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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
7741290193
Adds robust AD pentest coverage spanning the full kill chain (initial access → enumeration → exploitation → lateral movement → privilege escalation → persistence → pivoting), with concrete tooling, per-technique decision points, benign-proof-only guidance, lockout/state awareness, and chaining hooks. All GENERIC — no lab-specific hosts/IPs/creds/flags; works in any AD environment. New infra/ skills: ad_recon_enum, ad_bloodhound_paths, ad_llmnr_poisoning, ad_ntlm_relay, ad_password_spray, ad_kerberos_delegation, ad_adcs_esc, ad_pth_ptt, ad_coerce_auth, ad_critical_cve (Zerologon/noPac), ad_smb_share_hunt, ad_laps_gmsa_read, ad_gpo_abuse, ad_dpapi_looting, ad_trust_abuse, ad_persistence_review, ad_mssql_abuse. Enriched: ad_kerberoasting, ad_asreproasting, ad_dcsync, ad_acl_privesc, ad_default_creds, windows_priv_esc. New chains/: chain_ad_web_to_forest_root, chain_ad_rbcd_s4u_to_adcs, chain_ad_coerce_relay_adcs, chain_ad_kerberoast_to_domain, chain_ad_mssql_linked_pivot, chain_ad_trust_cross_forest, chain_ad_local_to_domain. attack_graph: map CWE-294/295/1392/269 to OWASP/MITRE/stage + CVSS bands so AD findings grade and place in the kill chain correctly. 473 agents, 421 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# AD LAPS & gMSA Password Read via Delegated ACLs Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for readable LAPS local-admin passwords and gMSA (group Managed Service Account) passwords exposed by over-broad delegated ACLs.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Determine what you can read (ACL recon)
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- Pull the graph: `bloodhound-python -u <user> -p '<pass>' -d <domain> -ns {target} -c All`, then in BloodHound run the LAPS edge / `ReadGMSAPassword` and `ReadLAPSPassword` cyphers to see which principals your identity controls can read.
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- Decision: if your current user (or a group it is in) has `ReadLAPSPassword` on a computer OU -> read LAPS; if `ReadGMSAPassword` on a gMSA -> dump its blob.
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- Also enumerate who else can read (`msDS-GroupMSAMembership`, AdmPwd read ACEs) — an over-broad group (e.g. Authenticated Users / a large helpdesk group) is itself the finding, independent of whether you crack anything downstream.
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### 2. Read LAPS (legacy & Windows LAPS)
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- `nxc ldap {target} -u <user> -p '<pass>' --laps` — returns `ms-Mcs-AdmPwd` (legacy) or the encrypted `msLAPS-Password` (Windows LAPS) you are permitted to see.
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- Or `pyLAPS.py --action get -d <domain> -u <user> -p '<pass>' --dc-ip {target}`. For Windows LAPS encrypted blobs, `certipy`/`LAPSv2` decryption applies if you hold the decryption rights.
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- BENIGN proof = the returned computer name + cleartext local-admin password line. Validate with ONE lockout-aware check: `nxc smb <that-host> -u <local-admin> -p '<laps-pass>' --local-auth` -> `Pwn3d!`.
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### 3. Read gMSA
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- `nxc ldap {target} -u <user> -p '<pass>' --gmsa` or `gMSADumper.py -u <user> -p '<pass>' -d <domain>` -> dumps `msDS-ManagedPassword` and derives the NT hash / AES keys for the gMSA.
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- BENIGN proof = the derived gMSA NT hash line. This hash chains directly to OverPtH/PtH (see ad_pth_ptt) — prove with a single `nxc smb <host> -u '<gmsa>$' -H <nt>`.
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### 4. Scope & minimize
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- Read only the specific LAPS/gMSA objects your delegated rights legitimately cover and that are in scope. Do not attempt to WRITE/reset a LAPS password or expire it (STATE CHANGE).
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- If you only hold a WRITE ACE (not read) on the gMSA's `msDS-GroupMSAMembership`, adding yourself to read it is a STATE CHANGE — authorize first and record the membership for removal afterward.
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- Detectability: directory reads of ms-Mcs-AdmPwd / msDS-ManagedPassword can be audited (Event 4662 with the specific property GUID); note that LAPS reads are a monitored signal in mature environments.
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### 5. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Readable <LAPS local-admin | gMSA> password via delegated ACL on [object]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-522
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- Endpoint: [computer/gMSA DN, the ACE principal that grants read]
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- Vector: [ACL recon -> --laps/--gmsa read -> recover cleartext/hash -> validate]
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- Payload: [bloodhound cypher, nxc --laps/--gmsa, gMSADumper/pyLAPS command]
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- Evidence: [raw: BloodHound ReadLAPS/ReadGMSA path, returned password/hash line, Pwn3d! single-auth check]
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- Impact: <local admin on the LAPS-managed host(s) / gMSA identity compromise; lateral movement, possible service abuse>
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- Remediation: <tighten LAPS/gMSA read ACLs to a dedicated tier-0 group; audit msDS-GroupMSAMembership and AdmPwd read ACEs; rotate on exposure; adopt Windows LAPS with encryption>
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- chains_from: [the foothold cred finding, or an ACL-privesc finding that granted the read right]
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for LAPS and gMSA password exposure via delegated ACLs on an AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what raw tool output proves (the receipt: the BloodHound ReadLAPSPassword/ReadGMSAPassword path, the returned cleartext LAPS password or derived gMSA hash, and a single successful authentication) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Stay strictly in scope: read only the LAPS/gMSA objects your delegated rights legitimately cover. This is a READ technique — do NOT reset, expire, or write a LAPS/gMSA password, and make no other AD change without explicit written authorization. Validating a recovered local-admin or gMSA credential is lockout-sensitive: read the lockout policy first (`nxc ... --pass-pol`) and make a single deliberate attempt. A recovered gMSA hash chains to Pass-the-Hash — treat the downstream access with the same scope discipline. If your rights or observation are insufficient to read the secret, say so and gather more first. Never DoS a domain controller. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.
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