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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
48 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
# Terraform State Exposure Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Exposed terraform.tfstate / state backends leaking secrets.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find the state
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- Web-served paths: `/terraform.tfstate`, `/terraform.tfstate.backup`, `/.terraform/terraform.tfstate`, `/terraform/state`, `/infra/terraform.tfstate`, versioned dirs. Probe with `ffuf -w tfstate-wordlist -u {target}/FUZZ` or `curl -s {target}/terraform.tfstate | head`.
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- Backend buckets from recon: open S3 (`aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request`, or `curl https://<bucket>.s3.amazonaws.com/`), GCS, Azure Blob containers; look for `*.tfstate` keys.
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- CI/CD leaks: build artifacts, exposed `.git` (`/.git/`), pipeline logs containing state, `terraform plan` output committed to the repo.
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- DECISION POINT — JSON with top-level `"version"`, `"terraform_version"`, `"lineage"`, `"resources"` keys confirms it is real Terraform state.
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### 2. Parse for secrets (read-only)
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- `jq '.outputs' state.json` — outputs often hold DB passwords, API keys, tokens (check `.sensitive` flag — sensitive ones are still plaintext in state).
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- `jq '.resources[].instances[].attributes' state.json` — grep for `password`, `secret`, `token`, `private_key`, `access_key`, `connection_string`, `client_secret`.
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- `jq '.resources[] | {type,name}' state.json` — topology: DBs, IAM roles, security groups, hostnames, private IPs.
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### 3. Confirm
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- PROOF = the retrieved state content with a REAL secret present (redact/truncate the value — show enough to prove it is a live credential, e.g. key prefix + length, not the full secret). Quote the JSON path (`.outputs.db_password.value`).
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- Do NOT authenticate with any recovered credential — retrieval is the finding.
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### 4. False positives / pitfalls
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- An empty state (`"resources": []`) or access-controlled backend (403/redirect to login) is NOT a finding.
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- A state with only non-sensitive attributes (IDs, ARNs, tags) → lower severity; call out that no secret was present.
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- A sample/example `.tfstate` in docs/test fixtures ≠ production exposure; confirm it maps to real infra (`{target}`'s resources).
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- `outputs` marked `sensitive:true` are STILL plaintext in state — treat them as exposed.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Recovered cloud keys / DB creds / API tokens → cloud account takeover, database access, lateral movement (handed off under separate authorization; not used here).
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- Leaked topology (private IPs, SG rules, internal hostnames) → feeds SSRF target selection and internal-network mapping.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Terraform State Exposure Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-200
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
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- Impact: Disclosure of infra secrets, keys, and resource topology
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- Remediation: Use protected remote backends, encrypt state, never serve state over HTTP, rotate leaked secrets
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a terraform-state specialist. Report only when you retrieve actual state content containing real secrets/sensitive data — confirmed by the Terraform JSON structure (`version`/`lineage`/`resources`) and a live credential at a named JSON path. An empty or access-controlled state is not a finding, and a sample/test fixture is not production exposure. Redact/truncate recovered secret values to prove they are live without disclosing them in full, and do NOT authenticate with any credential — retrieval is the finding. AUTHORIZED engagement.
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