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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
8894649ccb
Hard scoping was already enforced in code (every request passes
ScopePolicy::check_request; exclude beats allowlist; capability token caps
it; out-of-scope findings withheld + audited). What was missing was a way to
author that boundary from a file or the web form instead of only CLI flags.
- scope.rs: ScopePolicy::from_yaml / from_file — a dependency-free parser for
the friendly string format (app.example.com, *.wildcard, CIDR, url-prefix),
the same strings Pattern::parse already takes, NOT the raw serde {kind,value}
shape. Strict in one direction: an unreadable file errors, an empty hard list
authorizes nothing (a safe failure, but the operator's choice, not a typo).
- CLI: --scope-file <yaml>. Loaded before authorization so --in-scope adds to
it and the capability grant still caps it.
- Web: a full Scoping & Guardrails section in the Authorization tab — hard
scope, exclusions, observe-only, destructive-method + account-creation
toggles, max accounts, rate limit, forbidden payloads, notes. The server
materializes a scope YAML and passes --scope-file; notes stay labelled
"guidance, NOT enforced" so prose is never mistaken for a control.
- examples/scope.example.yaml documents the format.
End-to-end verified: web form -> YAML -> Rust loader -> enforced boundary.
332 tests (+4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
68 lines
2.9 KiB
YAML
68 lines
2.9 KiB
YAML
# NeuroSploit — engagement scope & guardrails
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# HARD scope is enforced in code: a request whose host is not covered by `hard`
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# (or is hit by `exclude`) is REFUSED before it leaves — not warned about,
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# refused. SOFT scope is the guardrails inside that boundary.
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#
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# Every pattern below is a plain string, parsed the same way the --in-scope flag
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# and the web form parse it (crate::scope::Pattern::parse):
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#
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# app.example.com exact host
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# *.example.com the apex AND every sub-domain
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# 10.0.0.0/24 an IPv4 network (CIDR)
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# https://example.com/api/v2 a URL prefix — narrower than a whole host
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#
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# An empty `hard` list means NOTHING is authorized. Scope is never implicit.
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# ===========================================================================
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# --- HARD: the allowlist. Only these are testable. ------------------------
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hard:
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- app.example.com
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- "*.staging.example.com" # apex + subdomains of the staging tier
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- https://example.com/api/v2 # only this path prefix on the apex host
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- 10.20.30.0/24 # an internal range reached via --transport
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# --- EXCLUDE: carve-outs. These always beat the allowlist. ----------------
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# A host here is refused even if `hard` would otherwise cover it.
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exclude:
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- admin.example.com # never touch the admin console
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- https://app.example.com/billing # PCI surface — out of this engagement
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- payments.example.com
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# --- SOFT: guardrails inside the boundary ---------------------------------
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soft:
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# Hosts you may LOOK at but never attack (recon only — no payloads).
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observe_only:
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- cdn.example.com
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- "*.thirdparty.example.com"
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# State-mutating verbs (DELETE/PUT/PATCH). Off by default: a scan should not
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# change the target's state to "prove" a bug.
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allow_destructive_methods: false
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# Registering test accounts, and how many. 0 = unlimited (not recommended).
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allow_account_creation: true
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max_accounts: 3
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# Requests per minute across the WHOLE engagement. 0 = unlimited.
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# Keep this low on production; the OT profile caps far lower still.
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max_requests_per_minute: 240
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# Payload substrings that are NEVER acceptable, whatever the finding — the
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# classes that damage a production target instead of demonstrating a bug.
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# These extend the built-in defaults (drop table, rm -rf /, fork bombs, …).
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forbidden_payloads:
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- "drop table"
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- "truncate table"
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- "delete from"
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- "rm -rf /"
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- "shutdown"
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- "while(true)"
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# Free-text context for the agents. NOT enforceable — kept separate from the
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# rules on purpose, so nobody mistakes prose for a control.
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notes:
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- "Authorized per SOW-2026-0142; contact security@example.com on any outage."
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- "Test window 02:00–06:00 UTC only."
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- "Data-exfil PoCs: prove read access with a canary row, do not pull real PII."
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