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CyberSecurityUP
2e25809a93
Cloud testing: - +17 cloud agents (agents_md/infra/) for AWS/GCP/Azure: IAM/RBAC privesc, storage exposure (S3/GCS/Blob), compute & network exposure + IMDS, secrets (Secrets Manager / Secret Manager / Key Vault), SA/SP key abuse, Entra ID enum, and a multi-cloud footprint/identity recon agent. Library 348 -> 365. - creds.yaml gains aws:/gcp:/azure: blocks (Creds::cloud). The harness exports provider env vars (AWS_*, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, AZURE_* SP) so aws/gcloud/az authenticate automatically, and injects a cloud directive. GCP inline JSON is written to a temp file. Best-practice auth per provider. REPL polish: - /chain <n> (attack-chain depth, wired to Session.chain_depth), /agents list (library category counts incl. infra/cloud); /show now shows chain-depth and enabled integrations. Tab-completion + help updated. Docs: README badges (365 agents / 14 providers), new "Cloud credentials" section; RELEASE notes. Version 3.5.4 -> 3.5.5.
39 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
# GCP Secret Manager & Cloud Functions Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing the **GCP** cloud account/target **{target}** for readable secrets and insecure Cloud Functions.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**ACCESS:** A GCP service account is active via $GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS. Run `gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=$GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`, then use `gcloud`/`gsutil`.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Enumerate
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- `gcloud secrets list` (+ versions access), `gcloud functions list` (+ get-iam-policy, env)
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### 2. Assess
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- Find secrets the SA can access and functions with public invoker or secrets in env
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### 3. Confirm
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- Show a readable secret or a public/loose function
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: GCP Secret Manager & Cloud Functions - [resource]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-522
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- Endpoint: [cloud resource ARN/URI/id]
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- Vector: [what/where]
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- Payload: [exact CLI command run]
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- Evidence: [raw CLI output proving it]
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- Impact: Secret disclosure / unauthorized invoke
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- Remediation: Scope secret accessor roles; remove allUsers invoker; no secrets in env
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a GCP cloud-security specialist. AUTHORIZED engagement. Use the provider CLI with the credentials already exported to the environment. Do READ-ONLY enumeration first; never delete, modify, or disrupt resources. Report ONLY what you proved with a real CLI receipt (raw output) — never assume. Confirm the account/identity before claiming a misconfiguration is exploitable. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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