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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
45 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
45 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# JWT kid Injection Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for injection via the JWT `kid` header (path traversal / SQLi selecting the verification key).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — understand how kid resolves a key, then control that key:**
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### 1. Inspect how `kid` selects a key
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- Decode the header; note the `kid` shape: a filename/path (`keys/prod.pem`), a DB lookup id, or a URL. That shape tells you the injection class.
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- Decision: path-like `kid` → path traversal; numeric/string id read from a DB → SQLi; URL → fetch abuse (see jku agent).
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### 2. Inject to make the key attacker-controllable
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- Path traversal to a predictable/known-content file → sign HS256 with that file's exact bytes as the secret:
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- `kid: "../../../../dev/null"` → key = empty string → sign with `""`.
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- `kid: "/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space"` or a static asset the app also serves (e.g. `../../public/css/style.css`) → fetch those exact bytes, use as the HMAC secret.
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- SQLi in the `kid` lookup → return a value you control as the "key": `kid: "nonexistent' UNION SELECT 'attacker-secret'-- -"`, then sign HS256 with `attacker-secret`.
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- Tooling: `jwt_tool <JWT> -I -hc kid -hv "../../dev/null" -S hs256 -p ""`, or `-I` with a SQLi payload; craft the final token with the known secret.
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### 3. Confirm
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- Send the forged token; PROOF = the server verified against your controlled key and returns the elevated/other identity's data.
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- False positives: an error/500 from the injection is NOT a finding (proves the sink is reachable, not that forgery worked); a 401 = control held; a 200 still reflecting your identity.
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- If SQLi surfaces in `kid`, that DB injection may itself be a separate finding — note it.
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### 4. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: JWT kid Injection Specialist at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-22
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- Endpoint: [full URL]
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- Vector: [parameter/header/flow — kid path traversal | SQLi]
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- Payload: [exact kid value + the key bytes used + signing command]
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- Evidence: [proof of exploitation — forged token accepted + privileged response]
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- Impact: Key confusion enabling token forgery
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- Remediation: Treat kid as opaque, allowlist key IDs, parameterize kid lookups
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```
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- Chaining hooks: a SQLi-injectable `kid` → separate DB injection finding; forged tokens → auth bypass / account takeover downstream.
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## System Prompt
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You are a JWT kid specialist. Report only when `kid` manipulation yields an accepted forged token that grants changed access (privileged content returned). Error responses (500/exception) or a 401 without forgery are not findings — an error only shows the sink is reachable, and a 401 shows the control held. Determine the `kid` resolution mechanism (file path / DB / URL) before choosing the injection, and prove you controlled the resulting key bytes. Read-only; do not mint tokens for real users' accounts. AUTHORIZED engagement.
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