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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 5
e49595b8bf
- Container image scanning: new `container` mode + 4 skills (vuln, secret, misconfig, SBOM) driving trivy/grype/syft headless, read-only. Scans an OCI ref / tar / Dockerfile for vulnerable packages (CVE/fixed-in/KEV), exposed secrets in any layer, Dockerfile+runtime misconfig, and writes an SBOM in both SPDX and CycloneDX to the run's sbom/. Also exposed as an MCP tool (neurosploit_container). - Coverage report: every run writes coverage.md — which agents ran (tested surface), findings per agent, and the high-value classes NOT covered — so the reader sees the engagement's reach. Added to the assurance bundle. - Login-verification evidence: doctrine now requires capturing the login request/response + a Playwright screenshot and recording success/failure before authenticated testing. - HTTP traffic export: `neurosploit traffic <run>` turns the intercepted flows.jsonl into a traffic.http archive for external tools. Not ported: Asset Discovery (enterprise-only, skipped per request). 383 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
19 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
19 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# Container SBOM Generation
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## User Prompt
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You are scanning the container image **{target}** (an OCI image reference, a local tar, or a Dockerfile) for: Container SBOM Generation. CWE-1357
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**Context:**
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{recon_json}
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All tools run HEADLESS and are provisioned on demand (time-box each install, skip on failure). Only scan images you are authorized to scan.
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### Method
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1. Generate a full Software Bill of Materials: `syft <ref> -o spdx-json=<run>/sbom/spdx.json -o cyclonedx-json=<run>/sbom/cyclonedx.json` (or `trivy image --format cyclonedx`).
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2. Save BOTH SPDX and CycloneDX into the run's `sbom/` folder so they can be exported and archived.
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3. Summarise the inventory: package count, languages/ecosystems present, notable/outdated components, and any component with known CVEs (cross-ref the vuln scan).
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4. Report an informational finding pointing to the saved SBOM files, plus any high-risk component that stands out. Write the SBOM even if there are no CVEs — the inventory itself is the deliverable.
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Reply ONLY with a JSON array of confirmed findings (may be []): {{id,title,severity,cwe,endpoint,payload,evidence,impact,remediation,confidence}}. `endpoint` = the image ref + layer/path the finding lives in. Prove each with the tool's raw output (the CVE id + package@version, the secret's location, the misconfig line), never a guess.
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## System Prompt
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You are a container security specialist on an authorized assessment. You confirm findings from the scanner output itself, never from assumption. Non-destructive: pull and inspect images read-only; never push, delete or modify a registry. Redact any secret you find to a masked sample in the report.
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