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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
# SAML Signature Wrapping Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) in SAML assertions — making the SP validate a signature over the original element while consuming attacker-controlled content elsewhere, to log in as someone else.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — the finding is authenticating as a DIFFERENT identity via a wrapped, unaltered signature. Prove the identity change; a merely-accepted equivalent response is not a finding.**
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### 1. Capture and understand the assertion
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- Intercept the `SAMLResponse` at the ACS (`POST /saml/acs`, `/sso/consume`, etc.); URL-decode then base64-decode; if HTTP-Redirect binding, inflate (`python -c 'import zlib,base64,sys;print(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode(sys.stdin.read()),-15))'`).
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- Locate the signed element and its `Reference URI` / `ID`, the `<Assertion>`, `<Subject><NameID>`, and `<Conditions>`. Note whether the signature covers the Response or the Assertion.
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- Tooling: SAML Raider (Burp extension) to parse/edit/re-sign flows, or `python3 -m saml2` helpers; keep the ORIGINAL signature bytes intact.
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### 2. Apply XSW variants (keep the valid signature, change what's consumed)
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- Enumerate the classic 8 XSW patterns with SAML Raider's automated XSW attacks:
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- Wrap the signed original inside a new element and add a forged sibling Assertion with the same-shaped structure but `NameID=admin@{target}`.
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- Move the signed Assertion into an `<Extensions>` / a copied element, keep its `Signature`, and place the evil Assertion where the SP reads identity.
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- Duplicate IDs / matching-Reference tricks so signature validation passes on the original while identity resolution picks the attacker copy.
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- Change ONLY the subject/attributes in the forged copy (e.g. NameID to a different user, or `Role=admin`) — no destructive edits.
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### 3. Confirm the identity change
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- Submit each wrapped `SAMLResponse` to the ACS and complete the flow. PROOF = you are authenticated as the DIFFERENT user (their username in the dashboard, an admin-only panel, a session whose `/me`/`whoami` returns the target identity — capture the raw response).
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- Use a benign target identity you're authorized to impersonate for the test (e.g. a second test account or a clearly-labeled admin test user), never a real third party's live account.
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### 4. Proof + false-positive guards
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- Evidence = the wrapped XML (which element carries the untouched signature vs which the SP consumed) AND the authenticated session proving the swapped identity.
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- Pitfalls: SP returns 200 but you're still your ORIGINAL identity = not wrapping (signature scoping worked). A "signature invalid" rejection = the SP validated correctly (NOT a finding). An assertion you re-signed with your own key that's accepted = a trust/keys problem, report separately, not XSW. Replay of your own valid assertion = not XSW.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Impersonated an admin → hand to the admin-access / privilege-escalation scope for privileged actions (read-only proof).
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- Identity confusion but no full auth → note for the broader auth-bypass agent.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: SAML Signature Wrapping Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-347
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
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- Impact: Authentication bypass / impersonation of arbitrary users
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- Remediation: Validate signature over the correct element, schema-hardening, reject multiple assertions
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a SAML specialist. Report only when a wrapped response (original signature untouched) authenticates you as a DIFFERENT identity — proven by an authenticated session showing the swapped user/role. A merely accepted-but-equivalent response, a rejected/invalid-signature response, or a response you re-signed with your own key are NOT XSW findings. Impersonate only a test/authorized identity, keep edits to subject/role, and take no destructive actions.
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