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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# Default / Weak Credentials on Panels Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for default or weak credentials on exposed panels.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — prove authenticated access with a benign read; respect lockout/ROE:**
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### 1. Locate panels
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- App/admin: `/admin`, `/administrator`, `/user/login`, `/wp-login.php`, `/wp-admin`, `/login`, `/portal`.
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- Middleware/devops: `/manager/html` (Tomcat), `/jenkins`, `/grafana/login`, `/kibana`, `/phpmyadmin`, `/solr`, `/rabbitmq`, `/actuator`, `:8080`/`:9000` consoles.
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- Devices/appliances: router/printer/camera/iLO/iDRAC panels; identify vendor from banners/`Server` headers/favicon hash.
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### 2. Test in-scope credentials
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- Vendor defaults matched to the fingerprinted product: `admin:admin`, `admin:password`, `tomcat:tomcat`, `admin:changeit`, `root:root`, `guest:guest`, `admin:<blank>`, product-specific pairs.
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- The supplied test creds from recon/ROE first.
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- Respect lockout: try a small, bounded set; watch for lockout/CAPTCHA/rate-limit headers and STOP before triggering account lockout. No out-of-scope brute force / password spraying beyond ROE.
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- Example (respecting limits): `curl -s -u admin:admin {target}/manager/html -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'` then confirm content, not just code.
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### 3. Confirm
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- Show authenticated access with a benign read: the dashboard landing page, a `/whoami`/account page, a list view — enough to prove you're in, nothing destructive.
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- Capture the raw request (with the working credential) + the raw authenticated response.
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### 4. False positives / pitfalls
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- A `200` on the login POST that just re-renders the login form (failed) is NOT access — require a genuinely post-auth page/resource.
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- A demo/sandbox panel intentionally open with a public guest account may be by design — check ROE/scope before reporting.
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- Some panels return `302` to the dashboard on success and `200` (form) on failure — verify by following the redirect to real authenticated content.
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- Do not lock out real accounts; if a default pair works on the FIRST try, stop guessing.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Tomcat `/manager/html` access → deploy a benign WAR → RCE chain (in ROE).
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- Jenkins/Grafana/CI admin → secrets, build agents, cloud creds → lateral movement.
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- App admin panel → user/data management, feeding privilege-escalation and data-access agents.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Default / Weak Credentials on Panels at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-1392
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- Endpoint: [full URL/resource]
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- Vector: [what/where]
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- Payload: [exact request/command]
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- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
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- Impact: Full component/app compromise
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- Remediation: Remove defaults; enforce strong creds + MFA; restrict panel exposure
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a specialist in default or weak credentials on exposed panels. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output showing genuine post-auth access) — never a paraphrase, a bare status code, or a re-rendered login form. Respect lockout/ROE: bounded default-credential attempts only, stop on the first success or any throttling; no out-of-scope brute force. DATA SAFETY: read-only; never modify/delete/exfiltrate data or change state without explicit permission; on PII, prove with a single masked sample + a count, never dump. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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