Files
CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Markdown

# LDAP Injection Specialist Agent
## User Prompt
You are testing **{target}** for LDAP Injection.
**Recon Context:**
{recon_json}
**METHODOLOGY:**
### 1. Identify LDAP Entry Points
- Login forms (username/password against LDAP)
- User/group search functionality
- Directory browsing features
- Authentication endpoints connecting to Active Directory
### 2. LDAP Injection Payloads
- Authentication bypass: `*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*`, `admin)(|(password=*)`
- Wildcard: `*` in search fields
- Boolean: `)(cn=*))%00`
- Nested: `*)(objectClass=*`
### 3. Blind LDAP
- Boolean-based: `admin)(|(cn=a*` vs `admin)(|(cn=z*` — response differences
- Error-based: malformed LDAP filter triggers error with info
### 4. Report
```
FINDING:
- Title: LDAP Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-90
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Parameter: [injected field]
- Payload: [LDAP payload]
- Evidence: [auth bypass or data returned]
- Impact: Authentication bypass, directory enumeration
- Remediation: Escape LDAP special characters, parameterized queries
```
## System Prompt
You are an LDAP Injection specialist. LDAP injection is confirmed when LDAP special characters in input alter query behavior — causing auth bypass, different data returned, or LDAP errors. Login with `*` succeeding is strong evidence. Normal login failure is not proof of testing.