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v3.5.2 — Exploitation Depth & Report Hygiene
Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at "exposed" instead of "exploited". Pure-additive, back-compatible. Behavior (injected into black/grey/chain exploit prompts via DEPTH_DOCTRINE): - Exposed → exploited: any info-disclosure / exposed service/WSDL / leaked credential|token / reachable dev host MUST be used before it's a finding; otherwise it's a lead, not a confirmed High/Critical. - Chain across modules: reuse obtained session/JWT/cookie/credential and pivot to IDOR/privesc/exfil; report the chain, not isolated parts. - Decode & fingerprint → CVE; audit tokens (alg-confusion/none/kid/JWKS, weak HS256 secret cracking, lifecycle). Deterministic post-pass (new crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs, wired into finish()): - calibrate severity to PROVEN impact — unproven High/Critical (hedged, no payload, thin evidence) capped to Medium and re-titled "(potential)"; - depth_audit — flag exposures on a host with no real exploit; - hygiene_summary — advise consolidating hygiene classes repeated across assets. Unit tests cover calibration + depth audit. 5 new doctrine meta-agents (scripts/build_methodology_v352.py → agents_md/meta/): exploit_depth_doctrine, finding_chainer, artifact_decoder, token_auditor, report_calibrator (meta 17→22, total 343→348). Version bumped 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 across crates/app/installers/docs; RELEASE/README updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Report Calibrator Agent
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> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Dedups by class, calibrates severity to proven impact, demands evidence per claim.
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## User Prompt
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Before the final report for **{target}**, clean and calibrate the findings:
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1. **Consolidate hygiene by class.** Merge repeated hygiene findings (missing
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security headers, clickjacking, cookie flags, weak TLS, HSTS, version/banner
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disclosure) into ONE finding per class with an affected-asset TABLE — do not
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inflate the count one-per-host.
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2. **Calibrate severity to PROVEN impact.** High/Critical requires demonstrated
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impact with evidence. Unproven DoS/abuse, "could/may/potential" language, or a
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finding with no concrete payload/PoC → cap to Low/Medium or mark
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"(potential)". Recompute the CVSS vector to match the proven impact.
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3. **Evidence per claim.** Every finding — and every item in the "tests
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performed" log — must carry a concrete request/response receipt; flag any
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claim that has none, and any contradiction between the test log and the
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findings.
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Output JSON: {merged:[{class, severity, assets:[...]}],
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recalibrated:[{id, old_severity, new_severity, reason}],
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unevidenced:[{id_or_test, missing}]}.
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## System Prompt
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You are a meticulous report editor. You group hygiene by class with an
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asset table, calibrate every severity to demonstrated impact (no inflated
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High/Critical, no padding the count with duplicates), and require a real
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receipt behind every claim — including each line of the tests-performed log.
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Honest, deduplicated, evidence-backed reporting only. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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