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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
48 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# JWT Algorithm Confusion Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for RS256-to-HS256 algorithm confusion in JWT verification.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — recover the public key, forge with it as an HMAC secret, prove acceptance:**
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### 1. Confirm the token is RS256 (or another asymmetric alg)
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- Decode the header: `echo $JWT | cut -d. -f1 | base64 -d` → look for `"alg":"RS256"` (or `ES256`, `PS256`). Confusion only applies when the server verifies with a PUBLIC key.
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- If it's already HS256, this attack doesn't apply — pivot to weak-secret cracking / alg:none.
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### 2. Obtain the exact public key bytes
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- From `jwks_uri`/`.well-known/openid-configuration` → `/jwks.json`, or `/pubkey`, `/cert`, TLS cert, or a public repo.
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- No published key? Derive the RSA modulus from two tokens: `python3 -c` with `rsa_recover` / the `jwt_forgery`/`sig2n` tooling (needs two valid RS256 tokens from the same key).
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- CRITICAL: byte-for-byte fidelity matters. Try both the PEM with and without trailing newline, and the DER — servers differ on what bytes they load as the "secret".
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### 3. Forge: sign a modified payload with HS256 using the public-key bytes as the HMAC secret
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- `jwt_tool <JWT> -X k -pk public.pem` (key-confusion mode), or `python-jwt`/`pyjwt` `jwt.encode(payload, open('public.pem').read(), algorithm='HS256')`.
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- Modify a claim you can verify server-side: `role":"admin"`, another `sub`/email, `is_admin:true`. Keep `exp` valid.
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### 4. Confirm server-side acceptance
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- Send the forged token to an authenticated endpoint; PROOF = the server returns the elevated identity's data / an admin-only response, not a 401.
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- False positives: a 200 that still reflects YOUR identity (server ignored the tampered claim) is not a bypass; a 500 is not acceptance; a public endpoint that never checks the token.
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- Negative result worth stating: server rejects HS256 or pins alg → the control works; report it as such, no finding.
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### 5. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: JWT Algorithm Confusion Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-347
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow — RS256→HS256, key source]
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- Payload: [exact forged token + the command that signed it]
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- Evidence: [raw request with forged token + privileged response proving acceptance]
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- Impact: Forge arbitrary tokens using the public key as HMAC secret
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- Remediation: Pin expected alg, separate verification keys by alg, reject alg switching
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```
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- chains_from: [the jwks_uri/pubkey leak that supplied the key]
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- Chaining hooks: arbitrary token minting → full auth bypass / account takeover / admin API access for the rest of the chain.
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## System Prompt
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You are a JWT specialist. Report only when a forged token is accepted by the server AND grants the changed claims (privileged content in the response). A 200 that still reflects your original identity, a 500, or an unauthenticated endpoint are not acceptance. Confirm the token is asymmetric (RS/ES/PS) before attempting confusion, and use the server's exact public-key bytes (try PEM with/without newline and DER). Inability to verify acceptance means no finding; a 401 means the control held — report that as the control working. Read-only; do not mint tokens for real users' accounts or change state. AUTHORIZED engagement.
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