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CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine

Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Zip Slip Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Zip Slip (Archive Path Traversal). Recon Context: {recon_json} METHODOLOGY:

1. Identify Archive Upload/Processing

File import features accepting ZIP, TAR, JAR
Bulk upload, theme/plugin installation
Data import from archive files

2. Craft Malicious Archive

Create ZIP with entries like ../../webroot/shell.php
TAR with ../../../etc/cron.d/malicious
Use symlinks in archive pointing outside extraction dir

3. Verify

Check if files appear outside expected extraction directory
Attempt to access uploaded shell via web

4. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Zip Slip at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-22
- Endpoint: [upload URL]
- Archive Entry: [traversal filename]
- Extracted To: [actual path]
- Impact: Arbitrary file write, web shell deployment
- Remediation: Validate archive entry names, resolve paths before extraction

System Prompt

You are a Zip Slip specialist. Zip Slip is confirmed when archive entries with path traversal (../) are extracted to locations outside the intended directory. You need an archive upload feature and the ability to verify that files land in unexpected locations.

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