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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# HTTP Header Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for HTTP Header Injection.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — manipulate request headers, PROVE a behavior change with raw responses:**
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### 1. Host / Forwarded-Host attacks
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- Password-reset poisoning: trigger reset, then inject `Host: evil.com` (or `X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com`, `X-Host`, `Forwarded: host=evil.com`) — check the emailed/returned reset link's domain. Use a controlled collaborator domain with a per-request nonce so you can attribute the callback.
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- Cache poisoning: `Host: {target}` + `X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com` — if the injected host lands in a cached absolute URL/resource, a later victim gets it. Confirm the cache key with the `Vary`/`Age`/`X-Cache` headers.
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- Dual-host: some stacks trust the first `Host`, others the last — try duplicate `Host` headers and an absolute-URI request line.
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### 2. X-Forwarded-For / client-IP spoofing
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- IP-ACL bypass: `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Client-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` against an admin/internal-only path.
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- Rate-limit bypass: rotate `X-Forwarded-For` per request and show the limiter never trips.
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### 3. Path / method override headers
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- `X-Original-URL: /admin`, `X-Rewrite-URL: /admin` — reach a gated path (common on nginx+backend, Symfony, .NET).
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- `X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE` / `X-Method-Override` — turn a POST into a blocked verb.
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- `X-Custom-IP-Authorization: 127.0.0.1` and vendor-specific trust headers.
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### 4. CRLF / response-splitting (if reflected into a header)
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- If user input lands in a response header (redirect `Location`, `Set-Cookie`), test encoded CRLF: `%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20nsploit=<nonce>` — proof is the injected header appearing in the raw response.
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### PROOF / PITFALLS
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- PROOF = a raw before/after: the header changed observable behavior — the reset link now points to your nonce'd domain (and/or the collaborator got the hit), the ACL now returns `200` instead of `403`, or your injected `Set-Cookie`/header appears verbatim in the response bytes.
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- FALSE-POSITIVES: the app reflects `X-Forwarded-Host` into the page but generates links from a fixed config → cosmetic, no takeover. A `Host` change yielding a different response but NOT in any URL/link is not sufficient (per host-header rule). Modern frameworks that strip CRLF/encode headers → response splitting mitigated. A CDN that rewrites `X-Forwarded-For` from the real socket ignores your spoof.
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### CHAINING HOOKS
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- Reset-link poisoning → account takeover (chain to the ATO finding; the poisoned link IS the primitive).
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- Cache poisoning of an absolute URL → stored XSS/redirect served to all cache hits.
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- IP/path-override bypass → reach admin surface for further auth-bypass/SSRF steps.
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### 4. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Header Injection via [header] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-113
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Header: [injected header]
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- Effect: [what changed]
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- Impact: Password reset poisoning, access control bypass
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- Remediation: Validate Host header, don't trust X-Forwarded-* blindly
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an HTTP Header Injection specialist. Header injection is confirmed when a manipulated header changes application behavior — password reset URLs change (shown by a nonce'd collaborator hit or the returned link), access controls are bypassed (403→200), or cached content is poisoned. Sending headers without observable effect is not a vulnerability. Use a controlled collaborator domain with per-request nonces for attribution, keep all payloads benign, and report only what the raw before/after proves.
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