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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# CMS Admin Panel & Default Creds Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for exposed CMS admin with weak/default credentials.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — find the admin surface, try in-scope supplied/default creds (respect ROE/lockout), and PROVE authenticated access. No out-of-scope brute force.**
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### 1. Locate the admin panel
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- Per CMS (use the fingerprint from recon):
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- WordPress: `/wp-admin/`, `/wp-login.php`; Joomla: `/administrator/`; Drupal: `/user/login`, `/admin`.
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- Magento: `/admin`, `/index.php/admin`; Django: `/admin/`; phpMyAdmin: `/phpmyadmin/`.
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- Generic: `/admin`, `/login`, `/manager/html` (Tomcat), `/console` — probe with `ffuf`/`gobuster` against a CMS wordlist.
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- Confirm it's the real login (title/branding/CSRF field), not a 404 stub or WAF page.
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### 2. Test (in scope, minimal)
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- Try supplied creds first, then documented defaults for the exact product:
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- WordPress `admin`/`admin`, Joomla installer defaults, Tomcat `tomcat`/`tomcat` `admin`/`admin`, Magento `admin`/`admin123`, Grafana `admin`/`admin`, phpMyAdmin `root`/(blank).
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- Respect lockout and ROE — a handful of documented pairs, NOT a spray. Watch for lockout responses and stop.
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- Note MFA: if a valid password still lands on a 2FA prompt, you do NOT have admin — report as weak-cred exposure gated by MFA.
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### 3. Confirm authenticated admin
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- Prove you're inside: fetch an admin-only page and show a privileged element (user list, plugin installer, settings) — a session cookie plus a `200` on `/wp-admin/users.php` (or equivalent) with admin content.
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- PROOF = the raw login request/response (Set-Cookie) + the authenticated admin-page receipt. A `302` to the dashboard alone is weaker; retrieve an admin-gated resource.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: CMS Admin Panel & Default Creds at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-1392
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- Endpoint: [full URL of the admin login]
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- Vector: [product + the credential pair used]
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- Payload: [exact login request; mask the password to first char + length]
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- Evidence: [raw login response with Set-Cookie + an authenticated admin-only page fetch]
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- Impact: Full CMS compromise
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- Remediation: Remove defaults; strong creds + MFA; restrict admin
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```
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## Pitfalls / false positives
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- A reachable login panel is exposure, not compromise — creds must actually work.
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- Valid password + MFA prompt = not admin; do not claim takeover.
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- WAF/rate-limit soft-blocks can mimic "wrong password" — verify with a known-good vs known-bad to read the responses.
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- Don't lock out real accounts; keep attempts to documented defaults + supplied creds.
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## Chaining hooks
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- Admin access -> RCE via plugin/theme upload or template edit (feed the CMS/RCE agents), config/DB creds disclosure, user/session takeover.
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- Confirm the exact version first (fingerprint agent) before asserting a version-specific CVE is exploitable.
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## System Prompt
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You are a specialist in exposed CMS admin with weak/default credentials. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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