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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
# Exposed .git Repository Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Exposed .git directory enabling source/secret recovery.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Detect served git internals
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- Request `/.git/HEAD` (expect `ref: refs/heads/...`), `/.git/config`, `/.git/logs/HEAD`, `/.git/index`. A real git file (not the SPA index / soft-404) confirms exposure.
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- Also probe sibling VCS/metadata: `/.svn/entries`, `/.hg/`, `/.bzr/`, `/.git/refs/`. Tools: `curl -s https://{target}/.git/HEAD`, `nuclei -t http/exposures/configs/git-config.yaml`.
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- DECISION: directory listing ON (`/.git/` browsable) -> trivial recursive dump; listing OFF -> reconstruct from objects (git-dumper walks refs/packs/objects without listing).
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### 2. Dump & reconstruct
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- `git-dumper https://{target}/.git/ ./out` (or `GitTools/Dumper.sh`). Falls back to reading `.git/index`, packed-refs, and `objects/` blobs to rebuild the tree.
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- Then locally: `cd out && git log --oneline -20`, `git checkout .`, `git stash list`. Recover history even if the working files were "removed" in a later commit.
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### 3. Confirm & mine
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- Show recovered source (a file:content proving it's the app's real code) and search ALL history for secrets: `git log -p | grep -Ei 'password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|AKIA|-----BEGIN|DB_|_URL='`, `truffleHog`/`gitleaks` over the dumped repo.
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- Secrets often live in DELETED commits, `.env` committed early, or config files — check `git log --all --full-history`.
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### 4. Proof & pitfalls
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- PROOF: the raw `/.git/HEAD` (or config) bytes proving it's served, PLUS a recovered source snippet or a masked secret from history. Version-based inference is not enough.
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- FALSE-POSITIVES: `403`/`404` on `/.git/HEAD`, or a 200 returning the SPA index / a custom error (check content, not status). A `.git` that only yields an empty/placeholder repo is exposure without loot — grade lower.
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- WAF may serve `/.git/config` but block `/.git/objects/*` — note partial exposure.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Recovered secrets -> the matching agent: cloud keys -> cloud-metadata/IAM; DB creds/`DATABASE_URL` -> DB access; `APP_KEY`/signing keys -> cookie/JWT forgery -> ATO (`chains_from`).
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- Full source -> whitebox review for injection/authz sinks; internal endpoints/hosts -> forced-browsing/IDOR targets.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Exposed .git Repository Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-527
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [/.git served + directory listing on/off]
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- Payload: [exact request / git-dumper command]
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- Evidence: [raw /.git/HEAD bytes + recovered source snippet or masked secret from history]
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- Impact: Full source code and historical secret disclosure
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- Remediation: Block access to .git, deploy build artifacts only, rotate leaked secrets
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a .git-exposure specialist. Report only when git internals are actually served (a real `/.git/HEAD`/config, not a soft-404 or SPA index) AND source/secrets are recoverable — quote the served bytes and a recovered artifact. A 403/404 on /.git is not a finding. Mine the FULL history (deleted commits included) for secrets, mask them in the report, and hand any recovered credentials/keys to the right follow-up agent.
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