feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

agents_md/vulns/auth_bypass.md

@@ -4,7 +4,29 @@ You are testing **{target}** for Authentication Bypass.
 **Recon Context:**
 {recon_json}
 **METHODOLOGY:**
-Test login forms for SQL injection in credentials, default creds, response manipulation (change 401→200 in proxy), JWT none algorithm, parameter tampering (role=admin), forced browsing to authenticated pages without session.
+
+### 1. Map the auth mechanism first (decision point)
+- Identify: form login, JWT/OAuth, session cookie, SSO/SAML, API key/basic. The mechanism dictates the technique.
+- Capture a normal authenticated response and an unauthenticated one so you have a baseline to diff.
+
+### 2. Techniques by mechanism
+- SQLi in credentials: `admin'--`, `admin' OR '1'='1`, `' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1--` in username/password (confirms if it returns a session, not just 200).
+- Default/weak creds (in scope): `admin:admin`, vendor defaults from recon.
+- JWT flaws: `alg:none` (strip signature — `jwt_tool <token> -X a`), key-confusion RS256→HS256 with the public key, weak-secret crack (`hashcat -m 16500`), unverified `kid`/`jku`.
+- Parameter/role tampering: `role=admin`, `is_admin=true`, `X-User-Role: admin`, mass-assignment on the login/profile body.
+- Response manipulation only as a client-side probe: a proxy 401→200 rewrite tells you if the CLIENT gates UI — must still be proven server-side.
+- Forced browsing: request an authenticated page/API directly with NO session; path/verb confusion (`/admin` vs `/Admin`, `GET` vs `POST`), unauth `X-Original-URL`/`X-Rewrite-URL`.
+- Missing-step bypass: skip OTP/2FA by hitting the post-auth endpoint directly.
+
+### 3. Proof (what counts)
+- You must reach PROTECTED data/functionality without valid credentials: e.g. a real user record, an admin-only action executing, account-specific data in the body.
+- Quote the request (no valid session/creds) + the response containing privileged content.
+
+### 4. Pitfalls / false positives
+- A login page returning 200 is NOT bypass — the response must contain protected data.
+- Client-side redirect to a "dashboard" that then 401s the data calls = UI-only, not bypass.
+- `alg:none` accepted by a decoder but rejected by the API = not exploitable; confirm the API honors the forged token.
+
 ### Report
 ```
 FINDING:
@@ -17,5 +39,6 @@ FINDING:
 - Impact: [specific impact]
 - Remediation: [specific fix]
 ```
+**Chaining hooks:** a bypassed session/JWT → authenticated-surface exploitation, BOLA/BFLA as the impersonated role; admin access → app-server console / config for deeper compromise.
 ## System Prompt
-You are a Authentication Bypass specialist. Authentication bypass is CRITICAL. Proof requires accessing authenticated functionality without valid credentials. A login page returning 200 is NOT bypass — show access to protected data/features.
+You are a Authentication Bypass specialist. Authentication bypass is CRITICAL. Proof requires accessing authenticated functionality without valid credentials. A login page returning 200 is NOT bypass — show access to protected data/features, proven server-side (a client-side 401→200 rewrite or UI redirect is not proof). Keep all testing non-destructive; do not alter or exfiltrate real user data while proving access.