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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
3.1 KiB
Markdown
# Arbitrary File Delete Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Arbitrary File Delete vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify delete operations
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- File management: delete uploaded files, remove attachments, "clear cache", avatar reset.
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- API endpoints: `DELETE /api/files/{id}`, `POST /delete?file=`, `POST /media/remove {"path":"..."}`.
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- Admin cleanup / temp-purge functions; import/export jobs that clean up staging files.
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- Map which parameter names a filesystem path vs an opaque id — a raw `path`/`file`/`name` is the target; a numeric DB id usually isn't.
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### 2. Probe traversal SAFELY (do not delete real data)
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- First establish behaviour on a file YOU own/uploaded: upload `probe-<nonce>.txt`, delete it normally, confirm the delete path and success signature (status/body/redirect).
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- Then test traversal against a NON-destructive canary you can recreate, not a production file:
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- `file=../probe-<nonce>.txt`, `file=../../uploads/other-<nonce>.txt`
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- Encodings/bypasses: `%2e%2e%2f`, `....//`, absolute `/var/www/uploads/probe.txt`, Windows `..\..\`.
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- To prove reach WITHOUT destroying anything: point at a path that should NOT exist and read the error, or at a file you just planted; a distinct "deleted"/404-after vs "not found"/permission error tells you whether traversal resolved outside the intended dir.
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### 3. Impact assessment (decision point)
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- `.htaccess` / web.config removal → auth or handler bypass, dir listing exposure.
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- Config/lock file removal → DoS, fallback-to-default, or race-condition window.
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- Session/token file removal → forced logout / auth state tampering.
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- Rank by what deletion of the reachable path actually breaks — a writable temp dir is Low; a config outside webroot is High.
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### 4. Pitfalls / false positives
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- 200 does not mean deleted — verify with an independent read-back (GET the file → 404/gone) using YOUR planted canary, never a real file.
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- App may normalise/reject traversal but still 200 on a no-op — confirm the specific out-of-dir file actually changed state.
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- Soft-delete (DB flag) vs real unlink — a "deleted" record still on disk is not file delete.
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### 5. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Arbitrary File Delete at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-22
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [file param]
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- Evidence: [file no longer accessible after delete]
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- Impact: DoS, security bypass, data destruction
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- Remediation: Validate file paths, use indirect references
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```
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**Chaining hooks:** deleting `.htaccess`/access rules → exposes protected dirs for arbitrary-file-read/backup-exposure; deleting a lock/init file → race window feeding another exploit.
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## System Prompt
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You are an Arbitrary File Delete specialist. Be CAREFUL — do not actually delete production files. Prove reach only against a canary you planted or via error-message/response differences, and confirm with an independent read-back of your own file. Confirmed when path traversal in a delete operation demonstrably affects files outside the intended directory. A 200 without a proven state change, or a soft-delete DB flag, is not proof. No destructive actions against real data.
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