Two gaps this closes, both found by reading what the code actually did.
Scope was never enforced
------------------------
`out_of_scope` was rendered into the prompt as "HARD CONSTRAINT — do NOT test…"
and nothing checked it. That is a request to a model, not a control: an agent
that decided a discovered subdomain was interesting, or that followed a
redirect off-target, was free to act and the operator found out by reading the
report.
scope.rs adds a guard in code:
- Hard scope: allowlist of hosts, *.wildcards, IPv4 CIDRs, URL prefixes, with
exclusions that always win. Defaults to the engagement's own target, so
discovery cannot widen authorization — finding a host is not permission to
attack it. An unconfigured policy is closed, not open.
- Soft scope: observe-only zones, destructive verbs (off by default), an
account-creation cap, a rate guard that warns rather than silently dropping
requests (a dropped request reads as "target unreachable"), and payload
classes refused even in scope because they damage the target instead of
demonstrating a bug.
- Enforced at the harness's own chokepoint (probe) and as a post-run audit:
findings proven against an unauthorized host are withheld from the report and
written to out-of-scope-findings.json as an incident to disclose, because
shipping one would launder the mistake.
- REPL: /inscope, /observe, /guardrail, /policy; /scope-out now promotes
host-shaped entries into enforced rules immediately, and says plainly when an
entry is prose the guard cannot enforce.
Validation was models checking models
-------------------------------------
N-model voting plus an adversarial refute pass share the failure mode of the
thing they check — agreement is not evidence, and a confident hallucination
survives a vote by being confident. grounding.rs helps but matches keywords
("http/", "status", "alert(") and cannot tell a real response from a plausible
transcript of one.
validation.rs asks a different question — does the recorded evidence
demonstrate THIS class? — with per-CWE rules and no model in the loop:
SQLi baseline/attack difference that reproduces >= 2x
XSS a browser executed a harness-chosen marker; reflection is not proof
IDOR identity B reads A's resource AND the body matches (a 200 returning a
login page is rejected, which is the classic false positive)
SSRF controlled callback or canary retrieval
LFI controlled marker or a file signature the baseline lacked
RCE a unique nonce in output/callback; reflected input is rejected
Absent evidence is never a pass, and a class with no rule is never
auto-confirmed. NEUROSPLOIT_VALIDATION=advisory (default) rejects
contradictions without demoting voted findings for missing artifacts;
enforcing makes the verdict the status. The evidence contract is injected into
exploit prompts so agents collect the artifacts while they still hold the
target.
Finding gains evidence_data so agents can emit structured artifacts alongside
the finding JSON.
Two bugs the tests caught while writing this: the scope guard treated a SAST
`src/auth.rs:42` endpoint as a host and quarantined valid source findings, and
two canaries minted in the same clock tick came out identical — a marker that
repeats would let a stale token vouch for a new finding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
🧠 NeuroSploit v4.0.0
Autonomous, multi-model penetration-testing harness — Rust, CLI-only.
by Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders
⭐ If this is useful, star the repo — it helps a lot.
📖 New here? Read the full Tutorial & User Guide → — every mode, flag, config and example explained. Version-by-version changes live in RELEASE.md.
NeuroSploit turns a URL, a source repository, a running app, or a host/IP into
an autonomous security engagement. A Rust harness (tokio) drives a pool of
LLMs — via API key or local subscription (Claude Code / Codex / Gemini /
Grok) — recons the target, intelligently selects only the agents that match the
discovered surface, runs them in parallel, chains findings into deeper
impact, and validates every claim by cross-model voting + tool-receipt
grounding before reporting. It ships 435 markdown agents and a Mission
Control TUI.
Engagement modes
| Mode | Command | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Black-box | neurosploit run <url> |
recon → select → exploit → vote → report |
| White-box | neurosploit whitebox <repo> |
source/SAST review (file:line evidence) |
| Grey-box | neurosploit greybox <repo> --url <app> |
code review + live exploitation together |
| Host/Infra | neurosploit host <ip> --creds creds.yaml |
Linux / Windows / AD and cloud (AWS/GCP/Azure) testing |
| AI / LLM red-team | neurosploit aitest <ai-url> |
jailbreaks & prompt injection + OWASP LLM Top 10 / MCP against a live AI agent |
| AI Skills / n8n | neurosploit skills <file|folder> |
white-box audit of Skill/plugin & n8n workflow definitions |
| Mission Control | neurosploit tui <url> |
live TUI panels + composer during the run |
| Interactive | neurosploit |
persistent REPL session (resumes per project) |
Highlights
- 🧠 POMDP belief + value-of-information — the target is partially observable,
so findings aren't booleans: a property-graph belief carries probabilities,
and "scan more vs exploit now" falls out of belief entropy. The
may_assertgate is a mathematical anti-hallucination rule (don't claim exploitability while the belief is diffuse). - 🧾 Grounding — hard rule: no claim without a receipt (evidence, not
paraphrase). Empirical (raw tool output) for black-box/host/AI, symbolic
(
file:lineinto the reviewed source — a code citation is the receipt) for white-box SAST & skills audits, and either for grey-box; ungrounded claims are demoted. - 🔬 Deterministic HTTP probe — before the model recon, the harness runs a real request/response analysis (status/redirects, security headers, cookie flags, CORS reflection, tech fingerprint, linked JS, 404 baseline, high-signal paths) and feeds those observed facts into recon, so agent selection and exploitation decisions are grounded in evidence — not the model's guess.
- 🔗 Attack chaining — any primitive pivots. 13 multi-stage chain agents (SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→cloud creds, upload→LFI→RCE→LPE, CVE→RCE→pivot, …) plus a chaining doctrine that turns any confirmed foothold into the next step: reduce it to a primitive (exec / read / write / request-forgery / identity / secret) and pivot — file-upload→RCE, SSRF→metadata creds, IDOR→takeover — reusing looted creds and reasoning about business logic (payment/tenancy/workflow abuse). Each stage proven; strictly non-destructive (no data loss, no DB overwrite, no DoS).
- ☁️ Cloud testing — AWS / GCP / Azure agents that drive the provider CLIs
(
aws/gcloud/az). Connect viacreds.yaml: AWS keys, a Google service-account JSON, or an Azure service principal — see Cloud credentials. - 🤖 LLM red-teaming — 30 AI agents that jailbreak & prompt-inject a live AI system across scenarios: AdvPrefix, PAIR, TAP, Crescendo, many-shot, persona/DAN, encoding/obfuscation, refusal-suppression; plus indirect injection (RAG/web/email/tool output), goal hijacking, tool/function-call abuse, and system-prompt exfiltration. Each runs an attacker→LLM-judge loop (baseline refusal → technique → verdict) and proves the bypass with a benign, redacted receipt. Maps to OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025), MCP threats & OWASP AI Exchange; Skill/plugin & n8n files audited white-box.
- 🧰 Misconfig & CVE hunting → exploitation, safely — a full CVE pipeline:
version fingerprint (pin exact versions) → research analyst (map to
NVD/GHSA CVEs, judge reachability) → PoC finder (locate/vet/adapt a public
PoC) → exploit scripter (write a custom exploit when none exists). Every PoC
is written to the run's
pocs/folder and referenced in the report so findings are reproducible. Plus absurd-misconfig agents (exposed.git/.env, debug/actuator, default creds, dashboards, CORS) and rate-limit testing — all under a strict data-safety/PII guardrail (no destructive/state-changing actions; PII proven with a masked sample, never dumped). - 🎯 Re-test one vulnerability —
--only <agent>(repeatable / comma-separated) runs exactly the agent(s) you name and skips recon-based selection — re-test a single finding fast. Works onrun/whitebox/greybox;neurosploit agentslists the names. - 🔬 White-box stays white-box — code agents run under a static-review
doctrine (symbolic
file:linereceipts, source-to-sink taint tracing, manifest version→CVE) that forbids hallucinated live/black-box network actions, and can emit a repro PoC topocs/. - 🗣️ Natural-language REPL — in the interactive session, just describe what you want, in any language: "testa https://loja.com com opus, foco em SQLi, fora de escopo /admin, roda". A hybrid parser sets target/models/focus/ objective/out-of-scope and toggles (Burp, browser, votes, recon depth) and can launch — zero-token deterministic parse for the common shapes, model fallback for anything ambiguous. No flags to memorize.
- 🔀 CI/CD PR gate —
neurosploit pr <repo> <n> --fail-on criticalreviews a pull request, and on a confirmed finding at/above the threshold it fails the check, sets aneurosploit/securitycommit status, and posts a REQUEST_CHANGES review — so branch protection blocks the merge. Ready-made GitHub Actions workflows included (PR gate + a@neurosploitmention bot that runs a scan when a writer comments). See Integrations. - 🎯 Engagement objective & out-of-scope — give the goal/context and hard
exclusions in words (
/objective,/scope-out, or--objective/--out-of-scope); both steer every agent prompt. - 📸 Proof screenshots in reports — agents capture visual proof per finding
(
evidence/<finding-id>-N.png), embedded beside its vulnerability in the Typst/HTML/Markdown reports. - 🖥️ Local, uncensored & CPU-only models —
ollama:andllamacpp:run the whole engagement on your box with no API key and no data leaving the host.llamacpp:speaks to allama-serverOpenAI-compatible endpoint (LLAMACPP_BASE_URL, default localhost:8080); themodelis whatever gguf you loaded. Ideal for offline/air-gapped work and unfiltered offensive prompting. - 🕵️ Burp/ZAP proxy —
/proxy <url>(or/burp) routes agent traffic through your local intercepting proxy so you can inspect & replay in Burp. - 🗺️ Attack graph & kill chain — findings mapped to OWASP / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK / stage; rendered as a Mermaid graph in the report.
- ✅ Cross-model validation — a different model adjudicates each finding; RL-weighted, recon-aware agent selection.
- 🛰️ Mission Control TUI — live header/feed/findings/targets panels + a
composer you can type in while the run streams (
summary,pause, …). - 💾 Per-project memory —
<cwd>/.neurosploit/keeps session, run history and command history; the REPL resumes on reopen. No database required. - 🪙 Token/cost telemetry, per-agent attribution, graceful Ctrl-C → report or discard, Typst/HTML/JSON/MD reports.
This is the slim, Rust-only distribution (
neurosploit-rs/+agents_md/). The earlier Python engine and web GUIs live on the olderv3.4.0branch.
📦 Install (one line)
Linux / macOS (x64 & arm64):
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/main/setup.sh | bash
Windows (PowerShell, x64 & arm64):
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit/main/install.ps1 | iex
Supported platforms
| OS | x64 | arm64 |
|---|---|---|
| Linux (Kali recommended) | ✅ | ✅ |
| macOS | ✅ | ✅ (Apple Silicon) |
| Windows | ✅ | ✅ |
Pure Rust + stdlib, so it builds natively everywhere a stable Rust toolchain runs.
The installer auto-detects OS/arch and installs Rust if missing. On native Windows
use install.ps1; under WSL2 / Git Bash the setup.sh one-liner also works.
The installer auto-installs Rust if needed, clones the repo to ~/.neurosploit,
builds the release binary, and links neurosploit into ~/.local/bin. Re-run it
any time to update. Tweak with env vars: NEUROSPLOIT_REF (branch/tag),
NEUROSPLOIT_DIR, PREFIX.
Prefer to build by hand?
git clone https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit && cd NeuroSploit/neurosploit-rs
cargo build --release # → target/release/neurosploit
⚡ Quick start (60 seconds)
# easiest path — just run it; the interactive session asks everything:
neurosploit
# or one-liner (subscription login, no API key needed):
neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
# white-box — review a source repository (SAST agents, file:line evidence):
git clone https://github.com/digininja/DVWA /tmp/DVWA
neurosploit whitebox /tmp/DVWA --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
# grey-box — review the code AND exploit the running app together:
neurosploit greybox /tmp/DVWA --url http://localhost:8080/ --creds creds.yaml \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --mcp -v
# host / infra — Linux / Windows / Active Directory (SSH/Win creds in creds.yaml):
neurosploit host 10.0.0.10 --creds creds.yaml --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
# 🛰 Mission Control TUI — live panels (header/feed/findings/targets) + a composer
# you can type in WHILE the run streams (summary · pause · errors · notes):
neurosploit tui http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --mcp
Full step-by-step for every mode (black/white/grey/host) is in TUTORIAL.md.
No login? Use an API key instead — see Authentication.
🖥️ Web console (NEW in v4.0.0)
A browser UI for the same harness — every action spawns the real compiled CLI and parses its output; nothing about the harness logic is reimplemented in the browser.
cd neurosploit-rs && cargo build --release # once
node web/server.js # → http://localhost:4173
Zero npm dependencies (Node built-ins only).
- 5-step engagement wizard — Asset (mode + target/repo) → Scope & Auth (objective, focus, out-of-scope) → Leads (the 435-agent board below) → Model & Run (provider/model picker, API-key vs. subscription toggle, votes/chain-depth/recon) → Review. Every engagement is named up front, so runs are identifiable in history instead of by raw target string.
- Lead board — all 435 agents auto-categorized (Business Logic, Broken Access Control, Injection, LLM Application, Auth & Session, SSRF & Network, Cloud & Infra, …). Toggle a single lead, a whole category (indeterminate when partially selected), or use Select all / Clear all — respects the active search filter. Leave everything off to let the harness's own recon-driven selection choose.
- Custom lead → real agent — "+ Custom lead" doesn't just add a text hint: it calls the
claudeCLI (Opus, your Anthropic subscription) to generate an actual specialist-agent markdown file intoagents_md/vulns/, in the same format every built-in agent uses, pinnable immediately. Falls back to a plain focus-text hint if Claude isn't available. - Live run view — phase/progress streamed over SSE, a findings table, and Generative
Attack Path Chaining: a node/edge graph (root = target, one node per confirmed finding,
positioned by kill-chain stage, edges from
chains_fromwhen the harness set one) instead of a flat list — click any node or row for the full finding detail, including any PoC script the exploiting agent wrote topocs/. - Real REPL underneath
run/whitebox/greybox— the wizard scripts an actual interactiveneurosploitsession (/target,/model,/only,/run, …) instead of a one-shot CLI invocation, so the session keeps reading stdin while the engagement streams. The Activity log tab grows a prompt box (❭) to send/status,/stop,/continue, or a plain-language instruction mid-run — same REPL described in §6.host/aitest/skillsstay one-shot (their onboarding menu can't be scripted over piped stdin). - Dashboard — coverage (engagements, targets, agents run), findings by severity, most frequent weaknesses, and an annualized loss exposure computed with FAIR (Loss Event Frequency × Loss Magnitude): frequency from each finding's exploitability and validation confidence, magnitude from assumptions that are shown on screen and editable. Reported as a min / most-likely / max range, never a single number.
- Run history in folders — runs group into one folder per target with a filter box, instead of one flat list that grows forever.
- Terminal dock —
Ctrl+\`` (or❭_in the sidebar) opens a real terminal, xterm.js over an unstripped stdout stream, so the harness renders with its own colour and panels. Its header switches the terminal between a standalone REPL session and the engagement currently running, with local line editing: history,Tabcompletion over the slash commands,Ctrl+C/L/U`. - Auth & Keys (one menu) — target auth header + named roles for IDOR/BOLA/BFLA testing
(materializes an ephemeral
creds.yamlfor the run), and per-provider API keys held in the server process's memory only — never written to disk. - Survives a page refresh: an in-progress run reattaches to the same live stream instead of resetting to the wizard.
Full API reference: web/API.md · quick start: web/README.md.
Knowledge: memory + attack knowledge graph
Every model call starts with an empty context window, so without somewhere to put what a run
learned, the harness re-derives the same stack, the same endpoints and the same dead ends every
time. Two stores fix that, both under .neurosploit/ in the project directory:
- Layered memory (
/memory,/forget) — four tiers by scope, not importance: working (one run), engagement (one target), technique (one agent/CWE), reusable (generalized). Promotion is evidence-gated: a claim repeated within a run becomes engagement knowledge, one confirmed across runs becomes technique knowledge, and one that held on two different targets is generalized into a reusable lesson with the host-specific tokens stripped. Recall is scored (term overlap × past success × recency) and injected into recon/exploit prompts as leads to verify — never as assertions. - Attack knowledge graph (
/graph,graph.json) — typed entities (asset, endpoint, weakness, technique, finding, account, credential, impact) joined by typed, weighted, provenance-carrying edges, accumulated across runs. It answers what a finding list can't: ranked attack paths, which endpoint accumulated the most weaknesses, and the frontier — entities observed but never proven, i.e. where chaining should look next. Chain edges the harness derived itself are markedinferredand drawn dashed in the web console. Secrets never enter the graph; they stay in the vault.
Scope: enforced, not requested
out_of_scope used to be a sentence in the prompt and nothing checked it — a
request to the model, not a control. Scope is now a guard in code
(crates/harness/src/scope.rs):
- Hard scope — an allowlist of hosts,
*.wildcards, IPv4 CIDRs and URL prefixes, plus exclusions that always win. It defaults to the engagement's target and nothing else, so discovery can never widen the engagement: finding a subdomain in a JS bundle is not authorization to test it. - Soft scope — guardrails inside authorized territory: observe-only zones, destructive HTTP verbs (off by default), account-creation cap, request-rate guard, and payload classes that are never acceptable (data destruction, DoS) — refused even against an in-scope host.
- Findings proven against a host outside the boundary are withheld from the
report and written to
out-of-scope-findings.jsonas an incident to disclose.
/inscope *.example.com 10.0.0.0/24 # authorize more
/scope-out payments.example.com # host-shaped entries become ENFORCED denials
/observe legacy.example.com # discovery allowed, interaction blocked
/guardrail destructive on · accounts 5 · rate 60
/policy # what is actually enforced
Evidence & Validation Engine
Voting is models checking models, and a confident hallucination passes a vote by
being confident. crates/harness/src/validation.rs adds a deterministic layer
that never consults a model:
HYPOTHESIS → CANDIDATE → [ VALIDATION ENGINE ] → CONFIRMED | NEEDS_REVIEW | REJECTED
Per-CWE rules, because "is this real?" has a different answer per class:
| class | what confirms it |
|---|---|
| SQLi (89/943) | baseline vs attack difference that reproduces ≥2× |
| XSS (79/80) | a real browser executed a harness-chosen marker — reflection alone is not proof |
| IDOR/BOLA (639/862/863) | identity B reads identity A's resource and the body matches (a 200 returning a login page is rejected) |
| SSRF (918) | controlled callback, or retrieval of a canary resource |
| LFI (22/23/98) | controlled file marker, or a file signature the baseline lacked |
| RCE (77/78/94) | a unique nonce in command output or a callback — reflected input is rejected |
Two rules keep it honest: absent evidence is never a pass (it becomes
needs-review), and a class with no rule is never auto-confirmed.
NEUROSPLOIT_VALIDATION=advisory|enforcing|off — advisory (default) rejects
contradictions but won't demote a voted finding merely for missing artifacts;
enforcing makes the verdict the status.
Keeping a run going
- Command rectification — a mistyped command is corrected (
/staus→/status), completed (/onb→/onboard), or reported as ambiguous, never guessed at. Arguments too: a bare host gets its scheme, an out-of-range count is clamped with a note, a near-miss model id is matched against the live catalog. - Automatic backend fallback — when every configured model is quota-exhausted or its token is dead, the pool switches to whatever else this machine can reach (an installed CLI subscription, or a provider whose API key is in the environment) and keeps going. It only parks the run when nothing at all is available.
- Resume where it stopped — findings are checkpointed live, so an interrupted run is
recovered on the next start and
/continuecarries them forward. Non-interactive sessions (the web console drives the REPL over a pipe) resume automatically, since no one is there to type it; setNEUROSPLOIT_AUTO_RESUME=1to get the same at a terminal.
🔌 Integrations (GitHub · GitLab · Jira)
Wire NeuroSploit into your SDLC. Toggle from the REPL (/integrations) or the CLI
(neurosploit integrations enable github|gitlab|jira). Tokens are never stored
— only the name of the env var is saved; the value is read from your environment.
export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_... # PAT with `repo` scope (private repos)
neurosploit integrations enable github
# Review a Pull Request's code (clones the PR head, white-box) and comment back:
neurosploit pr digininja/DVWA 42 --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --comment
# Same, but BLOCK the merge on a confirmed critical: fails the check, sets a
# `neurosploit/security` commit status, and posts a REQUEST_CHANGES review.
neurosploit pr digininja/DVWA 42 --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --comment --fail-on critical
# Watch a branch and re-review on every new commit:
neurosploit watch myorg/private-app --branch main --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8
# Private GitLab repo (token-injected clone) — works in whitebox/greybox:
export GITLAB_TOKEN=glpat-... ; neurosploit integrations enable gitlab
neurosploit whitebox https://gitlab.com/myorg/private-svc --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8
# Open a Jira card per finding (any engagement):
export JIRA_EMAIL=you@org.com JIRA_API_TOKEN=... # set base/project once: /integrations setup jira
neurosploit whitebox https://github.com/myorg/app --jira --subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8
| Integration | What you get | Env vars |
|---|---|---|
| GitHub | private clone · pr review + comment · PR gate (--fail-on: fail check + commit status + REQUEST_CHANGES) · watch branch |
GITHUB_TOKEN |
| GitLab | private clone for whitebox/greybox | GITLAB_TOKEN |
| Jira | one card per finding (--jira) |
JIRA_EMAIL, JIRA_API_TOKEN |
Automations (GitHub Actions)
Two ready-made workflows ship in examples/github-actions/ — copy
them into your repo:
neurosploit-pr-gate.yml— reviews every PR and blocks the merge on a confirmed critical. Make it enforcing: Settings → Branches → require theneurosploit-pr-gatestatus check (and/or require review to honor the REQUEST_CHANGES). SetANTHROPIC_API_KEY(or swap the model) in Actions secrets; the built-inGITHUB_TOKENcovers statuses/reviews.neurosploit-mention.yml— comment@neurosploiton a PR or issue to trigger a scan (only repo writers can). Text after the mention is the instruction (any language):@neurosploit focus SQLi and IDOR, or@neurosploit scan https://staging.appfor a black-box run.
📖 Step-by-step setup for each tool: TUTORIAL-INTEGRATION.md.
☁️ Cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure)
Add a cloud block to creds.yaml and the harness exports the right env vars so
the AWS/GCP/Azure agents can drive aws / gcloud / az. Secrets stay in your
file/secret-manager; agents do read-only enumeration first, never destructive.
# --- AWS: static keys (or a named profile) ---
aws:
access_key_id: AKIA...
secret_access_key: ...
# session_token: ... # if using temporary creds
region: us-east-1
# profile: my-sso-profile # alternative to keys
# --- GCP: service-account JSON (path recommended; inline single-line also works) ---
gcp:
service_account_json: /path/to/sa.json
project: my-project-id
# --- Azure: service principal (recommended for automation) ---
azure:
tenant_id: ...
client_id: ...
client_secret: ...
subscription_id: ...
neurosploit host my-cloud-account --creds creds.yaml \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
Agents cover IAM privilege-escalation, storage exposure (S3/GCS/Blob), compute &
network exposure, secrets (Secrets Manager / Secret Manager / Key Vault),
service-account/SP abuse, and identity enumeration (Entra ID). Best-practice
auth: AWS access keys or profile; GCP a service-account JSON
(GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS); Azure a service principal
(az login --service-principal).
👥 Multiple identities — access-control testing (IDOR / BOLA / BFLA)
Give NeuroSploit two or more named roles in creds.yaml and it authenticates
as each and tests cross-role access (a low-priv role reaching another user's
object or an admin function is a finding):
admin:
jwt: eyJ... # per role: jwt | header (raw) | cookie | apikey | login+username+password
user:
apikey: abc123 # → X-Api-Key: abc123
victim:
cookie: "session=deadbeef"
neurosploit run https://app.example --creds creds.yaml \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
Each finding is proven with the authorized vs unauthorized request pair, under the data-safety guardrail (read-only, PII masked).
🏷️ Identification & attribution (anti-plagiarism)
Every request is tagged with an identifying User-Agent (default
NeuroSploit/<ver> …, change with /ua or NEUROSPLOIT_UA) plus an
X-NeuroSploit-Scan header, and every finding is stamped "Identified and
validated by NeuroSploit" — so provenance travels in the traffic, the finding
text, findings.json and the report footer.
Build
cd neurosploit-rs
cargo build --release # → target/release/neurosploit
Requires a Rust toolchain (rustup). Recommended: run on Kali Linux (or the
Kali Docker image) so the offensive tools the agents use are already present:
docker run -it --rm kalilinux/kali-rolling
apt update && apt install -y curl nmap ffuf nodejs npm
# rustscan (faster port scan): cargo install rustscan (or grab a release from GitHub)
The agents degrade gracefully: if rustscan isn't installed they use nmap; if
neither, they probe with curl. If a Playwright MCP browser is available they use
it for JS-heavy pages, otherwise they fall back to curl.
Usage
Run with no arguments for an interactive wizard:
./target/release/neurosploit
Or drive it directly:
# Black-box — subscription (no API key), Opus, browser via Playwright if present, verbose
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --mcp -v
# Black-box — API keys, multi-model voting panel (1st finds, others adjudicate)
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ \
--model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --model openai:gpt-5.1 --vote-n 3
# White-box — clone a vulnerable app and review its source
git clone https://github.com/digininja/DVWA /tmp/DVWA
./target/release/neurosploit whitebox /tmp/DVWA \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 -v
# Offline pipeline self-test (no keys/login needed)
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ --offline
# Utilities
./target/release/neurosploit agents # library counts
./target/release/neurosploit models # providers & models
./target/release/neurosploit --help # full help with examples
Options (run / whitebox)
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--model provider:model |
Repeatable. First = primary; the rest fail over and form the voting jury. |
--subscription |
Use the local CLI login (Claude/Codex/Gemini/Grok) instead of an API key. |
--mcp |
Enable Playwright MCP (auto-provisioned via npx; backends without MCP use built-in tools). |
--vote-n N |
How many models must agree a finding is real (default 3 / 2 for whitebox). |
--max-agents N |
Cap agents run (0 = all matching the recon). |
--offline |
Exercise the full pipeline without calling any model. |
-v, --verbose |
Log each agent as it launches, recon, and votes. |
Authentication — run via API key or subscription
You can run NeuroSploit two ways. They're independent: pick per run.
1) Via API (provider API key)
Export the key(s) for the providers in your model panel, then run without
--subscription. Any OpenAI-compatible provider works.
# pick one or more, depending on the models you select
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... # anthropic:claude-*
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... # openai:gpt-*
export GEMINI_API_KEY=AIza... # gemini:gemini-*
export XAI_API_KEY=xai-... # xai:grok-*
export NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY=nvapi-... # nvidia_nim:*
export DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=... # deepseek:*
export MISTRAL_API_KEY=... # mistral:*
export DASHSCOPE_API_KEY=... # qwen:* (Alibaba DashScope)
export GROQ_API_KEY=... # groq:*
export TOGETHER_API_KEY=... # together:*
export MOONSHOT_API_KEY=... # moonshot:* (Kimi K3/K2)
export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=... # openrouter:*
export OPENCODE_API_KEY=... # opencode:* (OpenCode Zen gateway)
export NOUS_API_KEY=... # nous:* (Nous Portal — Hermes)
export LITELLM_API_KEY=... # litellm:* (your LiteLLM proxy)
export AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY=... # azure:<deployment> (also set AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT)
# ollama / llamacpp need no key (local)
# then run via API (note: NO --subscription)
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ \
--model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --vote-n 3 -v
# multi-provider voting panel via API (1st finds, the others adjudicate)
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ \
--model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --model openai:gpt-5.1 --model gemini:gemini-2.5-pro
Or put the keys in a .env and source it (cp .env.example .env; edit; set -a; . ./.env; set +a).
Provider → env var → endpoint (all OpenAI-compatible):
--model prefix |
Env var | Base URL |
|---|---|---|
anthropic: |
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
api.anthropic.com |
openai: |
OPENAI_API_KEY |
api.openai.com |
gemini: |
GEMINI_API_KEY |
generativelanguage.googleapis.com |
xai: |
XAI_API_KEY |
api.x.ai |
nvidia_nim: |
NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY |
integrate.api.nvidia.com |
deepseek: |
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY |
api.deepseek.com |
mistral: |
MISTRAL_API_KEY |
api.mistral.ai |
qwen: |
DASHSCOPE_API_KEY |
dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com |
groq: |
GROQ_API_KEY |
api.groq.com |
together: |
TOGETHER_API_KEY |
api.together.xyz |
moonshot: |
MOONSHOT_API_KEY |
api.moonshot.ai |
openrouter: |
OPENROUTER_API_KEY |
openrouter.ai |
opencode: |
OPENCODE_API_KEY |
opencode.ai/zen (OpenCode Zen gateway) |
nous: |
NOUS_API_KEY |
inference-api.nousresearch.com (Hermes 4) |
litellm: |
LITELLM_API_KEY |
your LiteLLM proxy (LITELLM_BASE_URL, default localhost:4000) |
azure: |
AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY |
your Azure OpenAI resource (AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT) |
ollama: |
(none) | localhost:11434 |
llamacpp: |
(none) | localhost:8080 |
Run ./target/release/neurosploit models for the full provider/model list.
Local, uncensored & CPU-only —
ollama:andllamacpp:run entirely on your box with no API key and no data leaving the host.llamacpp:targets allama-serverOpenAI-compatible endpoint (override withLLAMACPP_BASE_URL); themodelis whatever gguf you loaded. Ideal for offline engagements and unfiltered offensive prompting.
2) Via subscription (no API key)
--subscription drives your local agentic-CLI login instead of an API key —
install and log into one of the CLIs first:
--model prefix |
CLI used | Login |
|---|---|---|
anthropic: |
claude (Claude Code) |
claude then /login |
openai: |
codex |
codex login |
gemini: |
gemini |
gemini login |
xai: |
grok |
grok login |
opencode: |
opencode |
opencode auth login (or /connect in the TUI) — Zen/plan account |
nous: |
hermes |
hermes setup --portal — Nous Portal OAuth |
opencode: also gets the Playwright MCP (--mcp) like anthropic/openai do.
nous: relies on Hermes's own built-in toolsets (web/terminal/computer-use)
instead — it has no CLI-level MCP hook.
./target/release/neurosploit run http://testphp.vulnweb.com/ \
--subscription --model anthropic:claude-opus-4-8 --mcp -v
How it works
target ─▶ recon (curl/nmap/…) ─▶ INTELLIGENT agent selection (recon-aware)
─▶ parallel exploitation ─▶ cross-model validation vote
─▶ severity/score ─▶ report (HTML + Typst PDF) ─▶ RL reward update
Every run writes a self-contained folder runs/ns-<ts>-<target>/:
| File | Contents |
|---|---|
status.json |
running → complete with a summary |
recon.json / recon.md |
mapped attack surface |
exploitation.md |
raw per-agent transcript |
findings.json / findings.md |
validated findings (reuse by other tools/AIs) |
report.html, report.typ, report.pdf |
final report (PDF via the Typst engine) |
A reinforcement-learning reward store (data/rl_state_rs.json) biases agent
selection on future runs.
Agent library — agents_md/ (435)
| Category | Count | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
vulns/ |
245 | Exploit a specific vulnerability class (web/API) |
code/ |
78 | White-box source-code (SAST) review |
ai/ |
30 | AI/LLM red-teaming, jailbreaks, MCP threats |
infra/ |
34 | Host/cloud: Linux, Windows, AD, AWS/GCP/Azure |
meta/ |
23 | Orchestrator, validator, scorers, reporter, RL |
chains/ |
13 | Multi-stage attack chains (SQLi→RCE→LPE, SSRF→cloud, …) |
recon/ |
12 | Information gathering / attack surface |
Each agent is a self-contained markdown playbook (## User Prompt methodology +
## System Prompt strict anti-false-positive rules). Drop a new .md into the
matching folder — or generate one from the web console's "+ Custom lead" (see above) — and the
harness picks it up; neurosploit agents shows live counts.
Safety
For authorized testing only. Agents are instructed to stay in scope, never run destructive/DoS actions, and require proof-of-exploitation. You are responsible for having permission for any target.
Credits
Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.
License
MIT.