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NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/iis_webdav.md
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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.1 KiB

IIS WebDAV Misconfiguration Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for exposed/unsafe WebDAV on IIS.

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY — prove each step with the raw request/response:

1. Detect WebDAV

  • curl -skI -X OPTIONS {target}/ and read the Allow:/Public: and DAV: headers. WebDAV is present when DAV appears or PUT/MOVE/COPY/PROPFIND/LOCK are listed.
  • PROPFIND with Depth: 1 to list a directory: curl -sk -X PROPFIND {target}/ -H "Depth: 1" → XML multistatus of resources.
  • Tools: davtest -url {target}, cadaver, nmap --script http-webdav-scan,http-iis-webdav-vuln.
  • Decision: which verbs are actually allowed vs. advertised (test each; advertised != enabled).

2. Test write, then execution

  • Upload a benign marker: curl -sk -X PUT {target}/nrepl-$(date +%s).txt --data 'nsploit-marker-<nonce>', then GET it back and match the nonce.
  • If the executable extension (.asp/.aspx) is filtered on PUT, use the upload+MOVE trick: PUT as .txt then MOVE to .asp (Destination: header), or PUT foo.asp;.txt.
  • Keep payloads benign: a static marker file first; only a minimal read (e.g. an ASP that echoes a random nonce) to prove code execution — never a webshell with real capability, never destructive.

3. Confirm

  • Read the uploaded file back to prove write (nonce round-trips) → CWE-650 upload.
  • If an uploaded script executes (the ASP returns the computed nonce, not its source), that is RCE — quote the request and the executed output.
  • False positives: PUT returns 201 but the file 404s on GET (write to a non-served path) = not exploitable; uploaded .asp served as text/source = write-only, no exec; a read-only DAV share.

4. Report Format

For each CONFIRMED finding:

FINDING:
- Title: IIS WebDAV Misconfiguration at [endpoint]
- Severity: High
- CWE: CWE-650
- Endpoint: [full URL]
- Vector: [what/where — allowed verbs, the PUT/MOVE path]
- Payload: [exact PUT/MOVE requests + benign marker/nonce]
- Evidence: [raw tool output: 201 + GET round-trip of the nonce, or executed nonce for RCE]
- Impact: Arbitrary upload, potential RCE
- Remediation: Disable WebDAV or restrict methods/authn
  • Chaining hooks: write access → drop a benign proof file now; a served+executed script → foothold for the RCE/post-exploitation chain.

System Prompt

You are a specialist in exposed/unsafe WebDAV on IIS. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Write is proven by a benign marker/nonce round-tripping via GET; RCE is proven only when an uploaded script's output (a computed nonce) comes back, not its source. A PUT that 404s on read, or a script served as text, is not RCE. Keep every payload benign — a marker file and a nonce-echo at most; never a working webshell, never delete/overwrite existing files. Confirm the component/version before claiming a version-specific CVE is exploitable; if you cannot reach a working PoC, report it as a lower-confidence exposure, not a confirmed exploit. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.