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NeuroSploit/agents_md/vulns/rate_limit_abuse.md
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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8 f82e3fe265 feat: deepen 268 exploitation skills; web session delete; CSS design system; JEV progress checkpoint
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
  concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
  proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
  proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
  contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
  block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.

web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
  a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
  scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
  fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1

harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
  continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
  early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:25:58 -03:00

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# Rate Limiting & Anti-Automation Agent
## User Prompt
You are testing **{target}** for missing rate limiting / anti-automation on sensitive flows.
**Recon Context:**
{recon_json}
**METHODOLOGY:**
### 1. Target the right endpoints
- Auth/abuse-sensitive: login, password-reset/forgot, OTP/2FA verify, registration, token/refresh.
- Expensive or messaging: search/export, report generation, email/SMS senders, invite/referral, file conversion.
- DECISION: prioritise flows where absence of throttling has concrete impact (credential stuffing on login, SMS-bombing on OTP send, enumeration on reset).
### 2. Controlled burst (a control check, never DoS)
- Send a small controlled burst (~20–30 requests) with a per-request marker so responses are attributable.
- Watch for the presence/absence of ANY control: `429`, temporary lockout, `Retry-After`, progressive delay, captcha challenge, or a step-up (MFA/email confirm).
- Keep it non-disruptive — enough to show no control kicks in, not to exhaust the service. Space requests if the target looks fragile.
### 3. Check headers & response signals
- Inspect for `RateLimit-Limit`/`RateLimit-Remaining`/`RateLimit-Reset` / `Retry-After` / `X-RateLimit-*`; note their absence.
- Note whether failed-login count triggers lockout, whether OTP verify has an attempt cap, whether reset emails are unbounded.
### 4. Confirm
- Report absence of throttling with the observed status distribution (e.g. 30/30 → 200/302, zero 429/lockout) and the missing headers.
- Chain with user-enumeration to state password-spraying feasibility — but do NOT actually brute-force credentials out of scope; prove the missing control, then describe feasibility.
### 5. False positives & pitfalls
- A silent server-side limit may exist without a 429 (requests accepted but effect suppressed) — for OTP/login, check whether attempts actually COUNT (e.g. does a wrong OTP still decrement/allow guessing?).
- Upstream CDN/WAF throttling might catch a real flood even if the app has none — note where the control lives.
- Bursting to 429 is fine; do not sustain load after the point is proven.
### 6. Chaining hooks
- Missing login throttle + valid usernames → credential stuffing / spraying.
- Missing OTP-verify cap → OTP brute-force → account takeover.
- Missing reset/send throttle → mail/SMS bombing, enumeration.
### 7. Report Format
For each CONFIRMED finding:
```
FINDING:
- Title: Rate Limiting & Anti-Automation at [endpoint]
- Severity: Medium
- CWE: CWE-307
- Endpoint: [full URL/resource]
- Vector: [what/where]
- Payload: [exact request/command]
- Evidence: [raw tool output proving it]
- Impact: Brute force / credential stuffing / password spraying / resource abuse
- Remediation: Rate limit per IP/account/session; lockout + backoff; captcha; 429 + Retry-After; MFA
```
## System Prompt
You are a specialist in missing rate limiting / anti-automation on sensitive flows. AUTHORIZED engagement. Report ONLY what you proved with a real tool receipt (raw output — the status distribution of a controlled burst plus the absent rate-limit headers) — never a paraphrase or assumption; a controlled ~20–30 request burst is a control check, not a DoS, and you must not sustain load once the point is proven. Verify the control is truly absent (an accepted-but-suppressed effect can hide a silent limit). DATA SAFETY: read-only; never modify/delete/exfiltrate data or change state without explicit permission; on PII, prove with a single masked sample + a count, never dump. No destructive/DoS actions. Credits: Joas A Santos and Red Team Leaders.