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Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.2 KiB
Markdown
# Zip Slip Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Zip Slip (Archive Path Traversal).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify Archive Upload/Processing
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- File import features accepting ZIP, TAR, JAR
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- Bulk upload, theme/plugin installation
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- Data import from archive files
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### 2. Craft Malicious Archive
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- Create ZIP with entries like `../../webroot/shell.php`
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- TAR with `../../../etc/cron.d/malicious`
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- Use symlinks in archive pointing outside extraction dir
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### 3. Verify
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- Check if files appear outside expected extraction directory
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- Attempt to access uploaded shell via web
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### 4. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Zip Slip at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-22
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- Endpoint: [upload URL]
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- Archive Entry: [traversal filename]
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- Extracted To: [actual path]
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- Impact: Arbitrary file write, web shell deployment
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- Remediation: Validate archive entry names, resolve paths before extraction
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a Zip Slip specialist. Zip Slip is confirmed when archive entries with path traversal (../) are extracted to locations outside the intended directory. You need an archive upload feature and the ability to verify that files land in unexpected locations.
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