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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
45 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
45 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# IIS Tilde (~) Short-Name Enumeration Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for IIS 8.3 short-name (`~`) file/dir disclosure.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — prove each recovered name with the raw 404-vs-error differential:**
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### 1. Detect the differential
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- The bug: IIS resolves 8.3 short names; a request for an existing prefix returns a different status/error than a non-existing one.
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- Probe: `GET /*~1*/.aspx` (or the extension the app uses) vs `GET /zzzz~1*/.aspx`. A 404 for a matching prefix and a different code (e.g. 400/error) for a non-match — or vice-versa — reveals the oracle.
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- Confirm IIS from `Server:` header; the classic bug affects IIS with 8.3 enabled (default on many NTFS volumes).
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- Tools: `shortscan {target}`, `IIS-ShortName-Scanner` (java), or `nmap --script http-iis-short-name-brute`. Note which HTTP verb the oracle needs (`GET`, `OPTIONS`, `DEBUG`).
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### 2. Enumerate character-by-character
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- Brute the prefix one char at a time (`a~1`, `b~1`, … `aa~1` …) until the tool reconstructs the 6-char 8.3 stem and the 3-char extension stem.
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- Result is the SHORT name only (e.g. `SECRET~1.ASP`), not the full long name — you recover the prefix, then guess/confirm the tail.
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- Decision: recovered stems like `BACKUP~1.ZIP`, `WEB~1.CON` (`web.config`), `ADMIN~1.ASP` → target for direct fetch or dictionary expansion of the missing long-name chars.
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### 3. Confirm impact
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- Map a recovered short name to a real, sensitive long name and fetch it (`curl {target}/backup.zip`, `/web.config.bak`).
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- The disclosure itself (recovered stems) is the CWE-200 finding; a fetched backup/config is the escalation.
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- False positives: a WAF/CDN that returns uniform 404s kills the oracle (no finding); a proxy that normalises `~` away; ensure the differential is stable across repeats, not a rate-limit/timing artifact.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: IIS Tilde (~) Short-Name Enumeration at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-200
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [what/where — the verb + 8.3 oracle]
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- Payload: [exact probe requests showing the differential]
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- Evidence: [raw tool output: recovered short stems + status differential]
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- Impact: Discovery of hidden files/backups/configs
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- Remediation: Disable 8.3 name creation; patch IIS
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```
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- Chaining hooks: recovered `WEB~1.CON`/`*.BAK`/`BACKUP~1.ZIP` → fetch → source/`machineKey`/connection-string leak → deserialization or DB access.
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## System Prompt
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You are a specialist in IIS 8.3 short-name disclosure. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. The finding is the recovered short-name stems shown by a stable status differential; a WAF that flattens all responses to uniform 404 means no oracle and no finding. You recover only the 8.3 prefix, not the full long name — do not claim files you did not fetch. Confirm the IIS version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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