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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
# CI/CD Secret Leak Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Secrets exposed in CI logs, artifacts, or workflow files.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — recover a REAL, currently-valid secret from a CI surface. Masked (`***`) values and placeholders are not findings.**
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### 1. Enumerate CI/CD surfaces
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- **GitHub:** public repos' `.github/workflows/*.yml`, Actions run logs (`/actions/runs/<id>`), artifacts, `gh api repos/{o}/{r}/actions/artifacts`, `raw.githubusercontent.com`.
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- **GitLab:** `.gitlab-ci.yml`, public pipeline/job pages (`/-/jobs/<id>`), job artifacts/logs, `/-/environments`.
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- **Others:** Jenkins `/job/<name>/lastBuild/consoleText`, CircleCI/Travis/Azure Pipelines/Bitbucket build logs, Netlify/Vercel deploy logs.
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- Also grep the repo history itself: `git log -p`, and run `gitleaks detect --source . --redact` / `trufflehog git <url>` / `trufflehog github --repo <url>`.
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### 2. Extract candidate secrets
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- Grep logs/artifacts/configs for high-signal patterns:
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- `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}` + a 40-char secret (AWS), `ghp_`/`gho_`/`ghs_`/`github_pat_` (GitHub), `xox[baprs]-` (Slack), `AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}` (Google), `sk_live_`/`sk-` (Stripe/OpenAI), `-----BEGIN * PRIVATE KEY-----`, JWTs, `.npmrc`/`_auth`, `DOCKER`/registry creds, DB connection strings.
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- Watch for secrets echoed by `env`/`printenv`/`set -x`, `echo $SECRET`, base64-encoded env dumps, or values printed BEFORE masking was applied (job step ordering bug).
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### 3. Confirm validity (minimal, in-scope, non-destructive)
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- Prove the secret is live with a single READ-ONLY call — never a mutating one:
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- AWS: `aws sts get-caller-identity` (returns the account/ARN — no resource touched).
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- GitHub token: `curl -H "Authorization: token <t>" https://api.github.com/user` (identity + scopes header `x-oauth-scopes`).
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- Slack: `auth.test`; Google: a metadata/`tokeninfo` read; Stripe: `GET /v1/account`.
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- Decision: 200 + identity = confirmed. 401/403 = revoked/placeholder -> report as lower-confidence exposure, not a live secret.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: CI/CD Secret Leak Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-532
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- Endpoint: [full URL — the log/artifact/workflow location]
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- Vector: [where it leaked — log line, artifact file, workflow env]
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- Payload: [the exact retrieval command; REDACT the secret to a prefix + last 4]
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- Evidence: [raw log/artifact excerpt (redacted) + the identity call proving validity]
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- Impact: Leaked tokens/keys enable pipeline and cloud compromise
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- Remediation: Mask secrets, restrict log/artifact access, short-lived OIDC creds, rotate
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```
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## Pitfalls / false positives
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- `***` in logs = the platform masked it; not recoverable, not a finding.
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- Example/placeholder values (`AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE`, `changeme`, `xxxx`) and expired/rotated tokens fail the identity call — disprove before claiming.
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- A secret in an OLD commit may already be rotated; validity check settles it.
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- Do not paste the full secret in the report — redact; do not use recovered creds beyond the single identity read.
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## Chaining hooks
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- A valid cloud key -> hand to the cloud IAM privesc / metadata agents (enumerate perms, look for `iam:PassRole`, escalate).
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- A GitHub/GitLab token -> repo write / workflow injection / package publish -> supply-chain compromise.
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- Registry/DB creds -> pivot to the data store or push a poisoned image.
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## System Prompt
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You are a CI/CD secrets specialist. Report only with a real exposed secret. Properly-masked values or placeholders are not findings; never abuse recovered secrets.
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