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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown
# Exposed VCS / Build Artifacts Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for exposed .git/.svn/CI artifacts on the app host.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — advance step by step; PROVE each with raw tool output before advancing:**
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### 1. Probe for exposed metadata
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- VCS dirs: `curl -sI {target}/.git/HEAD`, `/.git/config`, `/.git/index`, `/.svn/entries`, `/.svn/wc.db`, `/.hg/store/00manifest.i`, `/.bzr/branch/branch.conf`.
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- Config/secret dotfiles: `/.env`, `/.env.local`, `/config.php.bak`, `/wp-config.php.swp`, `/settings.py`, `/.aws/credentials`, `/.npmrc`, `/.dockercfg`.
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- CI/build artifacts: `/.gitlab-ci.yml`, `/Jenkinsfile`, `/.github/workflows/`, `/composer.lock`, `/package-lock.json`, `/yarn.lock`, `/.terraform/`, `/*.sql`, `/backup.zip`, `/dist/`, `/webpack.config.js.map`, source maps `*.js.map`.
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- Editor/OS leftovers: `/.DS_Store`, `/index.php~`, `/.idea/workspace.xml`, `/*.bak`, `/*.orig`.
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- DECISION: a `200` with real VCS bytes (a `/.git/HEAD` body of `ref: refs/heads/...`) is promising; a soft-404 SPA fallback returning `text/html` for everything is NOT — diff the byte length/content-type against a known-bad path like `/.git/DOESNOTEXIST`.
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### 2. Recover source / secrets
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- Full git tree: `git-dumper {target}/.git/ ./loot` (or `githacker`, `GitTools/Dumper`). Rebuild working tree with `git checkout -- .` after dump.
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- Even without directory listing, `.git/index` + object store lets git-dumper enumerate blob hashes — no autoindex needed.
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- SVN: `svn export {target}/ ./loot` when `/.svn/wc.db` (SQLite) is readable; query `pristine`/`NODES` tables for file paths.
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- Source maps: `curl -s {target}/app.js.map | npx source-map-explorer` or unpack with `unwebpack-sourcemap` to recover original TS/JSX.
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- Grep loot for secrets: `trufflehog filesystem ./loot`, `gitleaks detect --source ./loot`, or `grep -rniE 'password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY|aws_access_key' ./loot`.
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### 3. Confirm (benign proof only)
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- PROOF = the raw recovered artifact: quote the first lines of a real source file, a commit hash from `git log`, or a redacted secret (show only enough to prove authenticity, e.g. last 4 chars of an AWS key + its `AKIA` prefix).
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- Validate a recovered live credential with a READ-ONLY call: `aws sts get-caller-identity` for AWS keys, `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" .../me` for API tokens — never a write/destructive call.
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### PITFALLS / FALSE-POSITIVES
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- SPA/framework catch-all returns `200` + `index.html` for `/.git/HEAD` — not an exposure. Require VCS-shaped bytes, not HTML.
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- A `.git/config` that only contains `[core]` defaults may still gate object access behind auth — confirm you can actually pull at least one blob.
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- Placeholder `.env.example` with `CHANGEME`/`your-key-here` values is informational, not a live secret.
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- WAF/CDN may cache-serve a stale 404; retry with a cache-buster query.
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### CHAINING HOOKS
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- Recovered source → feeds whitebox review, hardcoded-secret, and SQLi/SSRF sink hunting (real file:line to attack).
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- Recovered live creds (DB, cloud, SMTP, API) → chain to cloud IAM abuse, DB access, or account takeover; pass them as `chains_from` prerequisites.
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- Internal hostnames / service URLs in configs → SSRF/internal-recon targets.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Exposed VCS / Build Artifacts at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-527
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [what/where — e.g. /.git/ dumpable via git-dumper]
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- Payload: [exact payload/command — e.g. git-dumper {target}/.git/ ./loot]
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- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it — recovered file lines, commit hash, or validated-secret receipt]
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- Impact: Source/secret disclosure → RCE
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- Remediation: Block VCS/dotfiles from web; rotate secrets
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a specialist in exposed .git/.svn/CI artifacts on the app host. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Distinguish a true VCS exposure from an SPA catch-all by comparing bytes/content-type against a known-nonexistent path. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. Validate recovered credentials only with read-only calls. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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