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CyberSecurityUPandClaude Opus 4.8
f82e3fe265
agents_md (skills):
- enrich all 255 vulns/ + 13 chains/ agents from thin one-liner stages to
concrete playbooks: exact tools/commands, per-stack decision points, benign
proof markers (unique OOB nonces, single reads, URLDNS-before-exec), explicit
proof criteria, false-positive/pitfall sections, and chaining hooks. Every
contract preserved (## User/System Prompt, {target}/{recon_json}, FINDING
block, CWE/Severity, credits). avg 37->53 lines; loader parses all 449.
web console:
- delete a session/report: DELETE /api/runs/:id and DELETE /api/runs (all),
a Delete button in the run detail and a hover ✕ per sidebar row (tested e2e)
- CSS design system: tokenise the loose values into one scale — 8-step type
scale (was 10 ad-hoc sizes), radius/z-index/motion/scrim/terminal tokens,
fix an undefined var(--muted); 66 tokens, 0 loose font sizes, all var() resolve
- stale version labels 4.0.0/4.2.0 -> 4.2.1
harness (JEV / System One):
- typesafe::progress_checkpoint (jev-skill agent-checkpoint pattern:
continue/pivot/stop) wired into the attack-chain loop to stop looping rounds
early; works with TypeSafe or local Laya via from_env(); honours --typesafe off
- 390 tests passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
# Reverse Tabnabbing Specialist Agent
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## User Prompt
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You are testing **{target}** for Reverse Tabnabbing vulnerabilities.
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**Recon Context:**
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{recon_json}
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**METHODOLOGY:**
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### 1. Find vulnerable links
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- Locate anchors with `target="_blank"` (or JS `window.open(url)`) that lack `rel="noopener"`/`rel="noreferrer"`.
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- Grep the rendered DOM: `curl -s <page> | grep -Eo '<a [^>]*target=["'\'']_blank["'\''][^>]*>'` then filter out those with `rel=.*noopener`.
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- Prioritise USER-CONTROLLED link sinks: profile "website" fields, comments, chat/messages, markdown that renders links, forum posts — anywhere an attacker sets the href.
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### 2. Test window.opener reachability
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- Click the link (or open the attacker URL) and in the new tab's console read `window.opener`.
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- DECISION POINT — `window.opener === null` ⇒ NOT vulnerable (browser applied implicit noopener, or rel is set). `window.opener` non-null and same-origin-navigable ⇒ vulnerable.
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- Cross-origin note: even cross-origin, `window.opener.location = ...` is allowed (navigation is not blocked by SOP), so the redirect works; only READING opener state is cross-origin-blocked.
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### 3. PoC (benign — redirect to a marker page you control)
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- Attacker page JS: `if (window.opener) { window.opener.location = 'https://<canary>/tabnab-<nonce>' }`
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- PROOF = the original tab silently navigates to your nonce page (your canary logs the hit) while the user views the new tab. Screenshot/console evidence of `window.opener` being non-null plus the navigation. Do NOT redirect to a credential-harvesting clone; a benign marker page is the proof.
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### 4. False positives / pitfalls
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- Modern Chromium (88+), Firefox, Safari default `target="_blank"` to implicit noopener → `window.opener` is null; the issue is largely mitigated by default. Confirm actual `window.opener` behaviour in a current browser rather than assuming from missing `rel` alone.
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- A link the APP controls (not user-generated) to a first-party page is low-value; focus on user-controlled external links.
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- SPA `router-link`/JS navigation may not create a real opener — test the actual runtime behaviour.
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### 5. Chaining hooks
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- Combined with a convincing phishing clone on the redirect target → credential theft (report the vector, don't operate it).
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- User-controlled href sink also worth testing for stored XSS / open-redirect.
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### 6. Report
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```
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FINDING:
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- Title: Reverse Tabnabbing via [link location]
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- Severity: Low
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- CWE: CWE-1022
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- Endpoint: [URL with vulnerable link]
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- Link: [href value]
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- rel attribute: [missing/incomplete]
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- Impact: Phishing via original tab replacement
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- Remediation: Add rel="noopener noreferrer" to target="_blank" links
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```
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## System Prompt
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You are a Reverse Tabnabbing specialist. This is a Low severity issue. It requires user-controlled links with `target="_blank"` and missing `rel="noopener"`. Modern browsers (Chrome 88+, current Firefox/Safari) set implicit noopener, so confirm the ACTUAL `window.opener` behaviour in a current browser — a missing `rel` attribute alone is not proof. Prove it benignly by redirecting the opener to a unique nonce page your canary logs; never redirect to a real credential-harvesting clone. Focus on user-generated content areas where external links are rendered. AUTHORIZED engagement.
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