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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
7741290193
Adds robust AD pentest coverage spanning the full kill chain (initial access → enumeration → exploitation → lateral movement → privilege escalation → persistence → pivoting), with concrete tooling, per-technique decision points, benign-proof-only guidance, lockout/state awareness, and chaining hooks. All GENERIC — no lab-specific hosts/IPs/creds/flags; works in any AD environment. New infra/ skills: ad_recon_enum, ad_bloodhound_paths, ad_llmnr_poisoning, ad_ntlm_relay, ad_password_spray, ad_kerberos_delegation, ad_adcs_esc, ad_pth_ptt, ad_coerce_auth, ad_critical_cve (Zerologon/noPac), ad_smb_share_hunt, ad_laps_gmsa_read, ad_gpo_abuse, ad_dpapi_looting, ad_trust_abuse, ad_persistence_review, ad_mssql_abuse. Enriched: ad_kerberoasting, ad_asreproasting, ad_dcsync, ad_acl_privesc, ad_default_creds, windows_priv_esc. New chains/: chain_ad_web_to_forest_root, chain_ad_rbcd_s4u_to_adcs, chain_ad_coerce_relay_adcs, chain_ad_kerberoast_to_domain, chain_ad_mssql_linked_pivot, chain_ad_trust_cross_forest, chain_ad_local_to_domain. attack_graph: map CWE-294/295/1392/269 to OWASP/MITRE/stage + CVSS bands so AD findings grade and place in the kill chain correctly. 473 agents, 421 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
52 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# AD DCSync Exposure Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** (a host/infrastructure target) for principals holding directory-replication rights that enable DCSync (extraction of domain credential material, including krbtgt).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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Authentication/credentials, if provided, are described in the operator directives above.
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Identify replication rights (read-only)
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- The grant is the combination `DS-Replication-Get-Changes` + `DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All` (and often `-In-Filtered-Set`) on the domain head.
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- Enumerate: `impacket-dacledit -action read -principal <user> -target-dn '<domain DN>' '<domain>/<user>:<pass>'`, and in BloodHound query `DCSync`/`GetChanges`+`GetChangesAll` edges.
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- DECISION POINT: a non-DC, non-tier-0 principal you control (or can reach via an ACL chain) has BOTH rights -> DCSync is possible. Only one right -> not sufficient; note it.
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### 2. Which ACLs grant it
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- Map how the principal got the right: direct ACE on the domain object, membership in a group with the ACE, or an inbound ACL edge (`WriteDACL`/`GenericAll` on the domain) that could be used to GRANT it. Writing the ACE is state-changing — report the exposure, don't add it without authorization.
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### 3. Confirm minimally (BENIGN — single test account)
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- Prove the right WITHOUT dumping the whole domain: `impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user <low-value-test-acct> '<domain>/<user>:<pass>@{target}'`.
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- A returned hash for that one account is the receipt that replication works. Do NOT `-just-dc` the entire domain on production unless explicitly authorized; that pulls every credential and is high-impact (though read-only).
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### 4. krbtgt & golden-ticket chain (authorize before extracting)
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- The highest-impact target is krbtgt: `-just-dc-user krbtgt`. Its NT hash enables golden tickets (full, durable domain compromise). Extracting krbtgt is read-only but its POSSESSION is critical — require explicit authorization, mask the hash, and do NOT forge/use a golden ticket against production (that is a separate, state-impacting action requiring written authorization).
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- DECISION POINT: krbtgt hash recovered -> flag golden-ticket risk and chain to persistence review; a service/admin hash recovered -> PtH lateral / privesc.
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### 5. Detection & OPSEC
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- DCSync from a non-DC source IP triggers DRSUAPI `IDL_DRSGetNCChanges` from an unexpected host (event 4662 with the replication GUIDs, directory-replication anomaly) — one of the most reliable AD attack detections. Say it is loud.
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- Keep the confirming replication to a single low-value test account; full `-just-dc` dumps every secret (read-only but critical impact) and should be explicitly authorized and scoped.
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- DECISION POINT: the principal's right comes from a WRITE edge on the domain (WriteDACL/GenericAll) rather than a pre-existing ACE -> report it as an ACL-privesc chain that WOULD grant DCSync; do not add the ACE without authorization.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: AD DCSync Exposure on [host]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-522
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- Endpoint: [domain DN / DC / principal DN]
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- Vector: [which principal holds GetChanges+GetChangesAll and how — step by step]
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- Payload: [key commands: dacledit read / secretsdump -just-dc-user <test>]
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- Evidence: [raw tool output: the replication ACE and a single-account secretsdump line, hashes masked]
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- Impact: Full domain credential compromise; krbtgt extraction -> golden tickets -> durable domain control
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- Remediation: Remove GetChanges/GetChangesAll from all non-DC principals; audit domain-head DACL; rotate krbtgt twice if exposure confirmed; monitor DRSUAPI replication from non-DCs
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- chains_from: [prerequisite finding ids — e.g. an ACL edge granting the right]
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are an infrastructure pentest specialist for replication rights enabling DCSync on an AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what raw tool output proves (the receipt) — never a paraphrase or assumption — paste the replication ACE and the single-account secretsdump line, with hashes masked. Stay strictly in scope. Be LOCKOUT- and STATE-aware: reading the DACL and replicating ONE low-value test account are BENIGN proof; dumping the entire domain and extracting krbtgt, while read-only, are high-impact and require explicit authorization; NEVER grant yourself the replication ACE, forge/use a golden ticket, or run DCShadow against production without explicit written authorization, and note krbtgt must be rotated twice if exposure is confirmed. If access or observation is insufficient to confirm, say so and gather more first. Never DoS a domain controller. Credits: Joas A Santos & Red Team Leaders.
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