- Remediation: Remove and rotate; use a vault; scan in CI
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in secrets committed to the repository. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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# Source CORS-with-Credentials Reviewer Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for permissive CORS with credentials in the source code.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
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- Reflecting Origin + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`
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- Wildcard origin with cookies
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### 2. Trace dataflow
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
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- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
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### 3. Confirm exploitability
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- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
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- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Source CORS-with-Credentials Reviewer at [file:line]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-942
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- Endpoint: [file:line]
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- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
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- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
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- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
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- Impact: Cross-origin data theft
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- Remediation: Strict origin allowlist; never reflect with creds
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in permissive CORS with credentials. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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# Source CSRF-Disabled Reviewer Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for CSRF protection disabled in the source code.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
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- `@csrf_exempt`, `csrf: false`, protection globally off
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- State-changing routes without tokens
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### 2. Trace dataflow
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
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- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
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### 3. Confirm exploitability
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- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
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- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Source CSRF-Disabled Reviewer at [file:line]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-352
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- Endpoint: [file:line]
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- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
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- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
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- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
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- Impact: Unauthorized state-changing actions
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- Remediation: Enable anti-CSRF tokens / SameSite
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in CSRF protection disabled. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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# Source Debug-Mode Reviewer Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for debug mode enabled in production in the source code.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
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- `DEBUG=True`, `app.debug=True`, verbose error pages
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- Stack traces / interactive debuggers exposed
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### 2. Trace dataflow
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
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- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
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### 3. Confirm exploitability
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- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
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- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Source Debug-Mode Reviewer at [file:line]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-489
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- Endpoint: [file:line]
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- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
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- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
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- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
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- Impact: Info disclosure, possible RCE (e.g. Werkzeug console)
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- Remediation: Disable debug in production; generic errors
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in debug mode enabled in production. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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# Source DOM XSS Sink Reviewer Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for client-side DOM XSS in the source code.
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|
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
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- `innerHTML`, `document.write`, `eval`, `location` from user-controlled `location`/`postMessage`
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- jQuery `.html()` with tainted data
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### 2. Trace dataflow
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
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- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
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|
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### 3. Confirm exploitability
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- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
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- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
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|
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### 4. Report Format
|
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Source DOM XSS Sink Reviewer at [file:line]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [file:line]
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- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
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- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
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- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
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- Impact: Client-side code execution
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- Remediation: Use textContent/safe APIs; sanitize; CSP
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```
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## System Prompt
|
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You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in client-side DOM XSS. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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# Source .NET Deserialization Reviewer Agent
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|
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## User Prompt
|
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You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for unsafe .NET deserialization in the source code.
|
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|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
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{recon_json}
|
||||
|
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The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
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|
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**METHODOLOGY:**
|
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|
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### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
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- `BinaryFormatter`/`LosFormatter`/`NetDataContractSerializer` on input
|
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- TypeNameHandling.All in JSON.NET
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|
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### 2. Trace dataflow
|
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- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
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- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
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FINDING:
|
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- Title: Source .NET Deserialization Reviewer at [file:line]
|
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- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Avoid insecure formatters; restrict types
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
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## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in unsafe .NET deserialization. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source .NET SQLi Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for SQL injection in ADO.NET/EF in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- String-concatenated `SqlCommand`/`FromSqlRaw`
|
||||
- Interpolated SQL with request data
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source .NET SQLi Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-89
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Database compromise
|
||||
- Remediation: Use parameters / FromSqlInterpolated
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in SQL injection in ADO.NET/EF. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source JS eval/Function Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for dynamic code execution in JS in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `eval`, `new Function`, `setTimeout(string)` on user input
|
||||
- Dynamic `require`/`import` of user names
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source JS eval/Function Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-95
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: RCE / arbitrary JS execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Remove dynamic eval; use safe dispatch
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in dynamic code execution in JS. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Insecure File Permissions Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for insecure file/dir permissions in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `chmod 0777`, world-writable paths, umask 0
|
||||
- Secrets written with broad permissions
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Insecure File Permissions Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-732
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Local tampering/disclosure
|
||||
- Remediation: Least-privilege permissions; restrict secrets
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in insecure file/dir permissions. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Go Command-Exec Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Go command injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `exec.Command("sh","-c", userInput)`
|
||||
- Shell strings built from request data
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Go Command-Exec Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-78
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Pass arg slices; avoid shell
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Go command injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Go SSRF Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Go server-side request forgery in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `http.Get`/`http.NewRequest` with user URL
|
||||
- No host allowlist; follows redirects
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Go SSRF Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-918
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Internal access, metadata theft
|
||||
- Remediation: Allowlist hosts; block internal ranges
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Go server-side request forgery. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source GraphQL Complexity Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for missing GraphQL depth/complexity limits in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- No depth/complexity/cost limit on resolvers
|
||||
- Introspection + nested queries unrestricted
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source GraphQL Complexity Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-770
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: DoS via expensive queries
|
||||
- Remediation: Add depth/cost limits; disable prod introspection
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in missing GraphQL depth/complexity limits. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source GraphQL Introspection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for introspection enabled in production in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Introspection not disabled in prod config
|
||||
- Schema fully exposed to clients
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source GraphQL Introspection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Low
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-200
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Schema disclosure aiding attacks
|
||||
- Remediation: Disable introspection in production
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in introspection enabled in production. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Hardcoded Crypto Key Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for hardcoded cryptographic keys/IVs in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Symmetric keys / IVs / salts as string literals
|
||||
- Keys committed in config/source
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Hardcoded Crypto Key Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-321
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Decryption/forgery of protected data
|
||||
- Remediation: Load keys from a secrets manager; rotate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in hardcoded cryptographic keys/IVs. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source HTTP Header Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for response header/CRLF injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input written to response headers without stripping CR/LF
|
||||
- Set-Cookie/Location built from input
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source HTTP Header Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-113
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Response splitting, cache poisoning
|
||||
- Remediation: Strip CR/LF; use safe header APIs
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in response header/CRLF injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source IDOR Ownership Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for missing object ownership checks in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- DB lookup by `req.id` without scoping to current user
|
||||
- No tenant/owner filter on fetch/update
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source IDOR Ownership Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-639
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Cross-account data access
|
||||
- Remediation: Enforce per-object ownership in queries
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in missing object ownership checks. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Insecure Cookie Flags Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for missing cookie security flags in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Cookies set without Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite
|
||||
- Session cookies readable by JS
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Insecure Cookie Flags Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-614
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Session theft via XSS/MITM
|
||||
- Remediation: Set Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite on sensitive cookies
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in missing cookie security flags. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Insecure Token Randomness Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for predictable security tokens in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `Math.random`/`rand`/`random` for tokens, OTPs, session ids
|
||||
- Time-seeded RNG for secrets
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Insecure Token Randomness Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-330
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Token/session prediction
|
||||
- Remediation: Use a CSPRNG (secrets, crypto.randomBytes)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in predictable security tokens. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source TLS Verification Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for disabled TLS certificate verification in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `verify=False`, `rejectUnauthorized:false`, `InsecureSkipVerify:true`
|
||||
- Custom trust-all cert handlers
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source TLS Verification Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-295
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: MITM, credential interception
|
||||
- Remediation: Verify certificates; pin where appropriate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in disabled TLS certificate verification. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Java Deserialization Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for unsafe Java deserialization in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `ObjectInputStream.readObject` on untrusted data
|
||||
- Gadget-prone libraries on the classpath
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Java Deserialization Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Avoid native deserialization; allowlist classes
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in unsafe Java deserialization. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source JWT alg=none Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for JWT 'none'/unverified algorithm acceptance in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `algorithms` not pinned; `verify=False`; accepting `none`
|
||||
- decode without signature verification
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source JWT alg=none Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-347
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Token forgery, auth bypass
|
||||
- Remediation: Pin algorithm allowlist; always verify signature
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in JWT 'none'/unverified algorithm acceptance. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source LDAP Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for LDAP injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input concatenated into LDAP filters `(uid=...)`
|
||||
- No escaping of `*()\` in filter components
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source LDAP Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-90
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Auth bypass, directory disclosure
|
||||
- Remediation: Escape LDAP metacharacters; use safe filter builders
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in LDAP injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Rails Mass-Assignment Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for mass assignment / strong-params bypass in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `permit!`, `params.permit(...)` missing, `update(params[:x])`
|
||||
- Binding whole params to models
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Rails Mass-Assignment Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-915
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Privilege escalation via hidden attributes
|
||||
- Remediation: Strong parameters allowlist; explicit fields
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in mass assignment / strong-params bypass. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Function-Level Authorization Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for missing function-level authorization in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Sensitive routes/handlers lacking auth/role checks
|
||||
- Admin actions reachable without verification
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Function-Level Authorization Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-862
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Privilege escalation
|
||||
- Remediation: Enforce server-side authorization on every sensitive action
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in missing function-level authorization. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Missing Rate-Limit Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for absent rate limiting on sensitive endpoints in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Login/OTP/reset endpoints without throttling
|
||||
- No lockout/backoff on auth attempts
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Missing Rate-Limit Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-307
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Brute force, credential stuffing
|
||||
- Remediation: Add per-identity rate limits + lockout
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in absent rate limiting on sensitive endpoints. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Node child_process Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Node.js command injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `child_process.exec`/`execSync` with user input
|
||||
- Template/concatenated shell commands
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Node child_process Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-78
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Use execFile/spawn with arg arrays
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Node.js command injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Node Path-Traversal Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Node.js path traversal in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `fs.readFile(path.join(base, req.param))` without normalize
|
||||
- `res.sendFile` with user path
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Node Path-Traversal Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-22
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Arbitrary file read
|
||||
- Remediation: Resolve+confine to base; reject `..`
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Node.js path traversal. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source NoSQL Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for NoSQL injection (Mongo/etc.) in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input in query objects: `{$where: ...}`, `$gt`/`$ne` operators from request
|
||||
- find/aggregate built from req body without casting
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source NoSQL Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-943
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Auth bypass, data exfiltration
|
||||
- Remediation: Cast/validate types; use parameterized query builders
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in NoSQL injection (Mongo/etc.). Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Open Redirect Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for open redirect in code in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `redirect(request.param)` without allowlist
|
||||
- `res.redirect(req.query.url)`
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Open Redirect Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-601
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Phishing, OAuth token theft
|
||||
- Remediation: Allowlist destinations; relative paths only
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in open redirect in code. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source ORM Raw-Query Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for unsafe raw ORM queries in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Django `.raw()`/`.extra()`, SQLAlchemy `text()` with interpolation
|
||||
- Knex/Sequelize raw with template strings
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source ORM Raw-Query Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-89
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: SQL injection via ORM
|
||||
- Remediation: Bind parameters even in raw queries
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in unsafe raw ORM queries. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source PHP assert/eval Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for PHP code injection via assert/eval/preg_replace-e in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `eval`, `assert`, `preg_replace('/e')`, `create_function` on input
|
||||
- Dynamic callbacks from request data
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source PHP assert/eval Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-95
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Remove dynamic eval; static dispatch
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in PHP code injection via assert/eval/preg_replace-e. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source PHP File-Inclusion Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for PHP LFI/RFI via include in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `include`/`require` with user input
|
||||
- `allow_url_include`; unfiltered path params
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source PHP File-Inclusion Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-98
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: LFI/RFI to RCE
|
||||
- Remediation: Allowlist includable files; disable url include
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in PHP LFI/RFI via include. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source PHP Type-Juggling Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for loose-comparison auth flaws in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `==` comparing secrets/hashes (`0e...` magic hashes)
|
||||
- strcmp misuse returning null
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source PHP Type-Juggling Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-697
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Authentication bypass
|
||||
- Remediation: Use strict `===` / hash_equals
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in loose-comparison auth flaws. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source PHP Unserialize Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for PHP object injection via unserialize in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `unserialize($_GET/_POST/cookie)`
|
||||
- Magic methods (__wakeup/__destruct) gadgets present
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source PHP Unserialize Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Object injection to RCE
|
||||
- Remediation: Use json_decode; allowed_classes=false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in PHP object injection via unserialize. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Prototype Pollution Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for JS prototype pollution in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Recursive merge/clone of user JSON into objects
|
||||
- Keys `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` not filtered
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Prototype Pollution Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-1321
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: RCE/DoS/logic bypass via gadgets
|
||||
- Remediation: Use null-proto objects; block dangerous keys; Object.freeze
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in JS prototype pollution. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Flask Debug/SSTI Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Flask debug console / render_template_string in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `app.run(debug=True)` in prod; Werkzeug PIN reachable
|
||||
- `render_template_string(user)`
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Flask Debug/SSTI Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-94
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: RCE via debugger/SSTI
|
||||
- Remediation: Disable debug; never template user input
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Flask debug console / render_template_string. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Python Pickle Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Python pickle deserialization in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `pickle.loads`/`cPickle` on untrusted data
|
||||
- Pickled cookies/params/files
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Python Pickle Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Avoid pickle on untrusted data; sign/JSON
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Python pickle deserialization. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Python subprocess(shell) Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for Python command injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `subprocess(..., shell=True)`, `os.system`, `os.popen` with input
|
||||
- Shell string concatenation
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Python subprocess(shell) Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-78
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Use arg lists; shell=False; validate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in Python command injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Python YAML Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for unsafe yaml.load in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `yaml.load(data)` without SafeLoader
|
||||
- Loading untrusted YAML with full loader
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Python YAML Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Use yaml.safe_load
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in unsafe yaml.load. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source React dangerouslySetInnerHTML Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for DOM XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}`
|
||||
- Unsanitized HTML rendered in React
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source React dangerouslySetInnerHTML Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-79
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Stored/reflected XSS
|
||||
- Remediation: Sanitize with DOMPurify or avoid raw HTML
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in DOM XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source ReDoS Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for catastrophic-backtracking regex in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Nested quantifiers `(a+)+`, `(.*)*` on user input
|
||||
- Regex validating untrusted strings
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source ReDoS Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-1333
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: CPU exhaustion / DoS
|
||||
- Remediation: Use linear-time engines (RE2); bound input
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in catastrophic-backtracking regex. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Session Fixation Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for session fixation in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Session id not regenerated after login
|
||||
- Accepting session id from URL/param
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Session Fixation Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-384
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Account hijacking
|
||||
- Remediation: Regenerate session on auth state change
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in session fixation. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Spring EL Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for SpEL expression injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input into `SpelExpressionParser.parseExpression`
|
||||
- `@Value`/`#{}` evaluated on tainted data
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Spring EL Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-917
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Never evaluate user input as SpEL
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in SpEL expression injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source SQL Format-String Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for SQL injection via format strings in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `cursor.execute(f"...{x}...")`, `% `/`.format()`/`+` into SQL
|
||||
- Template-built queries with request data
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source SQL Format-String Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-89
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Database compromise
|
||||
- Remediation: Use parameter binding / placeholders
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in SQL injection via format strings. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Webhook SSRF Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for SSRF via user-defined webhooks/callbacks in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User-provided webhook/callback URLs fetched server-side
|
||||
- No allowlist; internal ranges reachable
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Webhook SSRF Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-918
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Internal network access, metadata theft
|
||||
- Remediation: Allowlist + block internal ranges; no redirects
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in SSRF via user-defined webhooks/callbacks. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Server-Side Template Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for SSTI in server templates in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input concatenated into template source then rendered
|
||||
- Jinja/Twig/Freemarker/Velocity dynamic templates
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Server-Side Template Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-1336
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Never render user input as templates; sandbox
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in SSTI in server templates. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source TOCTOU/Race Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for time-of-check/time-of-use & race conditions in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Check-then-act on files/balances without locking
|
||||
- Non-atomic read-modify-write on shared state
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source TOCTOU/Race Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Medium
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-367
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Privilege/state corruption, double-spend
|
||||
- Remediation: Atomic ops/locks/transactions
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in time-of-check/time-of-use & race conditions. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Upload Content-Type Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for insecure file-upload validation in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Trusting client Content-Type/extension only
|
||||
- Executable upload dirs; user-controlled names
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Upload Content-Type Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-434
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Webshell upload, RCE
|
||||
- Remediation: Validate magic bytes; random names; non-exec storage
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in insecure file-upload validation. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Weak JWT Secret Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for weak/guessable JWT signing secret in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Short/dictionary HS256 secret in source/config
|
||||
- Default 'secret'/'changeme' keys
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Weak JWT Secret Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-326
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Token forgery
|
||||
- Remediation: Use long random secrets / RS256; rotate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in weak/guessable JWT signing secret. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Weak Password Hashing Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for weak password hashing in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- MD5/SHA1/SHA256 (unsalted) used for passwords
|
||||
- No bcrypt/argon2/scrypt; no per-user salt
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Weak Password Hashing Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-916
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Mass credential cracking on breach
|
||||
- Remediation: Use bcrypt/argon2id with salt
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in weak password hashing. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source XPath Injection Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for XPath injection in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- User input concatenated into XPath expressions
|
||||
- `selectNodes`/`evaluate` with string interpolation
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source XPath Injection Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-643
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Auth bypass, XML data extraction
|
||||
- Remediation: Parameterize XPath; validate input
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in XPath injection. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source XStream Deserialization Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for unsafe XStream/XML deserialization in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `XStream.fromXML` on untrusted XML without allowlist
|
||||
- Default permissive type permissions
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source XStream Deserialization Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: Critical
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-502
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Remote code execution
|
||||
- Remediation: Configure strict type permissions/allowlist
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in unsafe XStream/XML deserialization. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source XXE (parser config) Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for XXE via permissive XML parser config in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- `resolve_entities=True`, `no_network=False`, DTD loading enabled
|
||||
- Default-config XML parsers on untrusted input
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source XXE (parser config) Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-611
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: File disclosure, SSRF
|
||||
- Remediation: Disable DTD/external entities; harden parser
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in XXE via permissive XML parser config. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
# Source Zip Slip Reviewer Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## User Prompt
|
||||
You are reviewing the source code of **{target}** for path traversal during archive extraction in the source code.
|
||||
|
||||
**Recon Context:**
|
||||
{recon_json}
|
||||
|
||||
The relevant source files are provided to you below the methodology.
|
||||
|
||||
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Locate sources & sinks
|
||||
- Extracting archive entry names without normalization
|
||||
- `os.path.join(dest, entry.name)` with `../`
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Trace dataflow
|
||||
- Trace untrusted input from its source to the dangerous sink
|
||||
- Confirm the path is reachable and lacks effective sanitization/validation
|
||||
- Use grep/ripgrep across the provided files to find every call site
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Confirm exploitability
|
||||
- Quote the exact vulnerable lines (file:line)
|
||||
- Give a concrete exploit/PoC and explain why existing controls fail
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. Report Format
|
||||
For each CONFIRMED finding:
|
||||
```
|
||||
FINDING:
|
||||
- Title: Source Zip Slip Reviewer at [file:line]
|
||||
- Severity: High
|
||||
- CWE: CWE-22
|
||||
- Endpoint: [file:line]
|
||||
- Vector: [tainted source → sink]
|
||||
- Payload: [PoC / vulnerable code snippet]
|
||||
- Evidence: [exact code quoted]
|
||||
- Impact: Arbitrary file write, RCE
|
||||
- Remediation: Canonicalize and confine extracted paths
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## System Prompt
|
||||
You are a white-box source reviewer specialized in path traversal during archive extraction. Report ONLY issues you can prove in the PROVIDED code by quoting exact vulnerable lines (file:line) with a reachable dataflow from untrusted input. Reject sanitized, unreachable, dead, or hypothetical code. If the snippet is insufficient to confirm, say so instead of guessing. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
|
||||
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ async fn run_engagement(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, whitebox: bo
|
||||
cfg.rl_path = Some(base.join("data").join("rl_state_rs.json").display().to_string());
|
||||
write_status(&workdir, "running", &format!("\"target\":{:?}", cfg.target));
|
||||
|
||||
println!(" ┌─ NeuroSploit v3.4.1");
|
||||
println!(" ┌─ NeuroSploit v3.4.1 · by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders");
|
||||
println!(" │ run id : {run_id}");
|
||||
println!(" │ target : {}", cfg.target);
|
||||
println!(" │ models : {}", cfg.models.join(", "));
|
||||
@@ -186,13 +186,19 @@ async fn run_engagement(base: &Path, mut cfg: RunConfig, mcp: bool, whitebox: bo
|
||||
let providers: Vec<String> = cfg.models.iter().map(|m| ModelRef::parse(m).provider).collect();
|
||||
if providers.iter().any(|p| harness::mcp_supported(p)) {
|
||||
match harness::ensure_playwright_mcp() {
|
||||
Ok(()) => match harness::write_mcp_config(&workdir) {
|
||||
Ok(()) => {
|
||||
// Optional user-supplied extra MCP servers merged into the pipeline.
|
||||
let extra = base.join("mcp.servers.json");
|
||||
let extra_ref = if extra.is_file() { Some(extra.as_path()) } else { None };
|
||||
match harness::write_mcp_config(&workdir, extra_ref) {
|
||||
Ok(p) => {
|
||||
if extra_ref.is_some() { println!(" [*] merged extra MCP servers from mcp.servers.json"); }
|
||||
println!(" [*] Playwright MCP ready → {}", p.display());
|
||||
Some(p.display().to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => { eprintln!(" [!] MCP config failed: {e}"); None }
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => { eprintln!(" [!] Playwright MCP unavailable ({e}); using built-in tools"); None }
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@@ -272,6 +278,7 @@ async fn interactive(base: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<Cmd> {
|
||||
let backends = harness::installed_cli_backends();
|
||||
println!("\n ┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐");
|
||||
println!(" │ NeuroSploit v3.4.1 — interactive │");
|
||||
println!(" │ by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders │");
|
||||
println!(" └────────────────────────────────────────────┘");
|
||||
println!(" agents: {} · detected CLI logins: {}\n",
|
||||
lib.total(), if backends.is_empty() { "none".into() } else { backends.join(", ") });
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ pub use models::{
|
||||
};
|
||||
pub use pipeline::{run_whitebox, RunOutput};
|
||||
pub use pipeline::run;
|
||||
pub use pool::ModelPool;
|
||||
pub use pool::{ModelPool, Task};
|
||||
pub use types::{Finding, RunConfig};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -265,17 +265,31 @@ pub fn ensure_playwright_mcp() -> Result<()> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Write a Playwright `.mcp.json` into `dir` and return its path, so the agentic
|
||||
/// CLI can drive a real browser (DOM/JS/network/screenshots) during execution.
|
||||
pub fn write_mcp_config(dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
||||
/// Write an `.mcp.json` into `dir` (Playwright by default) and return its path,
|
||||
/// so the agentic CLI can drive a real browser during execution. If
|
||||
/// `extra_servers` points at a JSON file shaped like `{ "mcpServers": {...} }`
|
||||
/// (or just `{...}` of servers), those servers are MERGED in — letting users
|
||||
/// plug additional MCP tools into the pipeline to potentiate testing.
|
||||
pub fn write_mcp_config(dir: &std::path::Path, extra_servers: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> std::io::Result<std::path::PathBuf> {
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
|
||||
let mut servers = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"playwright": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@playwright/mcp@latest", "--headless", "--isolated"] }
|
||||
});
|
||||
if let Some(extra) = extra_servers {
|
||||
if let Ok(txt) = std::fs::read_to_string(extra) {
|
||||
if let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&txt) {
|
||||
let add = v.get("mcpServers").cloned().unwrap_or(v);
|
||||
if let (Some(dst), Some(src)) = (servers.as_object_mut(), add.as_object()) {
|
||||
for (k, val) in src {
|
||||
dst.insert(k.clone(), val.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let cfg = serde_json::json!({ "mcpServers": servers });
|
||||
let path = dir.join(".mcp.json");
|
||||
let cfg = r#"{
|
||||
"mcpServers": {
|
||||
"playwright": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@playwright/mcp@latest", "--headless", "--isolated"] }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}"#;
|
||||
std::fs::write(&path, cfg)?;
|
||||
std::fs::write(&path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&cfg).unwrap_or_default())?;
|
||||
Ok(path)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
use crate::agents::{Agent, Library};
|
||||
use crate::pool::ModelPool;
|
||||
use crate::pool::{ModelPool, Task};
|
||||
use crate::rl::{severity_reward, RlState};
|
||||
use crate::types::{Finding, RunConfig};
|
||||
use crate::report;
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ fn tool_doctrine(mcp_on: bool) -> String {
|
||||
const VOTE_SYS: &str = "You are an adversarial security validator. Decide if the candidate finding is a REAL, reproducible, exploitable vulnerability with proof. Reply with JSON {\"verdict\":\"confirmed\"|\"rejected\",\"reason\":\"...\"}. Default to rejected when uncertain.";
|
||||
const CODE_VOTE_SYS: &str = "You are an adversarial source-code reviewer. Decide if the reported issue is a REAL vulnerability in the provided code (reachable, exploitable, not a false positive). Reply JSON {\"verdict\":\"confirmed\"|\"rejected\",\"reason\":\"...\"}.";
|
||||
|
||||
/// ReAct loop directive: make the agent reason → act with a tool → observe →
|
||||
/// iterate, instead of one-shot guessing. Keeps it grounded in real evidence.
|
||||
const REACT_DOCTRINE: &str = "METHOD (ReAct): work in explicit Thought → Action → Observation cycles. \
|
||||
Each Action runs ONE concrete tool command (e.g. a curl request); read its real Observation before the next Thought. \
|
||||
Base every claim on an actual observed response — never assume. Stop when you've either proven an issue or exhausted reasonable checks. Be token-efficient: no filler, no repetition.\n\n";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Black-box web engagement: recon → parallel exploit → N-model vote → report.
|
||||
pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<String>) -> RunOutput {
|
||||
let _ = tx
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +69,7 @@ pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<Str
|
||||
"{}".to_string()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let recon_user = format!("{}Target: {}", tool_doctrine(pool.mcp_config.is_some()), cfg.target);
|
||||
match pool.complete(RECON_SYS, &recon_user).await {
|
||||
match pool.complete_routed(Task::Recon, RECON_SYS, &recon_user).await {
|
||||
Ok((m, t)) => {
|
||||
let _ = tx.send(format!("recon complete via {}", m.label())).await;
|
||||
if cfg.verbose {
|
||||
@@ -109,6 +115,11 @@ pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<Str
|
||||
let _ = tx.send("selection empty — using recon-keyword heuristic".into()).await;
|
||||
heuristic_select(&ranked, &recon, cap)
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Dedup: never run the same agent twice in one engagement.
|
||||
let selected: Vec<Agent> = {
|
||||
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
|
||||
selected.into_iter().filter(|a| seen.insert(a.name.clone())).collect()
|
||||
};
|
||||
let _ = tx
|
||||
.send(format!("intelligently selected {} agent(s) matching recon: {}", selected.len(),
|
||||
selected.iter().map(|a| a.name.clone()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", ")))
|
||||
@@ -118,26 +129,29 @@ pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<Str
|
||||
let target = cfg.target.clone();
|
||||
let verbose = cfg.verbose;
|
||||
let mcp_on = pool.mcp_config.is_some();
|
||||
// Token economy: each agent gets a capped recon context, not the full blob.
|
||||
let recon_ctx: String = recon.chars().take(3500).collect();
|
||||
let raw: Vec<(String, String, Vec<Finding>)> = stream::iter(selected.iter().cloned())
|
||||
.map(|ag| {
|
||||
let target = target.clone();
|
||||
let recon = recon.clone();
|
||||
let recon = recon_ctx.clone();
|
||||
let txc = tx.clone();
|
||||
async move {
|
||||
let user = format!(
|
||||
"AUTHORIZED engagement — you have explicit permission to test {target}. \
|
||||
Do not ask for confirmation — proceed and PROVE each issue.\n\n\
|
||||
{doctrine}{body}\n\nWhen done, reply with ONLY a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be empty []). \
|
||||
Each item: {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. \
|
||||
`evidence` must contain the concrete proof (request/response excerpt).",
|
||||
target = target,
|
||||
doctrine = tool_doctrine(mcp_on),
|
||||
body = ag.user.replace("{target}", &target).replace("{recon_json}", &recon),
|
||||
);
|
||||
if verbose {
|
||||
let _ = txc.send(format!(" ▶ launching agent: {} ({})", ag.name, ag.title.replace(" Agent", ""))).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
match pool.complete(&ag.system, &user).await {
|
||||
let user = format!(
|
||||
"AUTHORIZED engagement — you have explicit permission to test {target}. \
|
||||
Do not ask for confirmation — proceed and PROVE each issue.\n\n\
|
||||
{react}{doctrine}{body}\n\nWhen done, reply with ONLY a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be empty []). \
|
||||
Each item: {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. \
|
||||
`evidence` must contain the concrete proof (request/response excerpt).",
|
||||
target = target,
|
||||
react = REACT_DOCTRINE,
|
||||
doctrine = tool_doctrine(mcp_on),
|
||||
body = ag.user.replace("{target}", &target).replace("{recon_json}", &recon),
|
||||
);
|
||||
match pool.complete_routed(Task::Exploit, &ag.system, &user).await {
|
||||
Ok((m, text)) => {
|
||||
let f = extract_findings(&text, &ag.name);
|
||||
let _ = txc.send(format!("exploit {} via {} → {} candidate(s)", ag.name, m.label(), f.len())).await;
|
||||
@@ -155,8 +169,8 @@ pub async fn run(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: Sender<Str
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript = transcript_of(&raw);
|
||||
let candidates: Vec<Finding> = raw.iter().flat_map(|(_, _, f)| f.clone()).collect();
|
||||
let _ = tx.send(format!("{} candidate finding(s) — validating by {}-model vote", candidates.len(), cfg.vote_n)).await;
|
||||
let candidates = dedup_findings(raw.iter().flat_map(|(_, _, f)| f.clone()).collect());
|
||||
let _ = tx.send(format!("{} candidate finding(s) (deduped) — validating by {}-model vote", candidates.len(), cfg.vote_n)).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// ---- 4. Validate by N-model voting ---------------------------------
|
||||
let findings = validate(candidates, pool, VOTE_SYS, cfg.vote_n, &tx).await;
|
||||
@@ -217,8 +231,8 @@ pub async fn run_whitebox(cfg: RunConfig, lib: &Library, pool: &ModelPool, tx: S
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript = transcript_of(&raw);
|
||||
let candidates: Vec<Finding> = raw.iter().flat_map(|(_, _, f)| f.clone()).collect();
|
||||
let _ = tx.send(format!("{} candidate finding(s) — validating", candidates.len())).await;
|
||||
let candidates = dedup_findings(raw.iter().flat_map(|(_, _, f)| f.clone()).collect());
|
||||
let _ = tx.send(format!("{} candidate finding(s) (deduped) — validating", candidates.len())).await;
|
||||
let findings = validate(candidates, pool, CODE_VOTE_SYS, cfg.vote_n, &tx).await;
|
||||
finish(cfg, lib, "{}".into(), transcript, findings, selected, &mut rl, tx).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -235,8 +249,10 @@ async fn select_agents(pool: &ModelPool, recon: &str, catalog: &[Agent], tx: &Se
|
||||
.map(|a| format!("{} — {} [{}]", a.name, a.title.replace(" Agent", ""), a.cwe))
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
.join("\n");
|
||||
let user = format!("RECON:\n{recon}\n\nAGENT CATALOG (name — title [cwe]):\n{list}\n\nReturn a JSON array of agent names to run.");
|
||||
match pool.complete(SELECT_SYS, &user).await {
|
||||
// Token economy: cap the recon blob fed to the selector.
|
||||
let recon_trim: String = recon.chars().take(3000).collect();
|
||||
let user = format!("RECON:\n{recon_trim}\n\nAGENT CATALOG (name — title [cwe]):\n{list}\n\nReturn a JSON array of agent names to run.");
|
||||
match pool.complete_routed(Task::Select, SELECT_SYS, &user).await {
|
||||
Ok((m, text)) => {
|
||||
let names = parse_string_array(&text);
|
||||
if names.is_empty() {
|
||||
@@ -522,6 +538,20 @@ fn conf(v: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> f64 {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Drop duplicate findings (same CWE + endpoint + lowercased title) that
|
||||
/// different agents/models may each report, keeping the highest-confidence one.
|
||||
fn dedup_findings(mut v: Vec<Finding>) -> Vec<Finding> {
|
||||
v.sort_by(|a, b| b.confidence.partial_cmp(&a.confidence).unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal));
|
||||
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
|
||||
v.into_iter()
|
||||
.filter(|f| {
|
||||
let key = format!("{}|{}|{}", f.cwe.to_lowercase(), f.endpoint.to_lowercase(),
|
||||
f.title.to_lowercase().chars().take(40).collect::<String>());
|
||||
seen.insert(key)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn norm_sev(s: &str) -> String {
|
||||
match s.to_lowercase().as_str() {
|
||||
x if x.starts_with("crit") => "Critical",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,22 @@ use anyhow::{anyhow, Result};
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use tokio::sync::Semaphore;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Task type used by the model router to pick the best model for the step.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum Task {
|
||||
Recon,
|
||||
Select,
|
||||
Exploit,
|
||||
Validate,
|
||||
Default,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Heuristic: is this a fast/cheap model id (good for recon/triage)?
|
||||
fn is_fast(model: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
let m = model.to_lowercase();
|
||||
["haiku", "flash", "fast", "mini", "lite", "chat", "small"].iter().any(|k| m.contains(k))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A pool of candidate models with a global concurrency cap and provider
|
||||
/// failover. The same panel of models is reused for validator voting.
|
||||
///
|
||||
@@ -73,9 +89,17 @@ impl ModelPool {
|
||||
/// Complete a prompt, trying each candidate model until one succeeds.
|
||||
/// Returns the model that answered and its text.
|
||||
pub async fn complete(&self, system: &str, user: &str) -> Result<(ModelRef, String)> {
|
||||
self.complete_routed(Task::Default, system, user).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Router-aware completion: reorder the candidate panel by task before the
|
||||
/// failover loop. Recon/triage prefer a fast/cheap model to save tokens and
|
||||
/// latency; exploitation prefers the strongest (primary) model.
|
||||
pub async fn complete_routed(&self, task: Task, system: &str, user: &str) -> Result<(ModelRef, String)> {
|
||||
let _permit = self.sem.acquire().await.expect("semaphore closed");
|
||||
let order = self.route(task);
|
||||
let mut last = anyhow!("no candidate models");
|
||||
for m in &self.candidates {
|
||||
for m in &order {
|
||||
match self.one(m, system, user).await {
|
||||
Ok(text) => return Ok((m.clone(), text)),
|
||||
Err(e) => last = e,
|
||||
@@ -84,6 +108,25 @@ impl ModelPool {
|
||||
Err(last)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Reorder candidates for a task. With a single-model panel this is a no-op.
|
||||
pub fn route(&self, task: Task) -> Vec<ModelRef> {
|
||||
let mut order = self.candidates.clone();
|
||||
if order.len() < 2 {
|
||||
return order;
|
||||
}
|
||||
match task {
|
||||
// Prefer a fast/cheap model for recon & selection.
|
||||
Task::Recon | Task::Select => {
|
||||
order.sort_by_key(|m| !is_fast(&m.model)); // fast first
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Strongest (panel order = primary first) for exploitation.
|
||||
Task::Exploit | Task::Default => {}
|
||||
// Validation handled by vote() rotation (different model than finder).
|
||||
Task::Validate => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
order
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Ask up to `n` distinct models the same yes/no validation question and
|
||||
/// return (confirmations, total_votes). A model answering "yes"/"confirmed"
|
||||
/// counts as a confirmation. Used to cut false positives.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ pub fn html(target: &str, findings: &[Finding]) -> String {
|
||||
<h1><span class=b>NeuroSploit</span> Penetration Test Report</h1>\
|
||||
<div class=meta>Target: <b>{t}</b> · v3.4.1 Rust harness · multi-model validated</div>\
|
||||
<div>{chips}</div><h2>Findings ({n})</h2>{body}\
|
||||
<p class=meta>Authorized testing only. Findings confirmed by multi-model adversarial voting.</p></body></html>",
|
||||
<p class=meta>Authorized testing only. Findings confirmed by multi-model adversarial voting.<br>NeuroSploit v3.4.1 · by <b>Joas A Santos</b> & <b>Red Team Leaders</b></p></body></html>",
|
||||
t = esc(target), chips = chips, n = sorted.len(), body = body,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
|
||||
#text(13pt)[Target: #strong(meta.target)]
|
||||
#v(4pt)
|
||||
#text(10pt, fill: gray)[Run #meta.run_id · #meta.generated · models: #meta.model]
|
||||
#v(8pt)
|
||||
#text(9pt, fill: gray)[by #strong[Joas A Santos] & #strong[Red Team Leaders]]
|
||||
]
|
||||
#pagebreak()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user