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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
49 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
49 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Business Logic Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Business Logic vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Understand the business flow first
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- Map the complete journey (registration → cart → payment → fulfilment; or plan → upgrade → billing).
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- Write down the INTENDED invariants: price = sum(items), quantity ≥ 0, one coupon per order, payment before fulfilment, role set by server.
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- Each flaw = a request that violates one invariant and is accepted.
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### 2. Common logic flaws (with benign probes)
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- Negative/overflow quantity: `qty=-1`, `qty=0`, `qty=999999999`, fractional `qty=0.0001` — does total go negative / underflow?
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- Price/amount tampering: change a hidden field or API body (`price`, `amount`, `currency`, `discount`) to a benign-but-wrong value (e.g. 1.00) and see if it's honored.
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- Coupon/voucher abuse: apply the same code N times, stack codes, apply after totals are computed, race two applies concurrently.
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- Step skipping / flow bypass: jump straight to the post-payment/confirmation endpoint without paying; skip email/2FA verification by calling the next step directly.
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- Currency/rounding: mix currencies, exploit rounding on tiny amounts.
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### 3. Testing approach (decision point)
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- For each invariant, craft the minimal request that breaks it; keep dollar amounts benign and never complete a real purchase that moves money you can't reverse.
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- Use two sessions for race conditions (concurrent coupon/redeem); use a proxy to tamper values the UI won't let you change.
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### 4. Proof
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- Show INTENDED flow vs ACTUAL exploited flow side by side.
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- PROOF = the tampered request + the server response reflecting the illegitimate outcome (order total, granted entitlement, skipped state) + a read-back confirming the state (order created at the wrong price, feature unlocked).
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- A UI that shows a wrong price but the server recomputes at checkout = control working, not a finding.
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### 5. Pitfalls / false positives
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- Client-side total looks wrong but server recalculates on submit — verify the persisted/charged value.
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- "Success" response that a later step rejects — confirm the end state, not an intermediate 200.
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- Coupon appearing to stack in the UI but only one applied server-side.
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### 6. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Business Logic Flaw - [description]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-840
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Flow: [expected flow vs actual]
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- Manipulation: [what was changed]
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- Impact: Financial loss, unauthorized access, data integrity
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- Remediation: Server-side validation of all business rules
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```
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**Chaining hooks:** consumes client-trusted values found by browser-runtime-hooking; a role/entitlement flip → authenticated-surface as the elevated role; a flow bypass reaching an internal step → new surface for injection/BOLA.
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## System Prompt
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You are a Business Logic specialist. Logic flaws are the hardest to detect automatically because they depend on business context. Focus on: negative values, price manipulation, step skipping, and flow bypass. Each finding must show the INTENDED flow vs the ACTUAL exploited flow, proven server-side with a read-back of the resulting state. Keep amounts benign and never irreversibly move real money or complete a real purchase; rule out the server recomputing/validating the value (a working control is not a finding).
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