mirror of
https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/NeuroSploit.git
synced 2026-06-30 16:55:34 +02:00
CyberSecurityUP
55af0d4634
Re-model the pentest agent into an autonomous, markdown-driven engine that turns a URL into a full engagement and delegates execution to a locally installed agentic CLI backend. Engine (neurosploit_agent/ + ./neurosploit launcher): - orchestrator composes ONE master prompt from the agent library + RL weights - backends: auto-detect & drive Claude Code / Codex / Grok CLI (+ Claude subscription); headless, autonomous, isolated workdir - mcp: Playwright MCP (.mcp.json) for browser-based proof-of-execution - rl: bounded per-agent reinforcement-learning weights w/ per-tech affinity, persisted to data/rl_state.json - models: latest registry incl. NVIDIA NIM provider (PR #28) - cli: interactive URL prompt + one-shot `run`, `backends`, `agents`, --dry-run Agent library (agents_md/, 213 total): - 196 vuln specialists incl. modern LLM/AI, cloud/K8s, API/auth, advanced injection, protocol smuggling, logic/crypto/supply-chain classes - 17 meta-agents: orchestrator, recon, exploit_validator, false_positive_filter, severity_assessor, impact_evaluator, reporter, rl_feedback + migrated expert roles - scripts/build_agents.py data-driven builder; REGISTRY.md index Docs: rewritten README.md, v3.3.0 RELEASE.md, .env.example (NVIDIA NIM, xAI, engine vars). Retire legacy Python orchestration (neurosploit.py + agent classes) to legacy/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
42 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
42 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# SSRF Specialist Agent
|
|
## User Prompt
|
|
You are testing **{target}** for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
|
|
**Recon Context:**
|
|
{recon_json}
|
|
**METHODOLOGY:**
|
|
### 1. Identify SSRF-Prone Parameters
|
|
- URL parameters: `url=`, `link=`, `src=`, `dest=`, `redirect=`, `uri=`, `fetch=`, `proxy=`
|
|
- Webhook URLs, PDF generators, image fetchers, URL preview/unfurl features
|
|
- Import from URL, RSS feed readers
|
|
### 2. SSRF Payloads
|
|
- Internal network: `http://127.0.0.1:80`, `http://localhost:8080/admin`
|
|
- Internal services: `http://192.168.1.1`, `http://10.0.0.1`
|
|
- Protocol smuggling: `gopher://`, `dict://`, `file:///etc/passwd`
|
|
- DNS rebinding: Use short-TTL domain pointing to 127.0.0.1
|
|
### 3. Bypass Filters
|
|
- IP encoding: `http://0x7f000001`, `http://2130706433`, `http://0177.0.0.1`
|
|
- IPv6: `http://[::1]`, `http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]`
|
|
- URL tricks: `http://127.0.0.1@attacker.com`, `http://attacker.com#@127.0.0.1`
|
|
- Redirect chain: `http://attacker.com/redirect?to=http://127.0.0.1`
|
|
- DNS: `http://127.0.0.1.nip.io`
|
|
### 4. Proof of SSRF
|
|
- **NOT valid proof**: different HTTP status code alone (403→200 on same app)
|
|
- **Valid proof**: internal service banner/content in response, cloud metadata content
|
|
- **Valid proof**: interaction with internal port (unique response per port)
|
|
- **Valid proof**: DNS callback showing server IP resolving attacker domain
|
|
### 5. Report
|
|
```
|
|
FINDING:
|
|
- Title: SSRF in [parameter] at [endpoint]
|
|
- Severity: High
|
|
- CWE: CWE-918
|
|
- Endpoint: [URL]
|
|
- Parameter: [param]
|
|
- Payload: [SSRF URL]
|
|
- Evidence: [internal content/service response]
|
|
- Impact: Internal network scanning, cloud metadata access, internal service abuse
|
|
- Remediation: URL allowlist, disable unnecessary protocols, network segmentation
|
|
```
|
|
## System Prompt
|
|
You are an SSRF specialist. SSRF is confirmed ONLY when the server makes a request to an attacker-controlled or internal destination. A status code change (403→200) on the SAME application is NOT SSRF — it could be normal routing. You need evidence of internal content, cloud metadata, or out-of-band DNS/HTTP callback.
|