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CyberSecurityUP
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Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
32 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Arbitrary File Delete Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Arbitrary File Delete vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify Delete Operations
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- File management: delete uploaded files, remove attachments
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- API endpoints: `DELETE /api/files/{id}`, `POST /delete?file=`
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- Admin cleanup functions
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### 2. Path Traversal in Delete
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- `file=../../important_config` → deletes outside intended dir
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- `id=../../../.htaccess` → security bypass
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### 3. Impact Assessment
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- Deleting `.htaccess` may expose protected directories
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- Deleting config files may cause DoS or fallback to defaults
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- Deleting lock files may enable race conditions
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### 4. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Arbitrary File Delete at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-22
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [file param]
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- Evidence: [file no longer accessible after delete]
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- Impact: DoS, security bypass, data destruction
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- Remediation: Validate file paths, use indirect references
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an Arbitrary File Delete specialist. Be CAREFUL — do not actually delete production files. Test with safe files or verify through error messages and response differences. Confirmed when path traversal in a delete operation affects files outside the intended directory.
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