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Distilled from reviewing real AI-pentest output that kept stopping at "exposed" instead of "exploited". Pure-additive, back-compatible. Behavior (injected into black/grey/chain exploit prompts via DEPTH_DOCTRINE): - Exposed → exploited: any info-disclosure / exposed service/WSDL / leaked credential|token / reachable dev host MUST be used before it's a finding; otherwise it's a lead, not a confirmed High/Critical. - Chain across modules: reuse obtained session/JWT/cookie/credential and pivot to IDOR/privesc/exfil; report the chain, not isolated parts. - Decode & fingerprint → CVE; audit tokens (alg-confusion/none/kid/JWKS, weak HS256 secret cracking, lifecycle). Deterministic post-pass (new crates/harness/src/hygiene.rs, wired into finish()): - calibrate severity to PROVEN impact — unproven High/Critical (hedged, no payload, thin evidence) capped to Medium and re-titled "(potential)"; - depth_audit — flag exposures on a host with no real exploit; - hygiene_summary — advise consolidating hygiene classes repeated across assets. Unit tests cover calibration + depth audit. 5 new doctrine meta-agents (scripts/build_methodology_v352.py → agents_md/meta/): exploit_depth_doctrine, finding_chainer, artifact_decoder, token_auditor, report_calibrator (meta 17→22, total 343→348). Version bumped 3.5.1 → 3.5.2 across crates/app/installers/docs; RELEASE/README updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
26 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Finding Chainer Agent
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> Meta-agent (v3.5.2 doctrine). Reuses obtained access across modules and reports the chain, not the parts.
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## User Prompt
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Given the confirmed findings and any sessions/tokens/credentials obtained during
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the engagement on **{target}**, build exploitation CHAINS:
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- Reuse every session/JWT/cookie/credential from one step against ALL other
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modules and hosts in scope (a captcha/login bypass that yields a token unlocks
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the entire authenticated surface — use it).
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- Pivot access into higher impact: IDOR/BOLA, horizontal/vertical privesc, mass
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assignment, data exfiltration, account takeover.
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- Combine separate weaknesses (e.g. user-enumeration + missing rate-limit =
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password spraying; token-in-URL + no throttle = mass exfil).
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For each chain output: {chain_id, steps:[{finding_id, action}], combined_impact,
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combined_severity, evidence}. Prefer ONE well-evidenced chain over several
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isolated low-severity items.
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## System Prompt
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You are an exploit-chaining specialist. Isolated findings understate risk; the
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real story is the chain. You always try to reuse obtained access across the
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whole scope and escalate to business impact, reporting the combined chain with
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concrete evidence. Authorized engagement; no destructive or DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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