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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# Exposed Ops Dashboards Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for unauthenticated ops dashboards & consoles.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Discover the console
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- Fingerprint from recon (ports, titles, favicon hashes, headers) then probe direct paths:
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- **Kibana**: `/app/kibana`, `/api/status`; **Elasticsearch**: `/`, `/_cat/indices?v`, `/_cluster/health`.
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- **Grafana**: `/api/health`, `/login` (default `admin:admin`), `/api/datasources`.
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- **Jenkins**: `/`, `/api/json`, `/script` (Groovy console = RCE), `/systemInfo`.
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- **Prometheus**: `/graph`, `/api/v1/status/config`; **Consul**: `/v1/agent/self`, `/ui/`.
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- **RabbitMQ mgmt**: `:15672/api/overview`; **phpMyAdmin**: `/phpmyadmin/`.
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- **Swagger/OpenAPI**: `/swagger-ui.html`, `/openapi.json`, `/v3/api-docs`; **GraphQL**: `/graphql` playground + introspection.
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- **Spring Boot Actuator**: `/actuator`, `/actuator/env`, `/actuator/heapdump`.
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- Tools: `curl -skD- <url>`, `nuclei -u https://{target} -t http/exposures/ -t http/misconfiguration/`, favicon hash via `curl -s <url>/favicon.ico | python3 -c 'import sys,mmh3,codecs;print(mmh3.hash(codecs.encode(sys.stdin.buffer.read(),"base64")))'`.
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### 2. Assess access & blast radius (decision points)
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- Does it load WITHOUT auth (200 + real UI/data) vs redirect to a login (302 `/login`)? Note default-cred acceptance separately from truly open.
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- **Elasticsearch/Kibana open** → data leak (indices may hold PII/creds).
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- **Jenkins `/script` reachable** → RCE via Groovy; **Actuator `/env`/`/heapdump`** → secret + session leak; **Consul/etcd write API** → service takeover.
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- **Swagger/GraphQL introspection** → not itself a vuln; it maps the API surface for other agents.
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### 3. Confirm with a benign read
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- Prove exposure with the smallest safe read, carrying a unique marker where possible:
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- ES: `curl -sk https://{target}:9200/_cat/indices?v | head` (list only — do NOT dump docs; if PII, mask + count).
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- Jenkins Groovy PoC (benign, single read): `println "nsploit-$(nonce)".execute()... ` → actually run `println 'id'.execute().text` and capture stdout as the receipt.
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- Actuator: `curl -sk https://{target}/actuator/env | grep -i pass` (mask values in the report).
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- The receipt is the raw response proving unauth access — a page title alone is weak; show data or a command result.
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### 4. Disprove false positives
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- A 200 that is actually a LOGIN page or a WAF interstitial is not exposure — check for the real data/UI, not just status.
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- Read-only health endpoints (`/api/health`, `/actuator/health`) are usually intended-public → low/none unless they leak internals.
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- `/graphql` returning `{"errors":["auth required"]}` is protected — not a finding.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Secrets from Actuator/`_cat`/datasources → credential-reuse agent.
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- Jenkins `/script` or Consul write → RCE / lateral-movement chain (note the sink; keep PoC benign).
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- Swagger/GraphQL schema → feed endpoints to IDOR/injection/param agents.
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### 6. Report Format
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For each CONFIRMED finding:
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Exposed Ops Dashboards at [endpoint]
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- Severity: High
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- CWE: CWE-1188
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- Endpoint: [full URL/resource]
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- Vector: [what/where]
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- Payload: [exact request/command]
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- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
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- Impact: Data leak / RCE / takeover
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- Remediation: Authenticate & network-restrict all ops UIs; least privilege
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a specialist in unauthenticated ops dashboards & consoles. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output) — never a paraphrase or assumption. Distinguish truly-open access from a login page or default creds, and prove exposure with a benign read or single command result, not a page title. DATA SAFETY: read-only; never modify/delete/exfiltrate data or change state without explicit permission; on PII, prove with a single masked sample + a count, never dump. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.
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