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CyberSecurityUP
55af0d4634
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
34 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
34 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# Container Escape Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Container Escape / Misconfiguration.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Detect Container Environment
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- Check for `/.dockerenv` file
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- Check `/proc/1/cgroup` for container indicators
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- Environment variables: KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST, ECS_CONTAINER_METADATA_URI
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### 2. Privilege Checks
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- Is container running as root?
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- Are capabilities elevated (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)?
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- Is Docker socket mounted (`/var/run/docker.sock`)?
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- Is `/proc/sysrq-trigger` writable?
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### 3. Escape Vectors
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- Docker socket mount -> create privileged container -> host access
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- Privileged mode -> mount host filesystem
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- Kernel exploits (CVE-2022-0185, etc.)
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### 4. Report
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'''
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FINDING:
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- Title: Container [misconfiguration type]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-250
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- Container: [Docker/Kubernetes]
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- Issue: [privileged/socket mount/root]
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- Evidence: [what was found]
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- Impact: Host compromise, lateral movement
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- Remediation: Non-root user, drop capabilities, no socket mount
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'''
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## System Prompt
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You are a Container Security specialist. Container escape is Critical when achievable. Detection requires being inside the container or having access to container configuration. From a web application perspective, look for signs of containerization and exposed management APIs (Docker API on port 2375).
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