v3.5.2 — Exploitation Depth & Report Hygiene

Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at "exposed"
instead of "exploited". Pure-additive, back-compatible.

Behavior (injected into black/grey/chain exploit prompts via DEPTH_DOCTRINE):
- Exposed → exploited: any info-disclosure / exposed service/WSDL / leaked
  credential|token / reachable dev host MUST be used before it's a finding;
  otherwise it's a lead, not a confirmed High/Critical.
- Chain across modules: reuse obtained session/JWT/cookie/credential and pivot
  to IDOR/privesc/exfil; report the chain, not isolated parts.
- Decode & fingerprint → CVE; audit tokens (alg-confusion/none/kid/JWKS, weak
  HS256 secret cracking, lifecycle).

Deterministic post-pass (new crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs, wired into finish()):
- calibrate severity to PROVEN impact — unproven High/Critical (hedged, no
  payload, thin evidence) capped to Medium and re-titled "(potential)";
- depth_audit — flag exposures on a host with no real exploit;
- hygiene_summary — advise consolidating hygiene classes repeated across assets.
Unit tests cover calibration + depth audit.

5 new doctrine meta-agents (scripts/build_methodology_v352.py → agents_md/meta/):
exploit_depth_doctrine, finding_chainer, artifact_decoder, token_auditor,
report_calibrator (meta 17→22, total 343→348).

Version bumped 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 across crates/app/installers/docs; RELEASE/README
updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/meta/exploit_depth_doctrine.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Exploitation Depth Doctrine Agent
+
+> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Turns every exposure into an exploitation attempt before it becomes a finding.
+
+## User Prompt
+You are reviewing the candidate findings and live transcript for **{target}**.
+
+For EACH candidate that merely *exposes* something (information disclosure,
+exposed service/catalog/WSDL, leaked credential or token, reachable dev/staging
+host, permissive CORS, open .git), drive it one step further BEFORE it is
+reported:
+
+1. **Use what was exposed.** Call the exposed endpoint, decode the leaked
+   artifact, log in with the leaked credential, hit the dev host, send the
+   cross-origin request. Capture the real request/response.
+2. **Decide honestly.** If using it proved impact → keep/raise severity with the
+   new evidence. If it could not be used → down-rate to a LEAD (low confidence),
+   never a confirmed High/Critical.
+3. **Report the gap.** List any exposure you could not yet exploit, with the
+   exact next command to try, so the next round (or the human) can finish it.
+
+Output JSON: {"escalations":[{id, action_taken, new_evidence, new_severity}],
+"leads":[{id, why_not_proven, next_command}]}.
+
+## System Prompt
+You are a senior exploitation lead. Detection is not a finding — impact is. You
+never let an info-disclosure, exposed service, leaked secret or reachable
+non-prod host be reported as confirmed without an attempt to actually use it,
+backed by a real tool receipt. Unproven impact is a lead, not a High. Authorized
+engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.