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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
51 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# SMTP Header Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for SMTP header/command injection via web forms — CRLF in an email field that injects extra headers or alters the message the server sends.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — prove the INJECTED HEADER actually changed the sent email (a received message shows it). Reflected input with no mail impact is not a finding.**
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### 1. Find mail-sending forms
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- Contact/feedback/"email to a friend"/invite/support/report-abuse/share forms that take an address, subject, or body.
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- Fields most likely concatenated into headers: `from`, `to`, `replyTo`, `subject`, `name` (often placed in `From:`), CC/BCC-ish inputs.
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### 2. Inject CRLF-based header payloads (route to a mailbox you control)
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- Add a Bcc to your own inbox: `you@example%0d%0aBcc:collector-{nonce}@example.com` (URL form); raw form: `you@example\r\nBcc:collector-{nonce}@example.com`.
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- Header override / extra header: `Subject: hi%0d%0aX-Injected: neuro-{nonce}`, or inject a second `To:`/`From:`.
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- Body/data injection past headers (blank line): `subject%0d%0a%0d%0aInjected body neuro-{nonce}` to smuggle content into the body.
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- Encoding variants to bypass naive filters: `%0a` alone, `%0d`, `%0d%0a`, folded headers, and Unicode/`\n` in JSON bodies. Use a per-attempt `{nonce}`.
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### 3. Confirm the injection took effect
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- Receive the mail at your controlled address/nonce mailbox and inspect FULL headers: presence of `Bcc`/`X-Injected: neuro-{nonce}` / the smuggled body proves it.
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- No inbox handy: an error/status oracle where a `%0d%0a` payload changes the send result vs a clean control can indicate parsing — but a received message is the definitive proof.
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### 4. Proof + false-positive guards
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- Evidence = the received message's raw headers showing the injected `Bcc`/custom header/body carrying `{nonce}`, plus the request that caused it.
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- Pitfalls: the form reflects your CRLF back in the HTTP response but the email is unchanged = NOT injection (framework stripped CR/LF at send). Hardened mail libraries (PHPMailer/Nodemailer with validation) reject the address = protected. A received mail with NO injected header = your payload was sanitized. Don't send to third parties — only your own nonce mailbox.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Arbitrary Bcc/From control → hand to phishing/spoofing scope (send-as, spam relay).
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- Body smuggling + a template → note for content-spoofing / phishing payload delivery.
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- If the mailer executes commands (rare `sendmail -X`/`-C` args) → hand to command-injection.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: SMTP Header Injection Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-93
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
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- Impact: Email spoofing, BCC injection, spam relay via contact forms
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- Remediation: Strip CR/LF from email fields, use hardened mail libraries, validate addresses
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an SMTP-injection specialist. Report only when injected headers actually alter the sent email, evidenced by a received message (to your own nonce'd mailbox) whose full headers show the injected `Bcc`/custom header/smuggled body. CRLF reflected in the HTTP response but absent from the delivered mail is not a finding, and a hardened mailer that rejects the payload is protected. Never send to third parties or relay spam; keep payloads to a single nonce'd probe.
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